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fROST BITE. & TRENCH FOOT

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES
%of
% of
N.B.C. Tot Cas
Ret' d to duty w/ o lv. Ili.v. 52.0
33.9
Evacuated
48.0
31.4
Total Non-Battle Cas.
100.0
65.3
Total Battle & Non-Battle Cas.
100.
Total Battle Casualties Evacuated
Total Non-Battle Casualties Evacuated
Total Casualties Evacuated
Ret' d to duty from Casualty Status
as Reinforcements
Net Loss to Div.

5559
5137
10696
16400
5188
5137
10325
3353
6972

BATTLE CASUALTIES

TOTAL CASE:S - 1006

BATTLE CASUALTIES
% of
% of
B. C.
Tot Cas
3.1
Ret'd to duty w/ o lv. Div. 9.0
91.0
31.6
Evacuated
Total Battle Casualties 100.0
34.7

516
5188
5704

KA .. .... . ..... . . .
DOW ... .. . . .. .. ..
DOl .. ... . . . ......
SWA . .. ... ... . ... .
SIA . .. . . .. .. ... ...
LWA .. .. ... . .. . ...
LIA . . .. .. .. .... ...
MIA . ..... . .. . ... .
Totals . . . . . .. . .

COMBAT CASUALTIES
J l :tTl! 4Rir!ORED 0/V/S!ON PERSONNEL

18 t.ll/LY- 17 .J'EPT.
BRITTANY

/8 JEPT- 7 NOV:
U'EILLE
B;VOJ/. -ZJ/ PEe.

J'AAR
25 DEC. - 26 JAN.
ARDENNES

.27 tJA/V. -B MAR,
1/A.SBURC-PRVM
q MAR- /6APR.
CERMAIVY

LEG£ND :
f{/LLEO
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-

NOUN0£0

Officers
81
17
2
60
2
193
39
3
397

EM
994
174
4
507
82
2649
848
49
5307

Total
1075
191
6
567
84
2842
887
52
5704

% of
Bat Cas
18.9
3.4
0.1
9.9
1.5
49.9
15.6
0.7
100.0

PRISONERS .CAPTURED
BY CAMPAIGNS
BRITTANY

GERMANY
SEILLE RIVER

J8 JUL.-·17 SEP.

18 SE.P.- 7 Nov.

ARDENNES

2 5 DEC.- 26

JAN.

SAAR

8 Nov.- 24

DEC.

DASBURG - P RUM

27

JAN.- 8 MAR.

SECTION V. PROVOST MARSHAL
PRISONERS OF WAR PROCESSED
FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44-8 MAY 45
NonMthly
Month
Off. Corns Priv. Civ.* Total
0
152
July
2
1
149
Aug
109 737 4267
117 5230
Sept
5
34
289
77
405
Oct
33 157
844
13 1047
Nov
7
43
513
183
746
Dec
0
48
193 273
514
Jan
29 170 2104
91 2394
Feb
23 216
1111
25 1375
Mar
400 1633 13591
73 15697
Apr
639 1852 17849 342 20682
May
80 332 2437
13 2862
Totals
1327 5223 43347 1207 51104
Prisoners evacuated by Provost Marshal 51104
Prisoners evacuated through Medical
1340
Channels . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prisoners captured in Hospitals
(not evacuated) ....... •. . . . . . . . . . . 9420**
61864
** 746 prisoners evacuated from Hospitals by
Provost Marshal and included in figure,
51,104.
* Enemy agents, persons working for enemy,
informers, deserters, and other persons processed by the CIC.

9 MAR.- 8 MAY

GRAVES REGISTRATION
Number of American dead evacuated 1,289*
826**
Number of German dead evacuated
Percentage of American dead
unidentified . . . . . . Less than 1%
Cemeteries where Division dead are buried:
St. Mere Eglise, France Fay, Belgium
Blonville, France
Hamm, Luxembourg
St. James, France
Stromberg, Germany
Chalons, France
Butzbach, Germany
Andilly, France
Eisenach, Germany
Limey, France
Brenau, Germany
Grand Failly, France
Epernal, France
St. Avold, France
* Includes other units in addition to Division and
attached units.
**Figures on German dead evacuated not available for Brittany and Seille River Campaigns . .
During the Ardennes & Dasburg Prum Campaigns, 635 German dead were evacuated
and it is estimated that 600 of these died in the
fight for Bastogne.
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Composition of Commands:
CCA

CCB

·44th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
603d TD Bn (- )
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd

50th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Arty Comd (- )

9th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

Btry C 965th FA Bn
174th FA Bn (155mm SP Gun)
83d Armd FA Bn (l55mm SP How)
Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3916th QM Trk Co (Gasoline)
3398th QM Trk Co
990th Tdwy Br Co

Routes of Advance:
Route A (CCB): PONTAUBAULT- PONTORSON- LANNEHELIN- DINAN.
Route B (CCA): PONTABAULT-ANTRAIN-'--COMBOURG-ST DOMINEUC- EVRAN.
1 August 1944
CCA (Taylor): The advance continued towards AVRANCHES, north of which at 1530 the column
was strafed; casualties were light and one German plane was knocked down bY,. attached Btry A 777th
AAA Bn. At 1635 forward elements received hostile fire just south of LA SELUNE River, but it did
not hold up the advance. Between PONTAUBAULT and ANTRAIN SUR COUESNON the column
was subjected to continuous sniper fire.
CCB (Read): Was ordered to assemble for the night under the protection of Res Comd and to pass
through it at dawn 2 Aug. Btry B 777th AAA Bn was attached and directed to join the Command as
soon as possible. At 1900 the head of the column passed through AVRANCHES, proceeded south
through PONTAUBAULT, and assembled just east of PONTORSON at 2215 . The column was strafed
by 5 ME l09's at AVRANCHES but only two men were wounded.
Res Comd (Hanson) : Instructions were received at 0445 through the Div Liaison Officer to regroup and proceed at once astride Route A to capture a bridgehead at PONTORSON. Although the
advance guard encountered considerable small arms and sniper fire along the route, a message was
received at 1100 from the advance guard commander, the Commanding Officer of the 9th Armd In£
Bn, that he had reached the objective and established a bridgehead. No heavy gunfire was met until
the mainbody of the column rooched BREE. There, it was struck by 88mm gun, mortar, bazooka and
small arms fire. The enemy had allowed the advance guard to pass his well camouflaged positions.
Three M7' s of Btry A 231st Armd FA Bn were put out of action by 88s and mortars. The Command
quickly deployed. The 15th Tk Bn and Hq Co of the 9th Armd In£ Bn took up positions and opened
fire on the enemy strongpoint. After Companies A and C of the 9th Armd In£ Bn had dismounted and
deployed to the right and left of the road, they pushed forward to eliminate bazooka and machine gun
positions. The Commanding Officer of the 15th Tk Bn maneuvered a medium tank company around
to the right flank in support of the advance infantry elements. Two batteries of the 231st Armd FA Bn
quickly went into firing positions. The artillery forward observer and the Commanding Officer of
Res Comd, with the assistance of a Cub Liaison Plane, located mortar positions and three batteries of
horse-drawn field artillery which were taken under fire and destroyed. Co A 9th Armd In£ Bn,
advancing along the left flank, destroyed one 88mm gun previously abandoned by its crew. Longrange enemy artillery and 88mm fire destroyed several of our vehicles in dispersal areas. At 1230
all resistance with the exception of occasional sniper fire was reduced. Companies A and C 9th
I
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Armd In£ Bn had secured the crossroad at BREE. The main body arrived on the. bridgehead southwest of PONTORSON near VILLE CHERE at 1715. The town of PONTORSON and the area in the
immediate vicinity was cleaned by the advance guard reinforced by an additional company of infantry.
2 August 1944
CCA (Taylor): Proceeded southwest to COMBOURG-ST DOMINEUC__:_TINTENIAC and
BECHEREL, bivouacing that night between MEDREAC and QUEDILIAC. All of the 603d TD Bn except
the Reconnaissance Company and Company A was detached late in the day.
CCB (Read): Passed through Res Comd at 0600. The Div Arty including the 231st Armd FA Bn
and 174th FA Bn joined the Command at this time. Little enemy resistance was encountered until
the area just east of DINAN at LANVALLAY was reached. There the advance guard ran into strong
enemy opposition. An outpost of about 25 enemy was defeated, 12 enemy were killed, and only one
of our men was wounded. Continued artillery, AT, mortar, bazooka, machine gun and small arms
fire substantiated the belief that this was the enemy OPLR for DINAN which was reported strongly
held. Additional infantry was brought up to take LANVALLAY, the intermediate objective. Strong
patrols were sent to either flank to probe the enemy position, the flanks of which were believed to rest on the RANCE River just east of DINAN. The main highway bridge into DINAN was reported heavily
mined. Just as the attack was getting under way orders were received~ by-pass DINAN and proceed
to the vicinity of BECHEREL for the night. Since some elements had already been committed and it
might have proved costly to break off the attack, it was decided to take the immediate objective.
During this attack heavy artillery fire was placed on DINAN. The immediate objective was taken at
approximately 1500. At approximately 1800 the Command started its movement, covered by a rear
guard. Two enemy tanks moved in on our left (north) flank and opened fire. They were attacked by
friendly air and by an M7 which took one under direct fire and destroyed it. The other tank withdrew
without inflicting any damage. The Command, after marching east and then southwest, closed near
BECHEREL at 2200. .
Res Comd (Hanson): During the afternoon, at the request of a Navy officer, a platoon of light
tanks and a platoon of Engrs were sent to DOL where after a short fight they rescued a party of some
50 sailors and news correspondents who were headed forST MALO, not knowing it was held by the
enemy, In the late afternoon the Command marched southwest switching to Route B to follow CCA.
3 August 1944
Leading troops of CCA missed their route at GAEL, where they should have turned west, and
continued instead southwest where they ran into organized resistance at MAURON. It appeared
more practicable to the commander to defeat the enemy force and then regain his route, by passing
through MAURON, than to by-pass that place. This he accomplished by a coordinated attack in the
afternoon. As a result of the delay to CCA, CCB got about 20 miles in the lead on its parallel route
to tbe north. Therefore, the Res Comd was once again switched, this time back to the northern route
to fbllow CCB. While watching the action of CCA at 1600, the Div Comdr received orders by courier
from VIII Corps to stop all movement west and divert sufficient force north to capture DINAN. Since
the majority of the Div was already well past DINAN, this meant a retrograde movement. It was not
until 1900 that orders to halt could be gotten to the head of CCB. The column was then almost to
LOUDEAC. In order to comply with Corps instructions, the Commander of CCA was directed to
leave his infantry and tanks in place and, with his own artillery, pick up the Res Comd (at that time
north of him and between him and DINAN) for a move on DINAN from the southwest early on 4 Aug.
An effort was made to coordinate the attack on DINAN with General Ernst's Task Force "A", believed to be somewhere east of DINAN at this time. During the evening, the Div Command Post was
moved forward to MERDRIGNAC.
CCA (Taylor): Continued its advance southwest against light resistance and during the afternoon
made a coordinated attack on MAURON. This town contained a hostile force of approximately 250
men in a strong defensive position. At 1500 the attack was launched by the 44th Armd In£ Bn supported by the 212th Armd FA Bn. By 1830 the mission had been completed. The Combat Command
then bivouaced west of GAEL.
CCB (Read): Continued the march west on BREST. At BROONS minor resistance was encountered when the advance guard ran into enemy elements apparently trying to escape to the south.
Btry B of the 777th AAA Bn which had been ordered to join the Command at BROONS ran into some
enemy resistance southeast of the town. Eight miles east of LOUDEAC the column was halted on
* 67 *

orders from the Div Comdr and instructed to go into an assembly area to await further orders. The
Command closed at approximately 2100.
Res Comd (Hanson): Switched from the south to the north route following CCB.
4 August 1944
During the morning CCA. under the mission described above, reorganized and advanced northeast, reaching the vicinity of BROONS by noon when it was halted on Div order. The Army Commander arrived at the Div CP shortly before noon and directed that the advance on BREST be resumed
at once.
CCA (Taylor): Temporary organization untill200 4 Aug was:
9th Armd Inf Bn
83d Armd FA Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Rcn and A Cos 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
The Command proceeded north to JOUAN de L'ISLE. While orders were being issued to attack
a reported strong force of enemy tanks and infantry near BROONS and while waiting for newly attached
troops to arrive, the Combat Command was ordered to resume the mission of advancing on BREST
with its original composition. Earlier in the day the Rcn Co of the 603d TD Bn liberated a B-24 crew
of 6 officers and 8 enlisted men who had been prisoners of the Germans. CCA with its original troops
resumed its advance to the west. It was forced to cross the BLANET CANAL north of PONTIVY because of a blown bridge at the latter point.
CCB (Read): Resumed the march on BREST but was delayed by a blown bridge and mined fords
at LOUDEAC. At 1800 the march was continued west of CARHAIX. It was halted at 050230 in marph
formation with the head of the column in the vicinity of LE MOUSTOIR. The Command was re-gass~d
at this time and resumed the march at dawn.
Res Comd (Hanson): Followed CCB.
5 August 1944
Based on information from F.F.I., it was learned that CARHAIX was held by a German force of
about 2,000 paratroopers who had destroyed all local bridges and were prepared to defend themselves
in the city. Therefore, the Div Comdr ordered both columns to by-pass CARHAIX-CCB to the east
and north; CCA to the south and west. This city was evacuated by the Germans two days later, after
the Div had passed it. Then enemy withdrew west and reached BREST by way · of the CROZON
PENINSULA.
CCA (Taylor): Having stopped early in the morning for maintenance, the Command resumed
the march at 0800, turned north at GOURIN, and on Div orders by-passed CARHAIX to the south and
west. The column continued toward HUELGOAT via LANDELEAU and PLOUVE.
HUELGOAT and the woods to the north and east were held by a German force of about 500 men,
only a few of whom were in the city when the Rcn Tr at the head of the column reached it. After a
brief skirmish, leading elements pushed through the town and turned west where they ran into an
enemy position including a battery of artillery. Between the time that the Rcn Tr passed through the
town and the time the advance guard arrived, a considerable German force moved back into HUELGOAT from the woods to the northeast. In a stiff fight infantry, tanks and artillery of the advance
guard were employed to clear. the town. During the evening, the Command passed through and
halted for the night in the vicinity of KERBRANN. Unknown to CCA. the Res Comd, approaching
HUELGOAT on another route from the southeast, encountered the same group of enemy in the woods
and defile east of town.
CCB (Read): With orders to by-pass CARHAIX, the Command began reconnaissance for a suitable route. The march was resumed at 0830, passing east and north of CARHAIX. Enemy resistance
was encountered east of LE CLOITRE at 1215 but it was reduced without difficulty. The Command lost
several small vehicles but resumed the march at 1440. Information gained from prisoners disclosed
that they were leading elements of the 85lst Inf Regt, .343d In£ Div marching east to ST BRIEUC. The
advance guard made contact again on reaching LE CLOITRE and received light artillery and heavy
mortar and machine gun fire. Since resistance could not be cleared prior to darkness, the Command
was ordered to assemble near LE CLOITRE.
Res Comd (Hanson): Resumed the westward march on BREST at 1404 from the vicinity of GOUAREC. At 1451 Div Hq (forward) was positioqed in column and the march continued. At 1652 the
*
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advance guard reported that they had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of POULLAOUEN.
After this resistance was rapidly overcome, the march continued towards HUELGOAT which switched
the column from the rear of CCB to the rear of CCA. The route from POULLAOUEN through HUEL~
GOAT was a defile and when advance elements reached the vicinity of the HUELGOAT WOODS,
considerable small arms and mortar fire was received •from enemy estimated at 200. The advance
guard commander immediately employed the leading tank element and the 105mm assault gun platoon. The infantry company in the advance guard was deployed on the right flank. The entire highway along HUELGOAT WOODS was heavily mined.
6 August 1944
It was now apparent that MORLAIX was quite strongly held. Both combat commands moved out
early 6 Aug, but the route followed by CCA was a devious one over very poor roads and caused
extremely slow progress, both on the 6th and 7th of Aug. CCB, although on the outside flank, made
a rapid march on better roads and was delayed only by enemy resistance south of MORLAIX in the
morning and at LESNEVEN in the evening. The Res Comd, which on the previous day had swung
left to get in rear of CCA at HUELGOAT, was once again rerouted to follow the faster moving CCB.The Div CP remained in place a second day for the first time since the campaign started.
CCA (Taylor): Resumed the march travelling by secondary roules in order to by-pass strong
hostile forces reported ahead. At 1900, while halted, the column was shelled by light artill13ry and
mortars which inflicted a few casualties. That night the Command made a difficult march over
country roads not marked on any of the maps at hand. There were no vehicular cqsualties or stragglers. Troop D of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, reconnoitering for the Command, -fought a severe engagement against superior forces at CHATEAUNEUF and finally withdrew to by-pass this resistance.
CCB (Read): The enemy withdrew from LE CLOITRE under cover of darkness and the Command
resumed the march with the intention of by-passing MORLAIX to the south and PLEYBER CHRIST
to the east. At approximately 1015 a strongly defended enemy roadblock was encountered in a defile
six miles south of MORLAIX on Route No 169. Three beetle tanks sent out by the enemy were destroyed by tank fire. Several officers and men were wounded by grenades and small arms fire from
the high ground on either side of the defile. After a new advance guard was constituted, the route
through PLEYBER CHRIST was cleared and the march was resumed to the north. On reaching highway GC 19 near PENNHOAT the column turned west on LESNEVEN where enemy resistance was
again encountered at approximately 2000. After arillery shelling and an attack by infantry and tanks
the enemy was driven out and the town was taken at 2200. Three AT guns were destoyed and a large
dump of enemy mines and explosives was demolished in the vicinity of the railroad station.
7 August 1944
Action on this date was to determine whether or not BREST could be captured by the Div. The
plg,n contemplated an approach in three columns: CCB on the right (west), approaching south from
BOURG-BLANC; Res Comd breaking off from the CCB column and approaching in the center from
PLOUVIEN through GUESNOU; and CCA approaching from the northeast through ST THONAN
and GUIPAVAS. Div CP was established two miles southwest of PLABENNEC.
CCA (Taylor): Marched from north of ST THEGONNEC to the west, by-passing LANDIVISIAU.
During the day hostile resistance increased. Two of our artillery observation planes were shot down
and the column received light artillery shelling south of ST THONAN and heavier fire west of KERSAINT. The Command bivouaced late that night on the PLABENNEC-GOUESNOU road just north
of L'ORMEAU.
CCB (Read): Following a successful engagement at LESNEVEN during the late hours of 6 Aug,
the Command resumed the march at 0100. More intense enemy activity was encountered beyond
Hie town and a medium tank was knocked out by AT fire. A decision was made to halt and to resume
the march at dawn. The Command assembled just east of LESNEVEN and resumed the march at
0800, by-passing PLABENNEC to the west. Considerable small arms fire was encountered south of
LESNEVEN and enemy forces were pleared from PLOUVIEN, but otherwise the movement was uneventful until the column reached the intersection with GC 26 west of BOURG-BLANC. Elements
of the advance guard were allowed to pass this crossroad before encountering just east of MILIZAC
strong resistance in the form of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Near the crossroads a large
AA warning system and observation post was discovered. When this installation was attacked and
destroyed, enemy fire ceased and was not resumed again in that immediate area. The Command
assembled just east of MILIZAC. Forward elements to the south, in view of an enemy observation post.
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were badly shelled from the vicinity of BREST. When these units were withdrawn, the shelling ceased.
Res Comd (Hanson): Followed CCB to PLOUVIEN, thence south to an area northwest of GOUESNOU.
8 August 1944
Since the attack could not be made before 9 Aug, orders were issued early on 8 Aug calling for
an attack generally in the direction GUIPAVAS- BREST to be made at daylight the following morning.
This plan involved considerable shifting of troops, particularly artillery, and resulted in drawing
counter-preparation fires from the German artillery. Numerous losses, heaviest in the 44th Infantry,
were sustained.
In the early evening the situation, as known to the Div Comdr, appeared as follows: CCB, newly
organized with troops formerly in Res Comd, and its direct support artillery were in position for the
attack; CCA, which had been subjected to heavy shelling, was not in position and probably would be
unable to be in position to attack by daylight.
lst Bn 28th In£ Regt of the 8th In£ Div was attached to the Div on this date but did not join until
9Aug.
Composition of Troops:
CCB
CCA
44th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co A & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

9th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co A 50th Armd In£ Bn
Co D 69th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd
50th Armd In£ Bn (-)
69th Tk Bn (:-----)
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
603d TD Bn (- )
lst Bn 28th In£ Regt 8th In£ Div
Added to Div Tns

Arty Comd
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
83d Armd FA Bn
l74th FA Bn

Co D 15th Tk Bn
Note: CCB and Res Comd exchanged troops.
Co C 9th Armd
Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Btry C and D 777th AAA Bn
CCA (Taylor): While still in bivouac, the Command commenced receiving heavy arillery shelling.
The 44th Armd Inf Bn received the majority of the fire and suffered heavy casualties. All vehicular
movement drew fire and after several attempts the battalion was forced to withdraw without its vehicles.
Because of a lack of observation posts and observers' planes artillery was unable to deliver counterbattery fire. Later in the day the 212th and 83d Armd FA Bns delivered effective fire on the vicinity
of GOUESNOU. During the day orders were received for an attack on BREST the following morning.
Jn preparation for the attack the Command was organized into three combat teams, each consisting
of an infantry company, three sections of tanks, a tank destroyer platoon, an engineer platoon and
a section of anti-aircraft guns.
CCB (Read): With its new troop composition, the Command assembled near PENNHOAT east
of GOUESNOU and prepared to launch an attack on BREST in conjunction with the rest of the Div
at 090600.
Res Comd (Hanson): With its new composition of troops, the Command marched at 2200 to its
new assembly area preparatory to the attack on BREST. At approximately 2230, however; orders
were received through the Div liaison officer and by radio to halt the column for the purpose of carrying out a new mission. The Command was directed to march west and north to the vicinity of KERDALES and there to await further instructions.
Div Tns (Droste) : Was attacked by the enemy as it entered PLOUVIEN from the east. The attack
was beaten off by protective units with the trains and the Command proceeded into its bivouac area.
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9 August 1944
As stated above the attack on BREST by the Div was temporarily called off. First, because of
severe casualties inflicted on the troops of CCA who had received in their bivouac area heavy artillery
fire which prevented them from reaching their line of ,departure and, secondly, because of the arrival
of the 266th German Inf Div on the rear (north) of the Div.
·
The Commanding General decided to attack the 266th Div. To do this the Div completely reversed its direction and proceeded north in three columns, leaving an infantry screen to protect the
rear. CCA marched on the east, CCB in the center, and Res Comd on the west. During the movement north the Div fought 3 major engagements, and the units which had been the advance guard
were now a rear guard and engaged to the south.
CCA (Taylor) : With the 44th Armd Inf Bn badly hurt by the severe shelling of the day before,
the Command moved to attack in the direction of PLOUVIEN and assemble northwest of that town.
While marching to the north, the column including installations in adjacent fields was taken under
artillery and small arms fire which caused some casualties. PLOUVIEN was in German hands and
a platoon of the 9th Armd Inf Bn was pinned down in the village. Units of the 44th Armd Inf Bn
reinforced by a tank platoon of A Co 68th Tk Bn and supported by the 212th and 83d Armd FA Bns
assaulted the village, cleared it and relieved the platoon of the 9th Armd Inf Bn. Considerable assistance was given by friendly air which smashed a German column coming down from the north. The
Command then resumed the march and closed in bivouac northwest of PLOUVIEN.
CCB (Read): Received orders at 0300 cancelling the attack on BREST and ordering an attack
north to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of LANANNEYEN. At 0600 the Command moved out. As
the Command approached the crossroads at BESQUELN, about one mile south of LANANNEYEN,
strong enemy opposition was encountered. An attack was launched at 0830 by Band C Companies
of the 15th Tk Bn and B Co of the 9th Armd Inf Bn. Succeeding units cleared the road and the 23lst
Armd FA Bn (-) was placed in position with the mission of covering the rear of the Command just
north of GOUESNOU while the l28th Armd FA Bn was put in position to support the 9th Armd Inf Bn.
CoD of the 69th Tk Bn was committed with instructions to make a wide envelopment of the enemy
position. Co A and one platoon of C Co of the 25th Armd Engr Bn were comimtted at 1100 and Co C
50th Armd Inf Bn was also brought forward at this time. The enemy, after sustaining severe casualties, surrendered his remaining force of some 800 men at 1530. This force was part of the 896th,
897th and 898th Regts of the 266th Inf Div. The Command then proceeded to its assembly area and
closed at approximately 2000 hours.
Res Comd (Hanson): Following instructions received at 2230 the previous night, the Command
marched north in the direction of KERDALES. At approximately 0315 leading elements of the 50th
Armd Inf Bn reported heavy small arms and mortar fire from both flanks on the crossraod at BOURGBLANC. Considerable firing could be heard to the west and northwest of BOURG-BLANC. The
Commanding Officer of the 50th Armd In£ Bn was directed to attack BOURG-BLANC at daylight. The
ahack jumped off at approximately 0630 and after a short advance it encountered on the road a heavy
weapons company of the 85lst Inf Regt 266th German Inf Div. Outer security elements of the 50th
Armd Inf Bn which consisted of the heavy machine guns and one 57mm AT gun practically annihilated the column. This action was short and its accomplishment permitted the Command to march
again at 0830 and close near KERDALES at 1158.
Members of the DIVISION BAND which were guarding a gas dump at LESQUERN were attacked
by 150 paratroopers and 5000 gallons of gas were burned, but the attackers were driven off. Throughout the remainder of the day the Trains were shelled, and some gasoline and ammunition were destroyed by an enemy column moving in from its north until P-5ls strafed and bombed the enemy column
to destruction.
lO August 1944
In assembly area west of PLOUVIEN, the main body of the Div was out of enemy observed artillery
range and had an opportunity, for the first time since 27 July, for a day's rest and reservice. In the
meantime the lst Bn of the 28th RCT had been attached to the Div and joined it at PLABENNEC. It was
given a reconnaissance mission to secure in force the line GOUSENOU-GUIPAVAS in order to
cover positions for the artillery from which they could reach the center of BREST. The 86th Cav
extended the reconnaissance screen to the flanks. Artillery surveyed positions during the day'" and
moved in after dark. Later in the day the orders were amended to charge CCA with the mission of
securing a strong jump-off position in the vicinity of GUIPAVAS.
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The Commands were constituted as follows:
CCA

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- 3 Sects)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Bn 28th Inf (Atchd)

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 3 Sect)

Res Comd

Arty

44th Armd In£ Bn (- C Co)
69th Tk Bn (-D Co)
25th Armd Engr Bn (- A, B, C Cos)
603d TD Bn (-A, C, Rcn, Plat B Co)
777A:h AAA Bn (- A, B, C & D Tr adv CP)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FABn
23lst Armd FA Bn
83d Armd FA Bn
174th FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

1st Bn 28th Inf

C~md

Div Tns: Rein£ by
Co D 69th Tk Bn
Co C 44th Armd In£ Bn
Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Btrys C & D 777th AAA Bn
CCA (Taylor): Given the Div mission, CCA prepared for the attack on the Hill 95-Hill105line.
Meanwhile a detachment of the Rcn Co and 2 tank destroyers of Co A 603d TD Bn, a forward observer
from 83d Armd FA Bn and an interpreter from Command Hq approached a hostile battery in QUILLIFREOC which had been observed firing to the north. Negotiations were made with the German Commander to surrender 7 officers, 120 men, 9 field guns and 3 AA guns.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Harris): Established a protective screen south of the Div area and instituted reconnaissance of eastern exits of BREST south of GUIPAVAS.
Arty Comd (Jesse): Moved under cover of darkness to positions to support the attack of CCA.
Div Tns (Droste): Effected the surrender of approximately 300 prisoners at LOCMARIA.
1st Bn 28th Inf Regt: Remained in assembly area prepared to attack to secure the GOUESNOUGUIPAVAS road. At 102000 it was assigned to CCA.
11 August 1944
Delays incident to reorganization and redisposition of troops precluded a well-coordinated attack
by CCA prior to 12 Aug. Reconnaissance was intensified and troop movement to assembly positions
were completed during the day and evening. The remainder of the Div was inactive.
Dispersed elements of the 266th German Inf Div continued to surrender throughout the day.
CCA (Taylor): Exerte<;l every effort to encourage further surrender of enemy troops. The same
detachment that effected the surrender of the battery at QUILLIFREOC also negotiated the surrender
of a number of officers and men with several field guns and 70 horses. At 1130 the detachment proceeded to the vicinity of LANDEDA where 194 men and officers surrendered. Their equipment included six l55mm guns and 32 other guns of varying caliber.
The Command was given the mission of seizing Hill 105 and the "nose" west of Hill 105. Troops
A and E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) pushed south to gain artillery OPs and, with the lst Bn 28th Inf
Regt following, attacked south toward KERNHOAS. This force met stiff resistance and repeated
counterattacks but by nightfall the reconnaissance elements held OPs southwest of GUlPAVAS and
the infantry battalion held a line just north of the GOUESNOU- GUIPAVAS highway. The 50th
Armd Inf Bn with a platoon of Co A 603d TD Bn attached moved under cover of darkness to a forward
assembly area northeast of GUIPAVAS.
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CCB (Read): Remained in assembly north of LANANNEYEN where it was joined by CoD 15th
Tk Bn and Co C 9th Armd 'In£ Bn which had been released from their escort duties with Trains Command.
12 August 1944
The attack by CCA astride the GUIP.f;,.VAS-BREST Road had limited success. In the vicinity
of GUIPAVAS it gained good observation points which protected artillery positions to the rear, but
it failed to take the well defended strongpoints on Hill 105.
At 1900 on 12 Aug orders were received from the Corps to leave one combat command to contain
BREST and move at once the remainder of the Div to the LORIENT area to relieve the 4th Armd Div.
The VIII Corps began movement to the BREST area with 3 infantry divisions and Corps troops to
undertake an assault on the fortress city. Corps assumed command of CCA in place on 18 Aug.
CCA (Taylor): Following Div orders of the previous day, the Command launched an attack at
0800 to gain the limited objective of Hill105 and the "nose" west of it. CT 50 supported by Div Arty
attacked Hill 105 from the east. The attack was made up hill over difficult terrain into a position of
undertermined strength. The initial attack progressed about 400 yards when it was repulsed by
extremely heavy small arms and automatic weapon fire of 20mm and 40mm caliber. A second attemptmade with heavy artillery support gained a line 500 yards west of the line departure but was met with
the same fierce resistance and the battalion withdrew. The 1st Bn 2~th In£ Regt attacked south on
Hill 95. This attack was over difficult terrain and was met by considerable resistance and repeated
counterattacks from the front and the west flank. The attack was finally stopped some 200 yards south
of the GOUESNOU- GUIPAVAS highway where positions were consolidated.
A detachment from the Command which had remained as a security force in its old assembly area
at PLOUVIEN proceeded to ST P ABU where it effected the surrender of an artillery battery of 9 officers
and 309 men with 16 field guns and other military impedimenta . At this time the mission of the Command was changed to one of containing the enemy in BREST. It was estimated that there were 20,000 •
enemy troops in BREST.
CCB (Read): Received orders at 2045 to march to VANNES to relieve elements of the 4th Armd
Div.
Res Comd (Hanson): Remained in the vicinity of KERDALES prepared to move on LORIENT at
131200.
Although units of the Div were already on the march to take over a new mission, the battle of
BREST was far from finished. Elements left behind added greatly to the already outstanding achievments of the 6th Armd Div. CT 50 fought many actions around BREST and assisted in cleaning out
the DOUALAS and CROZON peninsulas opposite the fortress . In order to maintain a proper time
sequence for Div activity, a description of this action which is actually a part of the BREST operation
has been placed in the following section.
•
LORIENT
13 August- 17 September 1944
In accordance with orders received on 12 Aug, the Div started redeployment of troops to carry
out the new mission of containing BREST and to relieve the 4th Armd Div at LORIENT and VANNES.
Composition of Commands:
CCB
CCA
50th Armd In£ Bn
lst Bn 28th In£ Regt (Atchd)
83d Armd FA Bn (Atchd)
174th FA Bn (Atchd)
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Tr A & Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )

9th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

Div Arty

44th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
603d TD Bn (- )

212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
777th AAA Bn (-)
969th FA Bn (Atchd in place at LORIENT)
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Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3398th QM Trk Co
3916th QM Gasoline Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
Movement was made over the two following routes:
A. North Route: LESNEVEN- MORLAIX-CARHAIX- RESTRENEN- PONTIVY-VANNES.
B. South Route: Southern edge LESNEVEN- LANDIVISIAU- HUELGOAT- GC No 17GOURIN- PLOUAY- LORIENT.
CCA (Taylor): Continued the attack on the outer defenses of BREST with the 1st Bn 28th In£ and
the 50th Armd In£ Bn. Heavy machine gun, mortar, and 40mm fire prevented the breaching of the
enemy outpost line. At dark these battalions consolidated and held their positions.
CCB (Read): Following orders received at 2045 the day before, the Command marched on
VANNES. Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz marched at 0635 to reconnoiter the route of advance
through PLOUVIEN - LESNEVEN - MORLAIX- CARHAIX - ROSTRENEN - PONTIVY- LOCMINE
and VANNES. The advance guard followed at 0800. Tr B reached the road junction north of LOCMINE and established contact with elements of the 4th Armd Div at 1325. The Commander of the 4th
Armd Div sent word to the Command not to move south of the east-west highway through LOCMINE
prior to 140600. The Combat Command Commander went forward to 4th Armd Div Hq and made
arrangements to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div in the area north and east of VANNES beginnipg
at 140700. The Command closed in an assembly area about 2 miles north of LOCMINE at 2300.
The move had been made without incident.
Res Comd (Hanson) : On orders from Div, the Command marched toward LORIENT at 1200 with
the mission of relieving 4th Armd Div troops containing the fortress there. The Command arrived in
a temporary bivouac in the vicinity of Le FAOUET at 2045 . Contact was made immediately with the
Commanding General, 4th Armd Div to fulfill the mission of relieving 4th Armd Div units.
14 August 1944
The Div continued to contain BREST and commenced the relief of the 4th Armd Div at VANNES
and LORIENT. Upon arrival at VANNES, at noon, the Div Comdr found that Hq 4th Armd Div and all
troops in the VANNES area had departed during the morning. He further learned that the city of
VANNES and the surrounding area had been entirely cleared of enemy forces and were under complete control o( the French FFI. Since the German garrison-had withdrawn into the defenses of
LORIENT and onto the QUIBERON PENINSULA, it was apparent that no containing force was necessary
at VANNES. Therefore, the CCA column approaching VANNES from the north was diverted northwest to PLOUAY and employed to strengthen the containing force of LORIENT itself. The relief of
CCB 4th Armd Div, north of LORIENT, was completed during the day.
CCB 4th Armd Div was entirely west of the SCORFF River, leaving the sectors to the east covered
by cavalry. When relief was made, CCB was given the west sector; 15th Tk Bn reinforced, the center
sector (between the SCORFF and BLAVET Rivers); and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, the east sector.
The latter two forces were directly under Div control. Two battalions from the Res Comd were transferred to CCB. The artillery was initially all in place west of the SCORFF River. Later, one battalion
was shifted to the center sector.
·
CCA (Taylor): Reorganized and consolidated positions to contain the fortress of BREST, now
estimated to be garrisoned by 40,000 men with great numbers of AT guns. Aggressive and constant
patrolling became a part of the daily job of containing the enemy. Continuous activity on the flanks
by reconnaissance units and 24-hours-a-day harassing interdictory and observed fire by the 83d
and 174th FA Bns kept the enemy busy. Occasional counter battery by the enemy was increased in
intensity toward the end of the commitment in the BREST area.
CCB (Read) : Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz with one platoon of CoB 15th Tk Bn moved out
at 0700 to relieve elements of the 25th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz near MILIZAC. Co A 9th Armd In£ Bn with
one platoon CoB 15th Tk Bn moved to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div Res near AURAY. One
platoon of CoB 15th Tk Bn relieved elements of the 4th Armd Div at MEUCON. The remainder of
CCB moved at 1245 to assemble just east of VANNES. While the Command was enroute south from
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LOCMINE, its mission wa.s changed by the Div Comdr. The Command was ordered to proceed to
the vicinity of ARZANO to take over from Res Comd, relieve elements of CCB of the 4th Armd Div
between the SCORFF and LEITA Rivers, and contain the enemy in LORIENT within that zone. At this
time the 15th Tk Bn with Co A 9th Armd In£ Bn attached and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (less Tr B)
were given separate missions. The Command turned right through GRANDCHAMP and proceeded
to an assembly area three miles south of ARZANO, closing at 2300. The Commanding Officers of the
44th Armd In£ Bn, Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn, and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn made contact with elements
of the 4th Armd Div on the OPL and arranged to relieve them at 150600. Div Arty was in general
support.
The Command was now composed of the following troops:
. 44th Armd In£ Bn
9th Armd In£ Bn (- A Co)
68th Tk Bn
Cos A and C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd (Hanson) : (less 44th Armd In£ Bn, 68th Tk Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn) was relieved by
CCB. Remaining elements of the Command went into bivouac north' of ARZANO.
CT 15: Occupied the center sector south of PLOUAY between SCORFF and BLAVET Rivers,
relieving the 4th Armd Div cavalry.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) : Occupied the east sector from HENNEBONT to LAND EVANT and
patrolled east to REDON.
15 August 1944
By 0600 the Div had completed the relief of the 4th Armd Div on the BRITTANY PENINSULA
and was disposed in positions to contain the fortresses of BREST and LORIENT and to patrol the vicinity
of VANNES.
CCA (Taylor) : Continued to contain BREST; it received some sniper fire but the situation was
generally quiet. A truce was called on the left flank to remove wounded and dead. Artillery placed
unobserved fire on a reported CP and truck park.
16 August 1944
Activity of the Div was confined to vigorous patrolling on all fronts· and continuous artillery fire
which included harassing, observed and counterbattery missions.
Res Comd (Hanson) : From its bivouac area north of ARZANO the Command sent to CONCARNEAU a combat team comprised of:
\
l Light Tank Platoon
l Plat C Engr
1 Sound Truck (Psychological Warfare Team)
Russian-French Interpreter
8 Cargo Trucks
l JA-Ton with 3 Medical EM
1 CW Radio Half-Track
l Sect TDs
This combat team was to attempt to effect the surrender of a German garrison there. The force
arrived at CONCARNEAU about 1900. After several attempts were made to effect the surrender by
means of a sound truck, an interpreter proceeded into the town under a white flag. The interpreter
returned about 2030 with a German officer and negotiations were carried on until about 2300, but
nothing further was accomplished.
17 August 1944
The Div continued its mission of containing enemy garrisons at BREST, LORIENT and QUIBERON
and assumed responsibility for patrolling the area west as far as the base of the CROZON PENINSULA.
CCA (Taylor) : Which was still in the BREST area, began operations to cut the water supply of
the city. There was some small patrol activity, and attached artillery fired harassing and observed
fires , destroying one AA battery.
*
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CCB (Read): Continuing a further reorganization of its zone, the Command assigned to the 44th
Armd In£ Bn with Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn attached an area on the OPL from the SCORFF River
junction south of PONT SCORFF west to the stream junction southwest of KERVARSNOUEN. The 9th
Armd In£ Bn (-) with Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn was given the additional
mission of assisting 68th Tk Bn with mounted patrols west of the LEITA River extending south from
QUIMPERLE to the ocean. The 23lst Armd FA Bn was in direct support of the 9th Armd In£ Bn;
the 212th Armd FA Bn was in direct support of the 44th Armd In£ Bn.
Res Comd (Hanson): Was still in tactical bivouac north of ARZANO. The Combat Team which
was in the vicinity of CONCARNEAU was still attempting to get the German garrison there to surrender. A show of force and a few rounds fired over the city caused the surrender of 102 of the enemy.
Further operations in this area on that day were of no avail, however, and reinforcing tanks and
destroyers were sent to CONCARNEAU, closing at about 2115.
18 August 1944
Activities on the Div front were confined to vigorous patrolling by both enemy and friendly forces
and exchanges of artillery fire.
CCA (Taylor): The 28th Regimental Combat Team joined Command and occupied the left part
of the Command's sector. The 45th FA Bn of the 28th RCT reinforced those battalions present.
CCB (Read): The Assault Gun Platoon of the 68th Tk Bn moved into position along the west bank
of the LEITA River and destroyed several gun and battery emplacements.
Res Comd (Hanson): The 69th Tk Bn was given a separate mission as part of the containing forces
of LORIENT. It moved to its assigned sector between the BLAVET River and the line of River de
l'ETEL-LANDEVANT-BAUD, relieving the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) which retained its recohnaissance mission to the east. Occupation of its zone was completed by 1200. The Combat Team
in the vicinity of CONCARNEAU requested civilians to evacuate the town and at 1600 shelled definitely located military targets in the town. Remaining forces of the Command were in tactical bivouac
north of ARZANO and had no contact with the enemy.
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Bridges): Established headquarters near CARHAIX in order to
perform its mission of maintaining patrols on the assigned route: LE FAOUET-GOURIN-CHATEAUNEUF-CHATEAULIN.
19 August 1944
The Div continued its mission of containing BREST, LORIENT and QUIBERON.
The Div Comdr visited Corps Hq at LESNEVEN, at which time the relief of Hq CCA was arranged
to take place the next day. All troops assigned to CCA remained in the BREST area under Corps
control and were attached to the divisions operating there. These troops took part in the assault on
BREST, all except the cavalry being employed on the DOUALAS PENINSULA until 10 September,
when they were returned to Div control. The cavalry operated on the west flank under 29th Div.
CCA (Taylor): Received some counterbattery fire and sustained some casualties in its continued
mission of containing BREST. The 28th FA Bn reinforced the Combat Command artillery on this day.
Two platoons of the 50th Armd In£ Bn attacked a 100-man patrol at SPREM and drove it back.
CCB (Read): Activity was confined to patrolling which contained enemy forces in LORIENT.
Co A of the 68th Tk Bn was attached to the 50th Armd Inf Bn and marched to the BREST area 21 Aug.
The 969th FA Bn was detached, reverted to Corps control, and marched to the BREST area. Enemy
patrols of 70 to 100 men were active in the vicinity of KERANANARE, KERDENOWTOLDER LA
BOULAIE and KERVENOU.
Res Comd (Hanson): Was in boviuac north of ARZANO with one combat team in the vicinity of
CONCARNEAU. This combat team again shelled the city. The German garrison was too strongly
emplaced on inaccessible ground to warrant an assault. Therefore, when the enemy did not submit
after being shelled, the Combat Team was recalled on Div order and the city was contained by FFI
personnel.
20 August 1944
The Div continued to contain LORIENT and BREST and patrolled the flanks from CHATEAULIN
to~REDON.

CCA (Taylor): Elements of the VIII Corps began to effect relief of CCA.
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21 August 1944
Upon the arrival of Hq CCA at LORIENT from BREST, the separate forces in the center and left
sectors (15th CT and 69th CT) were assigned to CCA in place.
CCA (Taylor): Was relieved at BREST by six battalions of the 2d Inf Div and the supporting
artillery. The Command Hq moved to the LORIENT area, leaving the following units attached to
VIII Corps to remain at BREST:
50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Trs A and E (- ) 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Reinf)
The route of march was by way of LANDERNEAU- HEULGOAT- GOURIN- POLUAY to the vicinity
of INZINZAC, a distance of approximately 100 miles. The Command now composed of:
15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
was given the mission of holding the center and east sectors at LORIENT between the SCORFF River
and the line de l' ETEL River- LANDEVANT- BAUD.
•
CCB (Read): Continued activities necessary to contain the enemy garrison at LORIENT. · Co A
of the 68th Tk Bn moved out to join the 50th Armd Inf Bn still at BREST, and Cos Band C withdrew
from the front lines to an area north of ARZANO to permit better maintenance and training.
22 August 1944
The Div responsibility now extended from the base of the CROZEN PENINSULA to REDON,
although troops of the Div were being employed as far west as the tip of the BRITTANY PENINSULA
to the west of BREST, where a troop of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to the 29th Div.
Composition of Troops:
CCA
CCB
15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Res Comd
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
60f3d TD Bn (- )
'
Arty Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn (-)
44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
Cos A & C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Rcn Tr 603d TD Bn
·
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-)
Div Tns

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3398th QM Trk Co
3916th QM Gasoline Co
990th Engr Tdwy Br Co
?77th AAA Bn (-)

CT 50 (AT BREST)

Div Hq (Fwd)

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Trs A and E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co A 68th Tk Bn

1 Sect Btry B, 1 Sect Btry C and Adv CP ?77th AAA Bn
86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

23-27 August 1944
The various units of the Div were involved in minor engagements throughout this period. Probably the most important of these actions was that carried out by CT 50 (Wall) as part of Task Force
*
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Van Fleet in cleaning up the DOUALAS PENINSULA opposite BREST. On the QUIBERON PENINSULA a cable was cut which broke communication between 1,500 German troops there and the
garrison at LORIENT. Tr D of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz extended its reconnaissance activities to
include enemy installations and movements on the CROZON PENINSULA.
CCB was alerted to move on 28 Aug to the vicinity of ORLEANS.
28 August 1944
With the departure of CCB for the east, CCA was given responsibility for the entire LORIENT
front. from the LEITA River below QUIMPERLE to BELZ. It was also given the remaining troops of
Res Comd.
CCA (Taylor) : Relieved CCB on its front and assumed responsibility for the west sector of LORIENT-from the coast west of LORIENT to the BLAVET River. Hq of the Command was moved to KERVASIE, approximately 1lf2 miles northwest of POINT SCORFF, and the Combat Command was reconstituted to include Res Comd and its attached units.
CCB (Read) : Moved out, by units, with Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz departing at 1000 to reconnoiter the route to REDON. The 69th Tk Bn moved at 1045 and the remainder of the Command moved
at 1200 by way of ARZANO- PLOUAY-BUBRY-BAUD-GRANDCHAMP- VANNES and REDON.
The move was made without incident and the Command closed in bivouac 4 miles east of REDON at
2045.
Res Comd (Hanson) : Was attached to CCA and reconstituted. With new troops, it was given
the mission, under CCA, of containing the LORIENT sector between PONT SCORFF and HENNEBONT. At 1319 Res Comd with the Hq 15th Tk Bn moved from bivouac north of ARZANO to an area
2 miles due south of PLOUAY.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Harris): Retained its responsibility for flank reconnaissance and took oxer
the easLsector to the east of the BLAVET River (formerly held by 69th CT) .
t
The composition df the commands at this time was:
CCA
CCB
Res Comd
9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn w / Sect 990th Tdwy Br Co Atchd
Co C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

29 August- 16 September 1944
During this period, there was no major change in the disposition of troops at LORIENT. On 29
Aug General Taylor was relieved from the Div and Colonel Hanson was assigned to command CCA.
On 12 Sept Colonel Harris was assigned to command the Res Comd. On the 6th of September Colonel
Riley returned to duty and resumed command of Div Arty. Relief of the Div at LORIENT by the 94th
Div was an extremely long, drawn-out process. The 94th Div Comdr arrived on 5 Sept, but leading
troops of the Div did not reach the area until noon 10 Sept, and the complete relief was not effected
until 16 Sept.
On 10 Sept the Div, with its mission of containing LORIENT and protecting the south flank of the
THIRD and NINTH ARMIES, wcl:s extended 460 miles from the eastern edge of the BREST area and the
DOUALAS PENINSULA where CT 50 was fighting to AUXERRE. The central section of approximately
220 miles from REDON to ORLEANS waq covered by patrols of the 83d In£ Div.
The Div reconstituted the commands on the completion of the movement into the LORRIS area.
CCA
CCB
50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
603d TD Bn (- )
Tr A & E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

44th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
1 Sect 990th Tdwy Br Co
*
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-Res Comd

9th Armd In£ Bn
·
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )

Div Arty
!28th Armd FA Bn
312th Armd FA BN
Btry 777th AAA Bn

Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bri
?77th AAA Bn' (- )
990th Tdwy Br Co (- )
3398th QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) Rein£ (Atchd to 94th Div)

1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
1 Gun Sect & Adv CP 777th AAA Bn
On the 13th of Sept, before the Div could be completely assembled in the LORRIS area, CCB was
ordered to move without delay to an area east of TROYES. From there the THIRD ARMY ordered the
Command into an assembly area in the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU, the first step towards the next
campaign.
•
CCA (Hanson): From this date to the 13th of Sept the Command continued to contain LORIENT
and actively patroller a line from QUIMPERLE to HENNEBONT and the BLAVET River. The. outposts .
were frequently attacked by enemy patrols and artillery. At no time was ground lost.
On the lOth of Sept elements of the 30lst In£ Regt arrived and began taking over the forward
positions. Initial relief was accomplished on the 12th of Sept. Because this was to be the first combat
experience for the relieving units, troops of the Command were left in the lines for 24 to 48 hours to
accustom the newcomers to the situation. The Command was officially released from the LORIENT
sector 13 Sept at 1200. All troops were detached and Hq of CCA moved to bivouac east of PLOUAY
prior to movement to the Div assembly area near LORRIS.
Res Comd (Harris): Was withdrawn from CCA control12 Sept and given a sector east of BLAVET
River. The last unit of the Div to be relieved at LORIENT, it followed CCA to LORRIS on 16 Se-pt.
CCB (Read): 29 Aug- The Combat Command with an advance guard moved out at 0800 in one
column through GUEMENE- NOZAY- CANDE- ANGERS- and BAUGE. Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz preceded the column by 1Y2 hours. At 1145 the Rcn Co 603d TD Bn was sent south through
NOZAY- NORT and ANCENIS along the LOIRE River to ANGERS and rejoined the column there.
No enemy were encountered enroute. The Command closed in an assembly area just north of PONTIGNE. Engineers were sent south to conduct bridge and road reconnaissance. Contact with elements of the 83d Inf Div was established . . Liaison officers were sent to secure information on enemy
at BLOIS and TOURS. A platoon of Rcn Co 603d TD Bn and a Rcn platoon of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
were dispatched south to secure information of enemy reported in the vicinity of SAUMUR.
t30 Aug- Extensive reconnaissance was carried on to the east, particularly in the vicinity of
SAUMUR and all along the LOIRE River. The Command remained in place. The north bank of the
river near SAUMUR was evacuated the night of the 29th. This was verified by an infantry platoon
and a platoon of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz at 1500 when they entered LA CROIX VERTE dismounted
and found all entrances mined. Two columns were composed as follows :
North Column:
South Column:
Div Hq (Fwd)

44th Armd In£ Bn (- )
69th Tk Bn (- 1 Co)
1 Co 69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn (- 1 Btry)
1 Btry 212th Armd FA Bn
2 Cos 44th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Btry B ?77th AAA Bn (- )
Co C 603d TD Bn (- )
Co B 76th Med Bn
Det A 128th Ord Maint Bn
Co A 128th Ord Maint Bn (- )
Hq & Hq Co CCB
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (- 1 Plat)
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Attached Gas Trucks
Ammunition trains of 69th Tk Bn & 212th Armd FA Bn
31 Aug- At 0730 CCB marched east in two columns from the vicinity of PONTIGNE. Just east
of BEAUGENCY, as the column arrived on the river road, small arms and AT fire was received from
the south side of the river. Two half-tracks were knocked out, but no <;asualties resulted. The enemy
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pulled out when tank fire was placed on his suspected position. The two vehicles were towed into
bivouac and repaired. CCB closed in bivouac 2 miles south of BUCY at 2145. The following day
the Command proceeded through ORLEANS to an assembly area in the vicinity of LORRIS.
2- 16 September 1944
Having received orders to relieve the 35th In£ Div of the responsibility of protecting the south
flank of the THIRD ARMY, the Div directed CCB, which closed in the LORRIS area at 1800 l Sept,
to carry out the mission. · Contact was established with the 83d In£ Div on the west at ORLEANS and
the 35th In£ Div on the east at MONTARGIS. The Div boundary was extended east to AUXERRE.
During CCB' s attachment to the THIRD ARMY contact was established with the SEVENTH ARMY
driving up from the south. This contact was made by patrols of Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz with
the 2d Dragoons of the 2d French Armd Div at SAULIEU on ll Sept.

CHAPTER II
SEILLE RIVER CAMPAIGN
17 September 1944 to 7 November 1944
17 September 1944
The Div continued its movement into the LORRIS assembly area and CCB effected the movement
east which had been ordered by Army the previous day.
CCB (Read): Moved on the following route: LUSIGNY- VENDEUVRE SUR BARSE- JUZENNECOURT- COLOGNE- ANDELOT- NEUFCHATEAU- to an assembly area southeast of MARTIG\NY
LES GERBONVAUX, closing at 2000.
18 September 1944
CCB made contact with the 4th Armd Div in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE. Res Comd arrived in
the LORRIS area and verbal orders from the Commanding General, THIRD ARMY were received
directing movement of the Div (less CCB) to an assembly area near COLOMBEY LES BELLES. In
accordance with these orders, CCA moved out at 2200. The following composition of troops was to
become effective upon arrival in the COLOMBEY LES BELLES area:
CCA
CCB
50th Armd In£ Bn
603d TD Bn (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

44th Armd In£ Bn
·69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd
9th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn (-)
68th Tk Bn (- )
86th Cav Rcn Sq

Div Arty
M~cz

l28th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (- 1 Sect)

(- )

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
Div Hq (Fwd Ech)
l28th Ord Maint Bn
Btry C (- 1 Sect) and Hq (Rr) 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects & Adv CP 777th AAA Bn
3398th QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
CCA (Hanson) : The 50th Armd In£ Bn, 603d TD Bn (-) and the 777th AAA Bn moved at 2200
on the following route: MONTARGIS- SENS- TROYES- BONNET- GONDRECOURT- VANNES
LE CHATEAL- COLOMBEY LES BELLES.
CCB (Read) : Moved at 0930 to an assembly area near SAULXURES LES NANCY. It had been
attached to the XII Corps, assigned to "Task Eorce Sebree", and ordered to attack and seize AMANEE
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HILL in conjunction with the 137th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div; but at 1800 these orders were rescinded by
Corps. Instead, the Command was ordered to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div in the vicinity of
LUNEVILLE. Accordingly, contact was made with the 4th Armd Div and arrangements were made
to effect the relief at 190930.
Res Comd (Harris): Remaining units arrived in the LORRIS area at 1900.
19 September 1944
CCB (Read) : Relief of elements of the 4th Armd Div was effected beginning at 0930. LUNEVILLE
was occupied against sniper and light machine gun fire by two companies of the 44th Armd In£ Bn',
and contact with the 6th Cav south of LA VEZOUSE RIVER was maintained by Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq
Mecz. Bridges at ROSIERES, DAMELEVIERES and DOMBASLE over the MEURTHE River were guarded by Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn. One company of the 44th Armd In£ Bn was placed on the line north
of LUNEVILLE and the Rcn Co 603d TD Bn with one platoon 691st TD Bn was sent to MAIZE to protect
the bridge and reconnoiter north and east. All elements of the Command came under heavy enemy
fire and many mines were encountered. During the night an enemy patrol attempted but failed to
infiltrate through the lines of the 44th Armd In£ Bn. Our artillery fires destroyed 3 German Mark IV
tanks. One of our medium tanks was lost to enemy anti-tank fire .
20 September 1944
In the LUNEVILLE area CCB p ushed tentative fingers east and northeast of the town and continued to receive heavy artillery fire from the enemy for its pains. Late in the day the Command received
orders under which it.was to be relieved and moved north where the enemy had a dangerous salient
thrusting down into the Corps MLR- a line that needed straightening. By now all of the Div had
cleared LORRIS for·COLOMBEY LES BELLES.
CCB (Read): Extended its outposts to the east and northeast of LUNEVILLE. Heavy artillery and
mortar fire and some small arms fire was received during the day. A platoon of medium tanks from
the 69th Tk Bn assisted and covered the withdrawal of an infantry battalion of the 79th In£ Div which
had been cut off by the enemy. Late in the day the Command received orders from XII Corps directing relief by the 2d Cav Gp and 695th TD Gp and movement to an assembly area in the FORET DE
GREMECEY near JALLAUCOURT.
21 September 1944
The Div (Less CCB) completed its move to COLOMBEY LES BELLES. CCB, in accordance with
orders issued the previous day, pulled north into the salient which the 35th In£ Div had pushed toward
the SAAR.
CCB (Read): Began a march at 0822 via DOMBASLE-VARANGEVILLE-HARAUCOURTGELLONCOURT-REMEREVILLE-ERBEVILLER-SORNEVILLE- MONCEL SUR SEILLE- PETTONCOURT- GREMECEY to an assembly area in the FORET DE GREMECEY, closing at 1600. The CP
was located in the west central portion of the woods. At 1030 a message was received from XII Corps
asiigning the Command to the 35th In£ Div. CCB was to move at daylight to attack positions southwest
of l,ANFROICOURT, after which it was to drive south and capture AMANEE HILL in conjunction with
an attack from the south and southeast by the 35th In£ Div and an attack from the west by the 80th
In£ Div.
Res Comd (Harris): The following units, comprising the remainder of the Div (-CCB), closed in
the assembly area at COLOMBEY LES BELLES:
9th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn
CCB jumped off early in the first phase of its swing to clear enemy from the rear of the 35th In£ Div
positions. It stabbed across the SEILLE River and before the day had hardly begun was at. grips with
the Germans. Because there was only one available crossing the combat teams had to follow one
another at first and then fan out to meet the enemy. Bitter fighting developed as the Germans, caught
by the triple thrusts of the 6th Armd, 35th and 80th In£ Divs. tried first to delay and when that became
impossible, attempted to extricate themselves from an untenable position. The Command pushed on,
hurdling each successive obstacle, and reached its primary objectives south of LANFROICOURT.
22 September 1944
The Div (-CCB, 15th and 68th Tk Bns and Div Tns) moved by way of COLOMBEY LES BELLESN404-VEZELISE- TANTONVILLE-HAROUE-BAYON-IC1- ROSIERES AUX SALINES-DOM*
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BASLE-IC8-ERBEVILLER- MONCEL SUR SEILLE to the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT. A reconnaissance patrol of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz moved north and northwest of LEMONCOURT and AULNOIS SUR SEILLE and made contact with the enemy.
CCB (Read) : Commencing at 0700, the movement of CCB was to be made in three columns. The
north column was to move northwest along the FOSSIEUX RIDGE to a point due north of HAN, thence
across the SEILLE River at HAN to ARMAUCOURT and then to the vicinity of LANFROICOURT. It
was to be followed by the reserve column. The south column was to move southwest to ALINCOURT,
thence north to ABONCOURT SUR SEILLE and MANHOUE. At MANHOUE it was to cross the bridge
over the SEILLE River and move to the vicinity of LANFROICOURT. From the crest of the FOSSIEUX
RIDGE south to HAN is a steep hill about 160 feet high. There was no bridge at HAN but the SEILLE
River could be forded there with difficulty. Fords across the SEILLE River are rare. It was decided
to ford at HAN rather than sacrifice hours of delay in building a bridge. The column went down the
hill and at the bottom forded the SEILLE River. At 0723, the north column established contact with
the enemy at ARMAUCOURT. Stiff anti-tank, tank and infantry resistance was overcome and the
column proceeded to its attack position, arriving at 1245. At noon the reserve column, which was
following the north column, approached ARMAUCOURT where it was met by strong enemy resistance.
The town was then held by approximately 1,000 Germans in defensive positions. The column attacked
through the town and captured it after heavy street fighting. The south column moved out at 0700
and met stiff enemy resistance south of MANHOUE. Our attempt to block the main road with Tr B
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was unsuccessful and the troop was driven in by enemy infantry and tanks.
A request for air was denied but Corps artillery interdicted the road.
23 September 1944
The Germans abandoned their positions on AMANEE HILL in the face of a fr.ontal assault durip g
the night by the 35th In£ Div and a flanking thrust by CCB. Consequently the planned attack on the
high ground was cancelled and orders were issued to harass the enemy withdrawal and to cut him off.
CCB was ordered to cut the road running north in two places and bottle the enemy.
The Div was ordered to hold a section of the Corps MLR in FORET DE GREMECEY, assist the 80th
In£ Div and 35th Inf Div in case of counterattack, and send one combat command to XX Corps. To
carry out these orders Div assigned troops as follows:
CCA

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt 35th Inf Div
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Rcn Co & Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd
9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
128th Armd FA Bn

Arty Comd
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (- )

Div Tns
Div Hq (Fwd)
76th Med Bn Armd
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Hq (- ) and Btry C (-) 777th AAA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
15th Tk Bn (- )
603d TD Bn (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )

Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAABn
CO F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- ) Rein£ (Atchd
to 94th In£ Div at LORIENT)
Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
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CCB (Read): At 0715 information was received that the projected attack on AMANEE HILL was
cancelled. Pressure caused by CCB moving down from the north had caused the enemy to withdraw
and permitted the 35th Inf Div coming up from the south to occupy the hill. In accordance with new
orders, CT 44 (McCorrison) was dispatched toward LEYR and by 1415 the town was captured and
0 utposted. Another force consisting of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, one medium tank company and
one light tank platoon from the 69th Tk Bn, and one platoon Co C 603d TD Bn was ordered to move
to the vicinity of ARRAYE ET HAN and block the highway west. Driven out of the town by intense
artillery and mortar fire this force established a defensive line on the high ground between ARMAUCOURT and ARRAYE ETHAN. At 1845 an enemy counterattack on LEYR was repulsed without loss.
Enemy artillery and mortar fire was placed on all our positions throughout the night.
Res Comd (Harris): Was ordered to XX Corps as a mobile reserve in the vicinity of JARNY.
24 September 1944
For the first time since the BREST Campaign, the Div (-Res Comd) now held a continuous
sector. CCB, on the left, had units just north of ARMAUCOURT and the line ran from there northeast
across the SEILLE, along FOSSIEUX RIDGE and down to the FORET DE GREMECEY. CCA maintained the line on the right. The enemy, who had been roughly thrust from his positions on the previous day, attempted for the second time to return but the Div held firm.
CCB (Read): At 1600 CT 44 in LEYR was relieved by elements ef the 35th Inf Div and returned
to an assembly area southwest of LANFROICOURT, leaving only a covering force north of ARMAUCOURT. A strong enemy counterattack was launched on this position late in the day and one company of infantry was brought up to help repulse the attack which was beaten off at 2000 hours. Enemy
artillery remained active throughout the day and night.
Res Comd (Harris) (-68th Tk Bn): Moved via NANCY and TOUL to the vicinity of JARNY and
became a mobile reserve in the XX Corps area. The 68th Tk Bn joined the Res Comd at JARNY.
15th Tk Bn: Closed in bivouac at FORET DE GREMECEY.
25 September 1944
For the third consecutive day the enemy tried to force his way back into positions wrested from
him by CCB, but the Comd did not yield a foot of ground. This enemy attack was typical-tanks and
infantry combined- but our concentrated fire of all types broke it up. CCA was relieved of its portion
of the line by the 35th In£ Div.
CCA (Hanson) : Continued to protect the northeast, north and northwest sectors of the FORET
DE GREMECEY pending relief by elements of the 35th In£ Div which was effected during the day.
The Command, in Corps reserve, moved to an assembly area near SAULZURES LES NANCY and prepared to counterattack any threat to the Corps bridgehead.
CCB (Read): At 0645 an enemy counterattack by three tanks and two hundred infantry on the
position north of ARMAUCOURT was repulsed. At 1500 orders were received from XII Corps for an
attack on MOIVRON in conjunction with the 317th Inf Regt, 80th In£ Div at 0800 the following day.
<;iT 44 moved to the vicinity of LEYR to hold the north-south road and tie in with the 80th Inf Div on
tHe left and the 134th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div on the right. This was accomplished at 1845.
26 September 1944
The enemy still held a small salient thrust down into the XXI Corps MLR in the vicinity of MOIVRON. It was from this area that he had been launching abortive attempts to get behind the FORET
DE GREMECEY, so Corps orders were to eliminate the bulge. The 35th In£ Div, supported by CCB,
was assigned the task. Plans called for the 317th In£ Regt to lead off, supported by CCB' s tanks, and
move from the southeast into MOIVRON. CCB was then to take over the new line. A combination
ofintense enemy artillery and deep mud stalled the attack soon after it started and the 317th came
back, leaving the line as it was.
Composition of Commands:
CCA
CCB
50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

44th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Rcn Co and Co C 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
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Arty Comd
Res Comd (Atchd to XX Corps)

23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (-)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) (Rein£)
(Atchd to 94th Inf Div)
Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
128th Armd FA Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
15th Tk Bn (-)
Tns Comd

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D & Adv CP 777th
3803d QM Trk Co
AAA Bn
Hq Co (-) & Btry C (--) 777th AAA Bn
CCA (Hanson) : Moved to the Div assembly area near SAULXURES LES NANCY as ordered.
CCB (Read): From 0745 until 0800 the 212th Armd FA Bn placed a concentration on MOIVRON
while a medium tank company and a tank destroyer platoon placed direct fire on the town. At 0800
the attack jumped off with the 2d Bn 317th Inf Regt coming through LEYR and attacking MOIVRON
from the southeast. A medium tank company of the 69th Tk Bn was to move up behind the infantry
advance and be prepared to counterattack or support the attack with additional direct fire. The 44th
Armd Inf Bn was to move up after the attack jumped off and extend the line from MOIVRON east to the
road junction south of ARRAYE ETHAN.
t
It was necessary for the 44th Armd Inf Bn to take up a defensive position north of LEYR when the
infantry of the 317th In£ Regt withdrew through our lines. Exceedingly boggy terrain prevented
proper maneuver of tanks across country. Two medium tanks hit mines on the road just south of
MOIVRON and four medium tanks mired down in the mud at the edge of town. All six tanks had to be
abandoned when the infantry withdrew. These tanks were later destroyed by the enemy.
25th Armd Engr Bn: Constructed a 160-foot treadway bridge at BRIN SUR SEILLE.
Div Hq (Fwd)

•

27 September 1944
CCB continued to hold stubbornly in the face of heavy shelling.
CCA (Hanson): CT 15 (Lagrew) consisting of:
Rcn Plat 15th Tk Bn
AG Plat 15th Tk Bn
Co A 15th Tk Bn
Co A 50th Armd In£ Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
was sent to vicinity of MAZERULLES on alert status to counterattack in case of enemy penetration
and to establish a road block.
CCB (Read): The 44th Armd Inf Bn continued to hold ground north of LEYR awaiting resumption
of the attack of the 80th Inf Div or relief by elements of that Div. Considerable enemy artillery and
mortar fire with some small arms fire continued. The Rcn Co 603d TD Bn reverted to Battalion control except for one platoon which was attached to Co C 603d TD Bn. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
was relieved except for one platoon which remained under Command control.
Div Arty (Riley): Hq Btry 212th Armd FA Bn received enemy artillery fire at three different times
and was forced to displace to its alternate position.
Composition of troops:
CCA
CCB
50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (-)
231st Armd FA Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Rein£)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co C with 3d Plat Rcn Co Atchd 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
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Res Comd (Atchd to XX Corps)

Tns Comd

9th Armd In£ Bn
I 28th Armd FA Bn
68th Tk Bn (-)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) Rein£ (Atchd to
94th Div at LORIENT

Arty Comd
Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co- F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: l Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

Hq & Hq Co
Div Hq (Fwd)
Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAABn

28 September 1944
CT 15 was already at MAZERULLES and was to be absorbed by CCA upon the Command's
arrival. When the Div was ordered to send a reconnaissance troop to Res Comd at XX Corps, Tr C
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned the mission. CCB continued to hold.
29 September 1944
Ordered to carry out the plan of the previous day, CCA moved from assembly to the vicinity of
MAZERULLES and prepared to cover withdrawal of the 35th In£ Div or to counterattack through that
unit to restore Corps' Main Line of Resistance. The Res Comd reverted to Div control upon its arrival
at 2020 from XX Corps where it had been in mobile reserve at JARNY and BRIEY. The Command
prepared to move into the Div assembly area.
30 September 1944
General GeorgeS. Patton Jr with General Manton S. Eddy visited the Div CP at SAULZURES at
1725 and issued orders through General Eddy for the Div (less CCB) to attack through the 35th In£
Div to restore the Corps MLR.
.
1 Accordingly Div issued Field Order No· 22 directing the attack at daylight, l October. Composi·
tion of troops:
CCA

CCB

50th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn (-)
Co B Rein£ and 1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr A Rein£ 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

9th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn (-)
Co A Rein£ 603d TD Bn (- )

40th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz Rein£
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn Rein£
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (- )
777th AAA Bn (- )

Div Arty

Div Tns

128th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

l28th Ord Maint Bn
76th Med Bn A
3803d QM Trk Co

Res Comd
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Div Tns

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) (Rein£) (at

642d QM Trk Co
Btry C (-) 777th AAA Bn

LORIENT)

Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 PlatCo D 68th Tk Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)
Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAABn

CCA (Hanson): Ordered to move to an assembly area east of the SEILLE River, the Command
prepared to attack north of FORET DE GREMECEY on Div order to gain high ground between FRESNES
EN SAULNOIS and LEMONCOURT.
CCB (Read): Was ordered to continue its present mission.
Res Comd (Harris): Was ordered to move to assembly area near PETTONCOURT, prepared to
attack east on Div order to gain high ground north of CHAMBREY and south of FORET DE GREMECEY.
Div Arty (Riley): Was ordered to support the attack.
1 October 1944
As planned, the Div attacked east and northeast through units of the 35th Inf Div, with the mission
of restoring the Corps Main Line of Resistance. CCA attacked to the north of the FORET DE GREMECEY with two combat teams abreast and one following, and by early morning the Command h<;id
reached and captured its objective: the high ground between FRESNES EN SAULNOIS and LEMONCOURT. One combat team was shifted to protect the left rear of the new area. Res Comd attacked
east to the south of the FORET DE GREMECEY with two combat teams abreast and by early morning
had captured its objective: the ridge north of CHAMBREY. Both Commands were relieved during
the afternoon and evening by elements of the 35th Inf Div which had closely followed the attack. They
then returned to the assembly area east of NANCY and, in Corps Reserve, prepared to move out to
repel any counterattack. CCB continued its holding action in the sector between the 80th and 35th
Inf Divs.
CCA (Hanson): Closed in an advanced assembly area near ALINCOURT by 0200. At 0620 the
Command moved into the attack with CT 15 on the left and CT 50 on the right, closely supported by
CT 15-A. CT 15 attacked north over terrain which included the rising ground near MALAUCOURT
SUR SEILLE. CT 50 also attacked north but moved along the western edge of the FORET DE GREMECEY, flushing the enemy from his cover. Because of recent rain the small stream south and west
of the MALAUCOURT SUR SEILLE-JALLAUCOURT area presented a temporary barrier, but prompt
action by forward elements in throwing down log crossings enabled the attack to move forward with
a minimum loss of time. Just north of FORET DE GREMECEY one such crossing was constructed under
small arms fire from an enemy unit in the woods. Immediate action by our infantry neutralized this
fire. About half-way to the objective the infantry dismounted from half-tracks and fought the remainder of the distance on foot. As the attack progressed CT 15-A was ordered to a position midway between the two leading combat teams. At 0900 CT 15 reached its objective and shortly thereafter CT
50 captured its part of the Command objective. At 1200 CT 15-A went into position to the left rear
of the Command objective to -grotect that flank.
Res Comd (Harris): The Command divided its troops as follows:
CT 9 (Godfrey)

CT 68 (Davall)

9th Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
2 Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
3 Plats Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
Comd Res

68th Tk Bn (-)
1 Co 9th Armd Inf Bn
3 Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777 AAA Bn

Co A 603d TD Bn (-2 Plats)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-1 Plat)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
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The Command launched its attack in conjunction with CCA at 0620 with CT 9 on the left and CT
68 on the right. Upon crossing the front line of the 35th Inf Div it encountered heavy artillery and
small arms fire and mines. The objective was seized at 0942. At 1000 the Command's reserve troops
were committed to hold the objective against strong enemy resistance. At 1045 the Command extended its operations south and seized the town of CH'AMBREY which had been held in force by the
enemy. Troops dug in on the objective and held against repeated enemy counterattacks and heavy
artillery fire while the 35th Inf Div moved up and occupied that portion of the Corps Main Line of
Resistance within its zone. When relieved by the 35th In£ Div the Command withdrew under cover
of darkness to an assembly area west of PETTONCOURT.
Div Arty: Shortly before and during the attack Div Arty fired heavy concentrations on MALADCOURT SUR SEILLE, JALLAUCOURT and FOSSIEUX.
CCB (Read): The 44th Armd Inf Bn with one medium tank company and one tank destoyer platoon
attached continued to hold an east and west line north of LEYR between the l34th Inf Regt, 35th Inf
Div on the right and the 317th Inf Regt, 80th In£ Div on the left.
2-5 October 1944
After units of the Div were relieved by the 35th Inf Div they coil.tinued to withdraw to the Div
assembly area east of NANCY on alert status in Corps reserve. The l28th and 23lst Armd FA Bns were
given the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 35th In£ Div Arty but remained under Div control.
Res Comd completed its movement to the assembly area, leaving a covering force consisting of Hq
and one company 9th Armd Inf Bn, one company 68th Tk Bn and one platoon 603d TD Bn west of
MONCEL SUR SEILLE.
6 October 1944
Once again the Corps decided to attack north from the line held by CCB to eliminate the enemy
salient in the vicinity of MOIVRON. This time it was to be mainly a 6th Armd operation with the two
infantry divisions coming in on the flanks to consolidate and hold when the armor had driven through.
The final objective was to be the high ground west of LETRICOURT. CCB was to lead off and CCA
was to take over when the primary objectives were reached. D-Day was set for 8 October. On that
day CCB was to move out and CCA was to 'c ome up to the vicinity of BOUXIERES, prepared to reinforce CCB and advance through on order.
The covering force left by CCA west of MONCEL was relieved by elements of the 86th Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz. CCB remained in position, receiving heavy artillery fire .
CCB continued reconnaissance for forward assembly areas and routes and organized four combat
teams. CCA was organized into 3 combat teams. Composition of commands at 1300 follows:
CCA

CCB

44th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn (- )
Co A 603d TD Bn, Reinf
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

50th Armd Inf Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (- )
69th Tk Bn
Cos A and C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Cos B and C 603d TD Bn, Rein£
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )

Div Arty
!28th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry C (- l Sect) & Btry D (-1 Sect)
777th AAA Bn
Co A 86th Cml Bn

Div Tns
l28th Ord Maint Bn
76th Med Bn A
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

Div Hq (Fwd)
Sect Btry C & Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn.
*

87 *

The four combat teams of CCB were composed as follows:
CT 69 (Forrest)
CT 50 (Wall)
69th Tk Bn (-1 M Tk Co & l L Tk Plat)
Cos A & C 9th Armd Inf Bn
CoB 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
lst Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
3 Sections Btry B 777th AAA Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn (-2 Rifle Cos)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
Plat CoD 69th Tk Bn
Plat Co C '-603d TD Bn
2 Sections Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)
CT 9 (Godfrey)
15th Tk Bn (-1 L Tk Plat)
Cos A & C 50th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (- 1 Plat)
lst Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 5 Sections)

9th Armd In£ Bn (- 2 Cos)
Plat CoB 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )

The plan of attack was as follows: CCB was to move out at dawn 8 October to seize ARRAYE ET
HAN, AJONCOURT, JEANDELINCOURT, MOIVRON and to clear the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIL
D'AJONCOURT. CT 69 was to attack on the right, seize and hold ARRAYE ET HAN 'a nd AJONCOURT until relieved by the l34th In£ Regt of the 35th In£ Div, and protect the northeast flank of the
Command. CT 15 was to clear the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIS D'AJONCOURT, seize and hold
JEANDELINCOURT until relieved by the 317th Inf Regt of the 80th In£ Div, and protect the north and
northwest flank of the Command. CT 50 was to seize and hold MOIVRON until relieved by elemE\nts
of the 317th Inf Regt, and CT 9 was to be prepared to move on Command order. Div Arty, reinforced,
was to support the attack: 212th Armd FA Bn and Co A 86th Cml Bn were in direct support of CT 69;
231st Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CT 15; and 696th FA Bn was in direct support of CT 50.
CCA was to stand by. in the assembly area near BOUXIERES, prepared to pass through CCB.
8 October 1944
The three-pronged attack of CCB moved out on schedule and early in the day seized some of its
primary objectives. In a quick thrust on the left flank CT 50 surrounded MOIVRON and forced its
way into the town. On the right flank success was almost as rapid in spite of a heavy fog that complicated operations. ARRAYE ET HAN was the first town to fall to the Command.
Coordination of infantry, tank, artillery and plane maneuvers worked so smoothly in the center
that enemy in the town of JEANDELINCOURT were completely disorganized and routed. The fighting
on all fronts was bitter and at times desperate, and casualties on both sides were high. Objective
after objective fell to the determined onslaught and by 1400 all objectives were seized and the stage
was set for the second act-the attack of CCA on the BOIS DES TRAPPES. At the end of the day
a tight defensive line was tied in between the 80th Inf Div on the west and the 35th Inf Div on the east.
CCB (Read): CT 50 ·advanced north through enemy resistance and attacked MOIVRON from the
east, entering the town and beginning mopping-up operations at 0800. At 1323 the town was cleared
and turned over to· the 317th Inf Regt. CT 15 advanced north through enemy resistance consisting
mainly of small arms and mor.tar fire. At 0845 units reached the edge of the BOIS DE BRASQUIN
and BOIS D' AJONCOURT while other units turned west to JEANDELINCOURT. JEANDELINCOURT
-was reached at 0920 and by 1130 the town was contained on the southeast and north. On the north
the 80th Inf Div was firing into the town from MONT ST JEAN. The town was shelled heavily by
artillery and bombed and strafed by air support. The enemy ran into the town from MONT ST JEAN
and hid in a factory. Enroute he was subjected to severe machine gun fire by CT 15. CT 15 shelled
the factory with direct fire and brought in a perfectly coordinated fighter-bomber strike which set the
buildings afire. When the enemy ran back up the hill he was again subjected to heavy machine gun
fire•. Those who lived surrendered. The town was captured at 1300 and the Combat Team was relieved by the 319th Inf Regt. In the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIS DE HANCOURT area CT 15
encountered heavy resistance, so Co B 9th Armd In£ Bn was relieved from CT 9 and moved forward
to assist. At 1206 Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn was relieved from CT 69 and was sent forward . By 1400 both
woods were clear of enemy. The advance of CT 69 was slowed by a very heavy fog which in one way
was an advantage inasmuch as it served as a screen for the advance; however, at 0750 it was forced
to halt about one mile south of ARRAYE ETHAN because of lack of observation. It resumed the ad* 88 *

vance at 0830 and closed .in on the town on three sides and attacked by direct fire. At 1000 the town
was occupied and later in the day turned over to the 134th In£ Regt. CT 69 then was given BOIS DE
CHENICOURT and the town of CHENICOURT as additional objectives. By dark the woods had been
cleared and the town was covered by fire . Because of extremely heavy anti-tank and artillery fire
from high ground north and east of the town and the inadvisability of occupying a town located in the
valley, this attack was not launched. The town continued to be covered by intense artillery and
direct fire by CT 69.
CCA (Hanson) : At 1320 CCA was ordered to assemble immediately in the vicinity of BOIS DU
RAPPOUT. The Command closed in this area at 1645. Orders were issued for CCA to pass through
CCB, pick up the 9th Armd In£ Bn, and seize the LETRICOURT area the following morning. CCB was
to protect the flanks of CCA during this operation.
9 October 1944
With CCB firmly holding objectives it had seized on the previous day and aggressively protecting
both flanks, CCA broke through the center of the line and fanned out for a triple thrust against the
BOIS DES TRAPPES. The left and the center column found relatively light opposition, since the enemy
was still reeling from the swift punches of the previous day. By mid-pay CTs 68 and 9 had entered
and outposted the western end of the BOIS DES TRAPPES.
On the right action was different. Enemy in the town of CHENICOURT defended stubbornly
and poured heavy fire from all types of weapons into the flank of the right column. The advance of
· CT 44 was greatly slowed by this resistance. It was necessary for CCB to send up reinforcements
and it was not until CHENICOURT was finally captured late in the day that pressure on this flank
was relieved.
In two days the Div had captured four strongly-held villages and liquidated the MOIVRON salient
through which the enemy was threatening the Corps front.
CCA (Hanson) : Began its attack at 0615 with the following three combat teams abreast:
CT 68 (Davall) Left

CT 44 (McCorrison) Right

68th Tk Bn (- )
Co 44th Armd Inf Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn (- )
Co 68th Tk Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
CT 9 (Godfrey) Center

9th Armd Inf Bn
Despite heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire CT 68 on the left made the most rapid headway,
entering the BOIS DES TRAPPES at 1000 and at 1200 reaching the northern edge of the woods where
it immediately reorganized and dug in. The greatest difficulty was getting heavy vehicles through
the woods but by 1245 the Combat Team reported consolidation of its objective. In the center, CT 9
reached the northern edge of the woods shortly after CT 68, reorganized, and dug in. The advance
of CT 44 on the right was constantly harassed by fire of all types from CHENICOURT and high ground
beyond. Forward elements reached the east-west road on the northern edge of the BOIS D' AULNOIS
at approximately 1130. This point was later designated as the final objective and it was necessary
to send reinforcements to CT 44 in order to protect the right flank from aggressive enemy action.
Heavy artillery fire caused many casualties in this team. At 1424 enemy tanks were reported moving
into the vicinity from the north. Artillery fire was placed on the area and the tanks withdrew after
a loss of three of seven tanks. Again at 1530 enemy tanks and infantry were observed in the vicinity
of ABAUCOURT. This threat was neutralized by artillery fire from the 80th Inf Div. The 80th Inf
Div was very efficient in its relief of the Command's forward positions, having followed closely behind
the combat teams. Relief of Combat Teams 68 and 9 was effected later in the day but darkness prevented relief of CT 44 that night. Command units withdrew to assembly areas south of LEYR and went
into Corps Reserve in support of 35th and 80th Inf Divs.
CCB (Read): CT 15 covered the left (northwest) flank and CT 69 the -right (northeast) flank for
the attack by CCA through the position held by CCB. The 9th Armd Inf Bn became part of CCA as
the attack began. CTs 50 and 9, the remaining elements of the Combat Command, reverted to Res
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Comd when elements of the 318th Inf Regt moved through the BOIS DU FOURASSE. As the 317th
Inf Regt moved up behind CCA, CT 15 was relieved from the mission of covering the left flank. CT 50
(- Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn which was part of CT 69) was ordered to return to billet area east of NANCY.
CTs 15 and 50 moved out at 1600 to return to billets.
10-ll-12-13 October 1944
Relief of CTs 44 and 69 by elements of the 317th Inf Regt in the vicinity of CHENICOURT and the
BOIS D' AULNOIS was effected and the units withdrew to assembly areas where the Div regrouped
as follows:
CCA
CCB
9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (-)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn Rein£
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (-)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn Rein£
Tr B Rein£ 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd
Div Arty
44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-J
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-) .

128th Ord Maint Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D (-) and 1st Plat Btry C 777th
AAABn

Div Tns

Div Hq (Fwd)

76th Med Bn A
Sect Btry C & Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C (-) 777th AAA Bn
CCA (Hanson): Withdrew to an assembly area near LEYR.
CCB (Read): Relief of CT 69 was completed at 0900 by the 3d Bn, 317th Inf Regt, 80th Inf lJiv.
Units moved to permanent type billets east of NANCY where the Command was on the alert to move
on one hour's notice.
Div Arty (Riley): Div Arty remained in position, reinforcing fires of 35th and 80th In£ Div. Later
it was given the mission of reinforcing Corps Arty. The 212th Armd FA Bn was prepared to move with
CCB in the event that its mission took it out of supporting range of Div Arty. Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq
Mecz (-)was relieved from attachment to the 94th In£ Div, NINTH ARMY and reverted to 6th Armd
Div, THIRD ARMY.
14- 15 October 1944
During the night of the 13th- 14th, between the hours of 0225 to 0515, Hq CCA was subjected
to an enemy artillery barrage.' A total of 13 rounds of estimated 280mm fell in the CP area. As
a result the Command Post was moved to a new area approximately lf2 mile south of BOUXIERES
AUX CHENES. The 9th Armd In£ Bn also received heavy artillery fire for two hours and moved to
a new bivouac area south of BOUXIERES AUX CHENES. On the 14th Div Arty fired one TOT at the
request of XII Corps and 3 counterbattery missions, and on the next day fired concentrations upon
enemy personnel and vehicles and one counterbattery mission. The 212th and 231st Armd FA Bns
received light counterbattery fire. Enemy artillery fire increased. Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
moved from LORIENT to join the Div.
16 October 1944
The 15th Tk Bn, with a secondary mission of reinforcing Div Arty fires, relieved the 68th Tk Bn
in its sector. This relief was effected at 1502. Oral orders were issued relieving units under CCA
in the field and assigning other units to CCA under the Div rotation policy. CCA continued to maintain troops in the vicinity of LEYR, prepared for movement to meet any counterattack. Composition
of troops:
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CCB

CCA

9th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Co B Rein£ 603d TD Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
. 25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
Co A Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)
Res Comd

Div Arty

44th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
603d TD Bn (-)

l28th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (- ) .

Div Hq (Fwd)

Div Tns

l Sect Btry C and l Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

76th. Med Bn A
l28th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

17-18 October 1944
To compensate for a shortage of l05mm ammunition and in preparation for resumption of the
offensive on 8 November, XII Corps ordered that tanks and tank destroyers be used to reinforce fires
of Div Arty.
Various changes in assignment among commands occurred.
CCA (Hanson): Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn were transferred to CCB. Btry
C 777th AAA Bn was assigned to CCB at 1500. CoB 603d TD Bn was assigned to reinforce the fires
of Div Arty.
CCB (Read): Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn were transferred to CCA. Btry
B 777th AAA Bn was assigned to CCA at 1500.
CCA (Hines): Co B 603d TD Bn and Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn moved to the LEYR area. Colonel
Hines arrived to assume command. The Command remained in Corps Reserve in immediate support
of front line units.
CCB (Read): Co A 603d TD Bn and CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn moved into the assembly area.
Res Comd (Harris) : Was ordered to guard crossing of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers.
20-24 October 1944
Res Comd was assigned the additional mission of guarding the LIVERDUN bridge. Tr A 86th
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz Command Post moved to BELLEVILLE to coordinate bridge guards. With the return
on the 22d of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) and reconnaissance platoons from tank battalions of
the Div, the entire Div was together for the first time since 13 August.
24-25 October 1944
CCA (Hines): On Div request a patrol of four men was sent out at 2300 to investigate a reported
enemy artillery piece north of LAY ST CHRISTOPHE. The patrol returned, reporting that only friendly
troops were contacted.
Res Comd (Harris): The covering force west of the MONCEL SUR SEILLE was relieved at 0930
by Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.
Div Arty (Riley): Hq Btry 23lst Armd FA Bn displaced to the vicinity of LEYR after receiving 30
rounds of enemy artillery fire .
26 October 1944
As part of the Div policy of rotating troops on the line with units that had been resting, relief of
CCA by Res Comd troops began shortly after daylight and was completed by 1300. Composition of
forces under this transfer was as follows:
*
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CCA

CCB

50th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn Rein£
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)

9th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co B 2 5th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn Rein£
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

Div Arty
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-)

44th Armd In£ Bn
69th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
. 603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )

Div Tns

Div Hq (Fwd)
1 Sect Btry C and 1 Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

CCA (Hines) : Was assigned the mission of maintaining a covering force west of MONCEL SUR
SEILLE. Elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were assigned this task. The Command was aJso
to guard the 14 river crossings on the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers. Four of the bridges wElre
assigned to the 25th Armd Engr Bn and the remainder to the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.
Res Comd (Harris): Relieved CCA and disposed itself in the vicinity of LEYR in immediate support
of front line units.
Div Arty (Riley): 69th Tk Bn relieved the 15th Tk Bn of the mission of reinforcing Div Arty fires.
27- 28-29-30 October 1944
The 231st Armd FA Bn neutralized an enemy observation post. On 27 October XII Corps directed
that tanks be relieved from the mission of reinforcing artillery fire because their fire was unnecessary.
Accordingly the 69th Tk Bn was released from further fire missions. On 28 O ctober CCA was ordered
to guard the railroad bridge at POMPEY and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz effected relief at 2015. On
29 October Btry C 777th AAA Bn (- ) was released from Res Comd and assigned to Div Tns the s,a me
day.
31 October- 7 November 1944
On 31 October the 128th Armd FA Bn displaced from the vicinity of BRATTE to an area near
PONT A MOUSSON where it registered fires from several alternate positions for support of the projected offensive of 8 November. On 2 November the 9th Armd In£ Bn and the 68th Tk Bn were attached to CCA and the 50th Armd Inf Bn and the 15th Tk Bn were attached to CCB. On 4 November
CCB Command Post displaced from the vicinity of ESSEY LES NANCY to the vicinity of ST MAX,
closing there at 1045, in order-to make room for XII Corps' advance CP. On 6 November at 0800
the 25th Armd Engr Bn was relieved of maintenance responsibility on four of the MOZELLE River
bridges.
On 7 November orders were issued by Div to all commands, alerting them for movement at 0800
the following day.
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CHAPTER III
SAAR CAMPAIGN
8 November to 24 December 1944
The projected THIRD ARMY drive through the SAAR River valley and on to the RHINE gave the
Diva major role. XII Corps with the 26th, 35th and 8bth Inf Divs from right to left, followed by the
4th and 6th Armd Divs, was to advance generally east from the NANCY bridgehead and cross the
SAAR south of SAARBRUCKEN.
Corps Mission: XII Corps was to attack on order to seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity
of FALQUEMONI and, in conjunction with XX Corps on the left, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ area.
Division Mission: The 6th Armd was to cross the SEILLE River on Corps order at PORT SUR
SEILLE, CLEMERY and NOMENY to attack through the 80th Inf Div and secure the FALQUEMONT
area until relieved by the 80th Div. In conjunction with XX Corps the Div was to destroy any enemy
forces withdrawing from METZ. It was also to be prepared to advance northeast.
The Div plan placed CCA on the right to cross the SEILLE River at either CLEMERY or NOMENY,
or both, and attack south of the line RAUCOURT-LUPPY-REMILLY, striking the NIED River on
a broad front. CCB on the left was to cross the SEILLE River at PORT SUR SEILLE, swing north and
then east generally along the ridge through VIGNY and BUCHY al'ld northeast, also striking the
NIED on a broad front. The Div CP was at SAULZURES LES NANCY.
Composition of Troops:
CCA (Hanson)

CCB (Read)

68th Tk Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd and 1
Truck Plats) plus (1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co)
Co B Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co D 69th Tk Bn

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (1 Armd and 1
Truck Plats) plus (1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co)
Co C Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Div Arty Comd (Riley)

Res Comd (Harris)
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn Reinforced by:
183d FA Gp
276th FA Bn
696th FA Bn
752d FA Bn

69th Tk Bn (- Co D)
44th Armd Inf Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (- ) Co C:
(3 Truck Plats)
C 603d TD Bn (-)
' Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
777th AAA Bn (-)
997th Tdwy Br Co (-2 Sects)

Div Tns (Droste)
Div Hq (Fwd)
76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

8 November 1944
Combat Commands, prepared to effect crossings of the SEILLE and exploit the 80th Div' s attack,
moved from the vicinity of NANCY to assembly areas near the proposed crossing sites and organized
combat teams for the operation.
CCA (Hines): Moved at 0800 to the initial assembly area just west of DOMMARTIN and organized its combat teams. Plans were completed for passing through the 80th Inf Div and crossing the
SEILLE River at CLEMERY or NOMENY.
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Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 9 (Godfrey)

CT 68 (Davall)

9th Armd Inf Bn (-)
CoD 69th Tk Bn (- )
Co B 68th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
(- 2 Sects)
·
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

68th Tk Bn (- )
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
3d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
2 Sects 1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA
Bn
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tns

Res
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )
Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn

Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (- 2 Plats)
(with Sect Tdwy Br Co Atchd)

CCB (Read) : Completed plans for crossing the SEILLE River on the left of CCA and attacking
northeast. The following combat teams were formed within the Div assembly area and they prepared
to move to an initial Combat Command assembly area the following morning.
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 15 (Lagrew)

CT 50 (Wall)

15th Tk Bn (- 1 Med Tk Co & 1 Lt
Tk Co)
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn (- )
Co C 15th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
(+)

(- )

.

1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

3d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
CT 86 (Brindle)

CCB Res

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co D 15th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB (Hq only)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Co C 603d TD Bn (- )
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Engr Br Co (- )

(+)

2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris) : Completed plans for carrying out its mission of being prepared to advance on Div
order behind either Combat Command or to engage in a separate operation. The Command displaced to an assembly area in the vicinity east of AITON, closing at 1120. The following Combat
Teams were organized:
CT 69 (Forest)

CT 44 (Brown)

69th Tk Bn (- Cos C & D)
Co A 44th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn ( +)
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat 997th Tdwy Br Co
Mine Roller Platoon

44th Armd In£ Bn (- 1 Co)
Co C 69th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (- 1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (~ 1 Plat)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-Cos A & B;
- 1 Plat Co C)
603d TD Bn (- 3 Lettered Cos)
Bridge Co (- 1 Plat)

Div Arty (Riley) : Separated into two groups and prepared to move on Div order. The Command
supported the 80th Inf Div attack and fired 69 battalion concentrations and 5 battery concentrations.
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Group No l (6th Armd Div Arty)

Group No 2 (l83d FA Gp) (Support

(Support CCB)

CCA)

l28th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

23lst Armd FA Bn
276th Armd FA Bn
752d FA Bn (155 How)

9 November 1944
CCB, delayed by flooded conditions along the MOSELLE River, had now come up and begun
crossing the SEILLE at PORT SUR SEILLE. Since Res Comd was no longer needed on the north,
it was scheduled to follow generally along the axis VIGNY- HAN-SUR-NIED, prepared to furnish
reinforcement to either combat command or to operate as a separate force . The Div Adv CP moved
to BONICOURT.
CCA (Hines): Marched from its initial assembly area to the vicinity of MANONCOURT SUR
SEILLE where all combat teams went into bivouac. CT 9 sent a strong patrol into south NOMENY to
clear it and protect the bridge construction crews.
CCB (Read): Displaced from the Div assembly area at.NANCY not th through ST MAX, LAY ST
SHRISTOPHE, STE GENEVILLE, FORET DE FACO to PORT SUR SEILLE. From this initial assembly
area CT 86 crossed the flooded SEILLE River with considerable difficulty. The Combat Team, after
passing through EPLY, made first contact with the enemy when it encountered anti-tank guns west of
ALEMONT. By 2000 all of CT 86 and CT15 had completed crossing the river; the remainder of CCB
remained on the west side.
Res Comd (Harris): Remained during the day in its assembly area near AITON where it was
prepared to follow either CCA or CCB.
lO November 1944
CCA (Hines) : Advanced northeast through the 80th Inf Div bridgehead to the ·vicinity of LUPPY
and SECOURT. CT 9, in the lead, reached SECOURT at 0815 and continued in the direction of
SOLGNE, passing through the 80th Inf Div. The Combat Team met increasingly sharp resistance
in the outskirts of LUPPY but after a battle lasting all afternoon the town was captured and CT 9 went
into bivouac for the night. CT 68 followed CT 9 to a crossroad just south of SOLGNE, turned right
at that point, and proceeded to MONCHEUX which was then held by elements of the 80th Inf Div.
Progress had been slow during the day because of muddy terrain and road blocks which the Germans
had constructed of felled trees.
CCB (Read): The remainder of the Command commenced crossing the SEILLE River at PORT
SUR SEILLE at 0500. Passage was slow because of heavy mud but by 0855 CT 15 had begun an
attack on VIGNY across country. Reconstruction of a blown railroad overpass east of VIGNY delayed
thE) Command three hours. At 1230 the force secured VIGNY and after a two-hour battle it seized
BUC HY. Afte r outposting BUCHY the unit bivouaced there for the night. Remaining elements of
CCB moved into the area by 1700 and contact was established with CCA on the right at BEAZ by CT
86. The 2d Inf Regt of the 5th Inf Div closely followed the Command on the north flank and assisted
greatly in securing ground gained. Preparations were made to continue the attack east the next day.
The following reorganization was effected within the Command:
Co D 15th Tk Bn reverted from CT 86 to CT 15
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz from CT 86 to CT 50
Co D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz from CT 86 to CT 15
3d Plat Co C 25th Engrs from CT 15 to CCB Res
2d Plat Co A 25th Engrs from Res to CT 15
CT 86 was thus dissolved and its remaining elements passed to CCB reserve.
Div Arty (Riley) : Fired preparations for the attack of the Div and began displacing forward. By
midnight all of the Command had crossed the SEILLE River and moved to the vicinity of VIGNY.
ll November 1944
CCA (Hines) : At 0700 a ten-minute artillery preparation was placed on the town of BECHY.
At 0710 CT 9 continued its advance and at 0900 it was fighting for entry into this town. The road
leading into town was blocked by a mine field that damaged two tanks. Dug-in enemy riflemen resisted
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strongly in a brief but bitter fight and the Combat Team continued its advance. On the eastern side
of BECHY CT 9 again met resistance but overcame it and continued toward the NIED River under
heavy artillery fire.
The bridge at HAN SUR NIED was intact. Light and medium tanks and tank destroyers of the
advance guard covered the bridge with fire and knocked out several enemy vehicles and guns which
w~re trying to retreat across it. A hasty assault against the bridge was organized by the advance guard
in conjunction with a battalion from the 80th Inf Div. A platoon of CoB 68th Tk Bn moved down the
hilL followed by infantry and a detachment of 4 men of CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn. They were covered
by fire of the tank destroyers and the remainder of the company of medium and light tanks. The
medium tank platoon succeeded in crossing the bridge although one tank was knocked out and the
platoon leader was killed. The Engineers, working under heavy fire of all types, succeeded in cutting
the wires leading to prepared demolitions on and under the bridge. 80th Inf Div troops together with
a few of the 9th Armd Inf Bn and a platoon of tanks of the 68th Tk Bn succeeded in holding the bridgehead the remainder of the day though under continuous fire. For this heroic action, CoB 68th Tk Bn
and its attachments later received a Presidential citation.
At 1620 an organized assault to reinforce the brdigehead was initiated. Infantry advanced down
the hill under supporting fires of all weapons and by dark some 100 men had crossed over the bridge.
At dark the remainder of the medium tank company and the light tanks had crossed; after dark the
remainder of CT 9 together with a regiment of the 80th Inf Div had entered HAN SUR NIED. During
the night the town was mopped up and an attack by the 80th Inf Div gained the ridge beyond.
At 0730 CT 68 continued its advance moving northeast from MONCHEUX. Little enemy resistance was met but blown bridges and road blocks formed obstacles which at times considerably retarded its progress. The Combat Team ran into ·heavy resistance in the vicinity of TRAGNY, but by noon
the town had been taken and CT 68 pushed on. Light resistance was overcome in the town of TH,IMONVILLE. The advance guard attacked and captured MORVILLE SUR NIED in cooperation with
80th Div troops. During the latter part of the afternoon they continued forward and after heavy fighting reached the river south of BAUDRECOURT. The main body moved to MORVILLE SUR NIED and
bovouaced for the night after constructing a treadway bridge at TRAGNY.
CCB (Read) : Moved out at 0700 in two columns. CT 15, on the left, advanced rapidly through
BEUX to ANCERVILLE where the bridge over the NIED River was blown just as elements of the unit
arrived. CT 15 then turned north toward LEMUD in an attempt to secure a crossing. Upon arrival
in LEMUD, the Combat Team found the bridge intact but as infantry attempted to make a quick crossing this bridge was also blown. Elements of the team were rushed north again and after considerable
difficulty secured intact a bridge just south of SANRY SUR NIED. Although the bridge was intact
it was under 18 inches of water. Investigation disclosed that passage under the bridge was blocked
by debris. When the debris was removed the river fell rapidly. This bridge also had been prepared
for demolition but quick action by an Engineer officer in cutting wires under intense fire prevented
the enemy from destroying the bridge. Enemy defenders on the south side of the river were caught
completely by surprise and annihilated. The shallow bridgehead was immediately reinforced, although it was under constant fire from enemy fortifications on high ground near SORBEY.
'·
At 0700 CT 50 on the right moved out with the mission of securing a crossing at REMILLY. Enroute, it received heavy small arms and artillery fire and about 1 mile north of BECHY it ran into an
extensive mine field which had to be by-passed crosscountry. Upon arrival at REMILLY at about 1030
the Combat Team found the bridge blown. The unit remained in position and directed heavy artillery
fire on the town, prepared to support CT 15 if needed.
At 1445 one company of •infantry from CT 50 and 1 reconnaissance troop from CT 86 were sent
to reinforce CT 15 .
Res Comd (Harris): Still in Div reserve, the Command displaced from its assembly area, crossed
the SEILLE River, and went into a new assembly area near ALEMONT. CT 69 was assigned to CCA
at 2100 and prepared to move forward. ·
Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparations for the attack of the Div and displaced forward to the vicinity
of VIGNY, the last units closing at 0345.
12 November 1944
The Div succeeded in enlargipg both bridgeheads across the NIED against bitter resistance,
secured another bridgehead across the river at BAUDRECOURT, and constructed 3 bridges across
the ROTTE River east of BAUDRECOURT for a basis of further operations. On the left CCB drove
the enemy back from the river and consolidated its gains of the previous day. CCA on the right
I
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fought its way east of the NIED River into positions from which it could continue the Div's advance.
CCA (Hines): At 0730 Corps. Arty commenced firing on targets. CT 9 attacked VATIMONT
from the northwest. The enemy held the town with a strong infantry force supported by artillery. The
Combat Team split into two groups, one attacking from the north and one attacking from the south
through heavy artillery fire against well-prepared positions. The two forces successfully executed
the envelopment, capturing the town aU500 . Mopping-up continued until dark, after which the town
was outposted. CT 69, which was assigned to the Command d uring the night, crossed the bridge at
HAN SUR NIED and attiicked toward HERNY against strong enemy resistance consisting of tanks,
anti-tank guns, artillery and infantry. After heavy fighting the Combat Team moved to a position 100
yards west of HERNY, prepared to launch a coordinated attack against the enemy strong point there.
The road into HERNY was interdicted by heavy artillery fire coming from the direction of CHEMERY
and MAINVILLERS. Supported by tank and artillery fire, the infantry company of this force ad vanced
on the town. It was captured and cleared of the enemy at 1700 after five hours of continuous fighting.
CT 69 then continued east, establishing an outpost line 1000 yards b eyond the town . During the night
more than 100 rounds of enemy artillery fell in the area.
At 0700 CT 68 established a bridgehead across the NIED River at BAUDRECOURT, constructed
a bridge, and moved northeast to the banks of the ROTTE River. Reconnaissance elements were sent
east to find possible crossing sites. They found the low area south oi the ROTTE impassable unless
further bridges were constructed. During the remainder of the period 3 more bridges we re constructed across the channels of the ROTTE River south of VATIMO NT. By the end of the day the
Combat Team had bridged its way across the lowlands and was moving north to follow CT 9 southeast
from VATIMONT.
CCB (Read): The mission of the Command was changed to effe ct seizure of the high ground south
and west ofFAULQUEMONT in the vicinity of CHEMERY. The crossing of the NIED River at SANRY
SUR NIED was organized so that the remainder of CT 15 was followed by Hq CCB, 212th Armd FA Bn
and CT 50. Initially CT 86 was to establish road blocks and protect the north flank while the column
passed.
Meeting strong resistance all the way, CT 15 attacked toward BAZONCOURT. Extensive minefields and adverse weather further hampered the attack, but by 1600 BAZONCO URT and VAUCREMENLhad been taken. The Combat Team bivo:Jaced for the nig ht and outposted the road junction
lY2 miles west of CHANVILLE. Because of craters and mines, Engineers from CT 50 assisted movement of the unit on the road to BAZONCOURT. Heavy enemy artillery fire continued throughout
the period. The 2d In£ Regt, 5th Inf Div again assisted in mopping up operations and in posting
security elements on the flanks .
Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of LUPPY late tn the night.
Composition of forces:
CCA

CCB

68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn (- Co C)
9th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd &
1 Truck Plats plus 2 Br Sects 997th
Tdwy Br Co
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
(Truck Plat)
Co B Rein£ 603d TD Bn
l Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr C 86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz
l Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (l Armd &
2 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co
Co C Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd
44th Armd In£ Bn (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)Co C (-) :
(2 Truck Plats)
603d TD Bn (-)
Co C 69th Tk ~.n
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
777th AAA Bn (~)
997th Tdwy Br Co (- 3 Sects)
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.
Div Arty

Div Tns

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Reinforced by
183d FA Gp
276th FA Bn
752d FA Bn
696th FA Bn

76th Med Bn A plus 3d Plat 16th
Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C (-) 777th AAA Bn
Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn
CCA

CT 9 (StabJein)

CT 68 (Davall)

9th Armd In£ Bn (- Co C)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Tr C 86 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

68th Tk Bn (-Co B)
Co C 9th Armd In£ Bn
3d Plat CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn
3d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sect 1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 69 (Forest)
Res
69th Tk Bn (- Co C & 1 Plat Co D)
Co A 44th Armd In£ Bn
2d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn

603d TD Bn (- )
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
CCB

CT 15 (Lagrew)

CT 50 (Wall)

15th Tk Bn (- 1 M Tk Co & Lt Tk Co)
Co C 50th Armd In£ Bn
3d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Sects 1 & 2 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn (- 1 Co)
Co C 15th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Sects 3 & 4 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 86 (Brindle)

CCB Reserve

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- Trs A & C)
Co C 603d TD Bn (-)
CoD 15th Tk Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-)
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Sects 5 & 6 Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd
CT 44 (Brown)
44th Armd In£ Bn (- 1 Co)
Co C 69th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-1 Plat)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-Cos A & B;- 1 Plat Co C)
603d TD Bn (-3 lettered Cos)
Bridge Co (-1 Plat) ,
.Mine Roller Platoon
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Div Arty
Group No 1 (6th Armd Div Arty)

Group No 2 (183d FA Gp)

(Support CCB)
!28th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

(Support CCA)
23lst Armd FA Bn
276th Armd FA Bn
752d FA Bn (155 How)
13 November 1944

Despite a heavy snow which fell during the night the southern spearhead of CCA advanced
farther east against bitter opposition and, in taking 6 towns by the end of the day, pushed a salient into
enemy territory 5 miles deep and 2 miles wide. The elements of CCB which had secured a bridgehead over the NIED River at SANRY SUR NIED in the northern part of the Div zone and which were in
position to thrust north of FAULQUEMONT were pulled south to consolidate and hold the new bridgehead at REMILLY in accordance with the change in Corps orders. The northern bridgehead was
turned over to the 2d Inf Regt, 5th Inf Div.
CCA (Hines) : The plan of the Command for the day was as follows: CT 9 was to attack from east
of VATIMONT and seize ARRAINCOURT: At that point it was to go into reserve. CT 68 was to pass
through at ARRAINCOURT and attack .east by way of BRULANGE, SUISSE, LANDROFF, and BERIGVINTRANGE. On the left CT 69 was_to press east in a parallel column along the route MANY, BOUSTROFF, EINCHEVILLE, and BISTROFF.
At 0830 CT 9 continued the attack southeast toward ARRAINCOURT. Fires were placed on the
town by supporting artillery. The part of the force driving south attacked and captured the town of
HOLACOURT after hard fighting. The attack continued east and ARRAINCOURT was taken at about
1500. Supporting infantry reported this town clear at 1730. CT 68 crossed the ROTTE River south
of VATIMONT and turned east, passing through CT 9. At nightfall CT 68 organized defensive positions west of BRULANGE.
At 0900 CT 69 advanced on MANY, driving the enemy before it. By 1015 leading elements had
reached the crossroad 500 yards beyond MANY. At 1025 the infantry, moving rapidly forward,
cleared MANY and immediately commenced firing on THICOURT to the southeast. In this action
3 enemy anti-tank guns and 4 enemy artillery pieces were destroyed. During the attack on THICOURT heavy enemy artillery fire was directed on our troops from positions at CHEMERY and MAINVILLERS. The town was taken and secured and the Combat Team moved south and captured the
town of THONVILLE by dark. Steep, muddy hills to the northeast were too slippery for tank operations.
CCB (Read) : At approximately 0815 CT 86 received a strong counterattack from the vicinity of
B¥RLIZE on its positions around BAZONCOURT. This attack accompanied by heavy artillery fire
forced the unit to withdraw. The Combat Team was ordered to reestablish the road block and when
the counterattack was finally repulsed, the enemy was driven back into BERLIZE.
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn (with CT 15) was so depleted by losses that Co C 50th Armd In£ Bn was
transferred to CT 15 from CT 50. The attack of CT 15 was still held up by large craters and mines
in the road. Bridging operations by the 5th Inf Div were so slow at this point that the Division Commander decided to build a bridge at REMILLY. Operations were begun at once and the bridge was
completed at about 1630. CT 15 moved down the east side of the river and CT 50 sent one company
of infantry across at REMILLY to outpost the area and protect the bridging operations. The route of
CT 15 was through ANCERVILLE south to the road junction east of REMILLY and then east fo VOIMHAUT and VITTONCOURT. The latter two towns were taken and the area was secured for the night.
At 1320 CT 86, at the road blqck on the northern bridgehead, received a second counterattack which
it repulsed. CT 86 moved to the vicinity of BECHY after turning over the area to the 2d Inf Regt,
5th Inf Div.
•
_
Res Comd (Harris) : Remained in Div reserve in the vicinity of LUPPY. CT 44 was ordered
forward and transferred to the control of CCA. CT 9 was transferred from CCA to Res Comd.
Div Arty (Riley) : Battalions fired preparations in support of the Combat Teams and on targets of
opportunity. The 128th Armd FA Bn smoked the fort at SORBEY for two hours and 45 minutes during
the afternoon .
*
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Composition of Commands:
CCA

CCB

68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd &
1 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co
2 Plats Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
(Truck Plats)
Cos A & B Reinf 603d TD Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (1 Armd &
2 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co
Co C Rein£ 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

Res Comd

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Reinforced by
183d FA Gp:
276th FA Bn
752d FA Bn
696th FA Bn

9th Armd Inf Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (-) Including
Co C (-) with 1 Truck Plat, 997th
Tdwy Br Co (-2 Sects)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)

Div Hq (Fwd)

76th Med Bn A plus 3d Plat 16th
Field Hasp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)

Div Tns

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

14 November 1944
CCA bore the brunt of the day's fighting in its thrust eastward to LANDROFF where desperate
enemy counterattacks were met. The remainder of the Div closed up behind the leading elements
in preparation for a coordinated attack the next day. Three towns were taken in bitter fighting and 4
separate enemy counterattacks on LANDROFF were beaten off. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting continued in the town throughout the night but our troops held fast.
CCA (Hines): At 0910 CT 68, continuing the attack east, entered BRULANGE. During the en·
gagement enemy artillery fire was received from the woods to the south. The Combat Team seized
SUISSE at 1200. The attack then continued in the direction of LANDROFF against exceptionally
strong enemy resistance. Hea"~;y artillery and mortar fire was placed along a 2-mile strip between
SUISSE and LANDROFF by the enemy. LANDROFF was taken at 1415 and by 1705 the town was
secured and outposted. Elements of CT 44 which had come forward from Res Comd assisted in clearing and holding the town for the night. At 1825 enemy from the north launched a counterattack with
2 self-propelled assault guns supported by infantry. A second counterattack at midnight, stronger
than the first, drove down from the north but was repulsed at the outskirts of town. At 0100 a third
counterattack came from the north and was repulsed before reaching the town. An hour later the
enemy launched a coordinated attack of approximately battalion strength pl.'eceded by a heavy artillery preparation. In spite of considerable losses the enemy continued his attack on the town and
hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Tank crews and infantry fought with bazookas, grena.des and small
arms ih the dark. Fighting eontinued in the town until about 150400 when the attack was finally
broken up and the majority of the enemy was destroyed. Mopping up continued until 0700.
CCB (Read): At 1400 CT 15 and CT 50, followed by CT 86, moved to the area south of HENRY.
At 1645 the combat elements of the Command ,c losed east of the NIED River. At 1605 CT 86 moved
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east to the vicinity of BRULANGE and later in the evening was ordered forward in support of CCA.
One unit participated in the street fighting in LANDROFF during the night and the remainder of the
Combat Team held open a strip of about 400 yards astride the SUISSE- LANDROFF road for the
evacuation of wounded and prisoners.
Res Comd (Harris): Co C of the 9th Armd In£ Bn was sent to the vicinity of LANDROFF to assist
in mopping up remnants of the enemy counterattack force.
Div Arty (Riley): The entire Div Arty, including the 183d FA Gp less the 231st Armd FA Bn,
displaced forward to support combat teams of CCA.
15 November 1944
Because of their exhausting battle in LANDROFF the night before, elements of CCA were forced
to reorganize and rest during the day. The 'position of the Div along the line THICOURT-THONVILLE-LANDROFF, however, was secured and improved with a successful attack by one combat
team toward the COTE DE SUISSE-the high ground southwest of EINCHEVILLE.
.
CCA (Hines): CT 44 moved out at 1515 in a coordinated infantry-tank assault on the COTE DE
SUISSE, moving crosscountry from BRULANGE. Tanks moved up the steep, slippery grade firing
on the ridge about 2500 yards away. After successfully gaining the Rorthwest end of the ridge, the
left flank secured the position. The objective was taken at approximately 1600. Capture of this
position deprived the enemy of his forward observation posts and as a result, hostile fire on the BRULANGE-SUISSE-LANDROFF road was rendered ineffective.
CT 69 continued to defend the high ground northeast of THICOURT and THONVILLE. CT 68
continued to defend the town of LANDROFF.
CCB (Read): All combat teams remained in place.
Res Comd (Harris): Co C 9th Armd In£ Bn was detached from CCA and reverted to Res Comd.
16 November. 1944
Two combat teams of CCA, each followed by a regiment of infantry from the 80th In£ Div, struck
early in the day and by afternoon five enemy-held towns had been captured and cleared and the 80th
Div stood on the slopes looking down into FAULQUEMONT while the 6th Armd turned east once
more. The Div CP moved to BRULANGE.
CCA (Hines): Plans for the attack toward FAULQUEMONT directed that the 2d Bn of the 318th
In£ Regt, 80th In£ Div move in conjunction with CT 69 on the left and that the 319th In£ Regt work with
CTs 44 and 68 on the right. CT 69 was to employ tanks and the battalion supporting weapons on
the north edge of the COTE DE SUISSE as a base of fire toward CHEMERY. The remainder of the
Combat Team was to swing around to the right (southeast) and assault the town. Accordingly the
base of fire moved up to the southwest of CHEMERY early in the morning and the encircling force
mqved out at 0900 north and east of the woods directly south of the town. Infantry moved in, cleared
the town, and advanced north.
Meanwhile CT 44, from positions won the previous day on the COTE DE SUISSE, laid down a base
of fire toward EINCHEVILLE. When CT 69 moved its base of fire forward, the encircling force of CT
44 also moved and crossed the northern part of the COTE DE SUISSE approaching EINCHEVILLE
from the north. The infantry was riding on the tanks and, after the shelling of the town, dismounted
and went in. The town was secured after a hard battle; 200 prisoners were taken and 200 of the
enemy were killed. Tanks of both the base of fire and the encircling force then continued the attack
toward high ground overlooking VILLER while the infantry cleared EINCHEVILLE. When the latter
town was secured, the infantry moved on and took VILLER, inflicting serious casualties on retreating
enemy.
CT 69, after shelling ADELANGE and BOUSTROFF, sent infantry forward and seized both towns.
CT 68, from its position in LANDROFF, moved up the valley of the ROTTE toward HARPRICH.
Since the BOIS DE ZANTE on the high ground to the north had not been cleared and was held in force,
the Combat Team did not push its attack farther than a point 100 yards east of LANDROFF.
CCB (Read): While waiting for orders to move forward, one troop of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
was sent to guard the bridge at HAN SUR NIED and another was sent to guard the bridge at REMILLY.
Contact was made with the 5th Inf Div (XX Corps) on the north.
Div Arty (Riley): Eighteen missions were fired as follows: 6 missions on towns, 4 on enemy infantry, 2 on mortar positions, 2 interdictory missions and individual missions on enemy OP, CP, tank
column and artillery positions.
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17 November 1944
While CCA consolidated and held positions won the previous day in the combined offensive,
CCB prepared to wheel around to the south, cross the ROTTE River, and close into positions from
which it could follow the 35th In£ Div eastward on Corps order.
CCA (Hines): Held its positions prepared to advance east behind CCB on the Corps left flank
on Div order. Meanwhile, orders were issued to be prepared to attack the following day and assist
the 317th In£ Regt in clearing out the woods northeast of HARPRICH.
CCB (Read): The 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)reverted to Reserve Command. Co A 167th Combat Engrs, which had been supporting the Command, was released to Corps at 1800. The Command
was alerted to move to the development area near DESTRY and MORHANGE as soon as the 137th
In£ Regt had cleared the roads.
Res Comd (Harris) : The 9th Armd In£ Bn moved from ARRAINCOURT to establish a line ANCERVILLE-VOIMHAUT-VITTONCOURT- ADAINCOURT, closing the gap between the 5th In£ Div,
XX Corps and 80th In£ Div, XII Corps.
Composition of Troops:
CCA

CCB

68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
Co B, 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 303d TD Bn {Rein£)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (Rein£)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co

Res Comd
9th Armd In£ Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
1 Plat 997th Tdwy Br Co (-2 Sects)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
18 November 1944
CCA (Hines) : Held its positions of the previous day.
CCB (Read) : Moved to th3 vicinity of MORHANGE, closing there at 1700 with the 15th Tk Bn on
the east side of town and the remainder of the Command on the west side. Combat teams were composed as follows:
CT 15 (Lagrew)
CT 50 (Wall)
15th Tk Bn
Co C 50th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Plats Co C 603d TO Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn (-1 Co)
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Res

Trains

HqCCB
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Rcn Plat 603d TD Bn
Security Plat 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- ) with 1
Sect 997 Tdwy Br Co

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of VATIMONT. Elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
were at HERN'{ and the 9th Armd In£ Bn wa~ at VOIMHAUT. The Command continued to protect
the gap between the 5th and 80th Inf Divs.
*
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The l28th and 696tl). Armd FA Bns were to be in direct support of CTs 15 and 50 respectively.
The 212th Armd FA Bn was to be in general support.
19 November 1944
CCB attacked northeast from MORHANGE through the !37th In£ Regt and fought bitterly in four
towns to overcome tank ditches, minefields, AT guns, heavy artillery and mud. At the end of the day
the Command was lY2 miles east of GROS TENQUIN.
CCA (Hines): Remained in position prepared to follow CCB east. CT 69 was assigned to CCB
as of 1630.
CCB (Read): CT 15 moved northeast toward GROS TENQUIN early in the morning, passing
through the l37th In£ Regt near the town of BERIG-VINTRANGE. At 1130 the main body of CT 15 was
still being held up by an anti-tank ditch. About this time 6 enemy tanks were located in the area and
2 were knocked out before the other 4 withdrew toward BERTRING. At 1255 two ME 109s came over
the position but were driven off by strong anti-aircraft fire. The anti-tank ditch was finally bridged
at 1400 and half an hour later one tank platoon was in BERTRING. About 1630 infantry elements of
the Combat Team took Hill 265 southwest of BERTRING, thereby relieving great enemy pressure.
Very little opposition was met in the town itself and the Combat Team pushed on. to capture GROS
TENQUIN by 1630. With the assistance of elements of the l37th Inf Regt which had closely followed
the assault the town was outposted for the night. Knowing that there was another anti-tank ditch
about l mile east of GROS TENQUIN, reconnaissance elements were sent forward and a crossing was
secured before it could be blown. A strong bridgehead protected this crossing during the night. To
reinforce the Combat Team the 69th Tk Bn with one platoon of TDs and two sections of AA was sent
forward. The Combat Teams were reconstituted as follows:
CT 15 (Lagrew)
CT 50 (Wall)
50th Armd In£ Bn (-Co C)
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B ?77th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
CT 69 (Forest)

15th Tk Bn
Co C 50th Armd In£ Bn
l Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B ?77th AAA Bn
2 Plats Co C 603d TD Bn
CCB Res

69th Tk Bn
Co B 50th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d Tp Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Div Arty (Riley): The 128th and 212th Armd FA Bns displaced forward to support CCB as did
the 696th Armd FA Bn of the 183d FA Gp. The 696th destroyed an enemy 3-gun battery early in the
day. Direct support missions were fired during the morning by the battalions supporfing CCB.
HqCCB
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
Btry B ?77th AAA Bn (-)
Co C 603d TD Bn (- )

20 November 1944
CCA (Hines) : At 1500 hours the Command was alerted to move on Div order to the northeast
and attack parallel to CCB.
CCB (Read): At 0910 CT 69 passed through CT 15 and moved up the road toward HELLIMER.
After leading elements reached the road junction 2 miles east of GROS TENQUIN, direct anti-tank fire
was encountered. The opposition was overcome and the column continued to advance east into the
forest where an extensive minefield was encountered. This minefield was covered by direct enemy
fire as well as artillery and mortar fire. The mines were cleared on the road and the col4mn advanced
about 2 miles. CT 50 was ordered forward to the vicinity of BERTRING and orders were issued for it
to attack FREMESTROFF the following morning.
Div Arty (Riley): Destroyed 2 enemy tanks.
21 November 1944
With the idea of securing maneuver room for CCA around the headwaters of the GERMAN NIED,
reconnaissance was sent northeast to LELLING. No passable routes were discovered in this area.
*
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CCA (Hines): A reconnaissance force consisting of Co D 68th Tk Bn (less one platoon), one platoon of the 44th Armd Inf Bn and one platoon of CoD 25th Armd Engr Bn moved by way of LANDROFF-EINCHEVILLE- VILLER- GUESSLING-HEMMERING to the vicinity of LELLING. At 0900
the force reached HEMERING and found the bridge there had been blown. The engineers immediately commenced repairing the bridge while infantry (dismounted) was sent forward to the outskirts
of LELLING. The infantry found that the bridge at LELLING had been blown, that road blocks were
constructed in front of the bridge site, and that there were large craters in the road.
CCB . (Read) : CT 50 moved at 0800 from the vicinity of BERTRING, turning north at GROS
TENQUIN. At about 0815 the force was 2 miles north of the town when it met strong anti-tank fire
from high ground northeast of GROS TENQUIN. The advance was very slow but by 1230 CT 50 was
in position to attack FREMESTROFF. At 1315 the Combat Team, with assistance from the 137th In£
Regt, moved out and advanced north, receiving mortar and artillery fire.
CT 69 moved out at 0800 meeting artillery, tank and small arms fire from the high ground northwest of HELLIMER. Hill 328 was strongly defended by dug-in infantry and direct fire weapons. At
1030artillery fire was placed on the hill and the enemy started withdrawing. With extremely effective
artillery fire, enemy pillboxes west of HELLIMER were reduced, after which fire was directed on the
town at 1100. A battalion of the 137th In£ Regt took the town of FREYBOUSE by noon and CT 69 continued its attack toward HELLIMER which it captured and reported clear at 1635. The town was outposted for the night with assistance from the 137th Inf Regt.
Res Comd (Harris): Was given the mission of maintaining contact between the 5th and 80th In£
Divs and of protecting the north flank of the NIED River bridgehead. Patrols from the 86th Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz were sent northwest to make contact with elements of the 5th In£ Div and also to maintain
contact with the 80th Inf Div to the east. Work was initiated by engineers of the Command to open
the roads on the patrol routes.
'
i
Div Arty (Riley) : A 30-minute preparation was fired preceding the attack of CCB and during the
attack fires were placed on call on enemy infantry, towns, AT guns and OPs . Battalions displaced
several times to give close support to attacking troops.
22 November 1944
In a skillful flanking movement CCB swung around HELLIMER on the north and spearheaded
through 2 towns to come within 4000 yards of the MADERBACH River on the main road to PUTTELANGE. The flanking maneuver, executed with two combat teams, apparently caught the enemy off
guard and dealt him a severe blow. Corps now directed the 6th Armd to take over the 35th In£ Div
zone (in which both Divs had been operating) and continue the attack east. An attempt to bring CCA
across the GERMAN NIED.at LELLING, where the lowlands were flooded, was halted by heavy enemy
small arms and artillery fire .
CCA (Hines) : Continuing its efforts to cross the GERMAN NIED, the Command· sent one combat
team forward along the route taken by the reconnaissance force the previous day .. The bridgejusteast
of HEMERING was completed at 1645. CT 44 arrived at GUESSELING during the afternoon and
bivouaced between the latter town and HEMERING for the night. The 9th Armd In£ Bn was attached
to the Command at 1145 and opened a CP at ARRAINCOURT at 1815.
CCB (Read): Moved out in the fol'lowing three columns: CT 15-south, which was to thrust up the
road from HELLIMER to STJEAN ROHRBACH; CT 15-north, which was to swing northeast of LEYVILLER and then east to ST JE!\N ROHRBACH; and CT 50, which was to move along the north flank
into LEYVILLER.
_.
At 0900 the south column of CT 15 was held up by a blown bridge between HELLIMER and DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER. A by-pass was constructed and the column continued east to the road
junction between the -two towns where it came under direct AT fire from the woods 1 mile northesat
of DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER. Enemy infantry and tanks in the town caused considerable difficulty until cleaned out. At 1045 the column had surrounded the town and knocked out 3 enemy
tanks. Soon .afterwards it took the town and the Combat Team moved toward the road junction east
of DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER, but it was stopped by continued heavy fire from the woods.
By 1045 the north column was clearing the high ground north of HELLIMER and by 1100 it was
1000 yards north of HELLIMER. It moved forward and at 1140 passed the road junction south of
ALTRIPPE and continued with light opposition toward LEYVILLER where contact was made with CT
50.- By 1345 this town was c leared and the column thrust directly east toward STJEAN ROHRBACH.
Some AT and small arms fire was received as the column neared the town, but at 1700 the town as well
as the bridge just beyond was reported clear:
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CT 50, which had halted befo::-e the town of FREMESTROFF the night before, thrust into the village
early in the morning. It held up temporarily to service vehicles but at 1015 it cleared the town and
went east toward ALTRIPPE which it seized. As rthe north column of CT 15 came into LEYVILLER,
CT 50 made contact with friendly elements and occupied and outposted the area while CT 15 moved
on east.
Res Comd (Harris): The 9th Armd In£ Bn passed to the control of CCA at 1145.
23 November 1944
Since sufficient maneuver room east of the headwaters of the GERMAN NIED (in the vicinity of
BISTROFF) had now been obtained and attempts to .cross the stream at LELLING had failed, it was an
opportune moment to bring CCA around behind CCB and deploy it on the north flank of the Div. This
was done during the day, the Command being given the mission of outflanking PUTTELANGE from
the north. CCA went into positions along the line FREMESTROFF- ALTRIPPE- LEYVILLER facing
north. CCB consolidated its positions facing east.
CCA (Hines): Work parties and forward infantry and tank elements in the vicinity of the bridge
at LELLING were subjected to intense artillery, mortar, anti-tank and small arms fire from the enemyheld high ground to the northeast. It was decided to abandon the bridge site and move the Command
east along the axis of advance of CCB and thence northeast. CT 44 was to hold the bridge site with
a light force employing fire to contain the enemy in LELLING while CT 68 moved behind them to
BIDING.
.
~
CT 69 occupied positions at LEYVILLER and ALTRIPPE and sent reconnaissance patrols north,
east and northeast. CT 68, in the vicinity of HELLIMER, moved at 0800 and secured high ground
northeast of FREMESTROFF but it was held up in its attack toward BIDING by enemy minefields across
the road at FREMESTROFF. CT 9 remained in position in the vicinity of BRULANGE.
CCB (Read): CT 50 moved southeast from LEYVILLER to clear. the BOIS HABST at 0800. No
opposition was met in the woods.
The Command divided its units as follows:
·
CT 737 (Kroschel)

CT 15 (Lagrew)

737th Tk Bn
lst Bn l34th In£ Regt
Co B 603d TD Bn
lst Plat Co A 60th Engr Bn
lst Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

15th Tk Bn
3d Bn l34th In£ Regt
Co C 603d TD Bn (- )
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
CT 50 (Wall)

CCB Reserve
50th Armd In£ Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
l Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
l Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Security Plat Co C 603d TD Bn

The plan of CCA was to attack north and expand the Div zone of advance. The Command divided
its forces as follows:
CT 69 (Forest)

CT 44 (Brown)

69th Tk Bn
Co B 9th Armd In£ Bn
l Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
l Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
CT 68 (Davall)

44th Armd In£ Bn (- )
Co C 68th Tk Bn
l Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (- )
l Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2 Sects Btry A, 777th AAA Bn
l Plat Co C, 25th Armd Engr Bn

68th Tk Bn (- )
Co C 44th Armd In£ Bn
l Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
l Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
l Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 9 (Britton)
9th Armd Inf Bn (- )
l Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
*
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24 November 1944
CCA (Hines): CT 9, moving up from the vicinity of BRULANGE, passed through CT 69 in the
area around LEYVILLER and drove north. The Combat Team was halted by strongly defended enemy
entrenchments in the woods between LEYVILLER and VALATE. CT 69 continued to hold in the positions in front of ALTRIPPE and LEYVILLER. CT 68 moved forward slightly to the high ground north
of the woods beyond FREMESTROFF. This line was held and outposted for the night.
CT 44 began withdrawing from its positions in the vicinity of the bridge at LELLING to the town
of BISTROFF where it would be in position to support the Command front.
CCB (Read): During the night the enemy drove elements of the 137th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div from
HILSPRICH which caused the offensive to be delayed because the town had to be retaken before units
could assemble for the initial jump-off. CT 737, ordered to move to positions from which it could
attack HILSPRICH, moved out at 1030. By 1615 it had been cleared of enemy and outposted.
CT 15 moved down the road toward PUTTELANGE and by 1400 was just west of the crossroads
in the woods, having received only moderate small arms fire. At 1520 the anti-tank ditch west of the
crossroads had been crossed ahd the area was strongly outposted while bridging operations continued
during the night.
Res Comd (Harris): Displaced to the vicinity of BERIGVINTRANGE.
25 November 1944
Over slippery and virtually impassable terrain both Commands made limited gains against the
enemy. Infantry elements of CCB captured REMERING LES PUTTELANGE on the flooded MADERBACH River and CCA on the north flank clawed its way up slippery slopes to gain commanding groufd
near VALATIE. The Div CP moved to HELLIMER.
·
CCA (Hines): CT 9 advanced to LE GROSSENBUSCH WOODS with infantry spearheading
the attack and artillery fire clearing the woods. After bitter hand-to-handfightingtheenemywas driven
from the high ground and it was outposted for the night.
CCB (Read): The attack on PUTTELANGE and REMERING LES PUTTELANGE moved out at 1000.
CT 737 ran into no difficulty after it had penetrated woods east of HILSPRICH untilll30 when it began
receiving heavy artillery fire. The Combat Team pushed forward, and by 1305 had two companies
of infantry in REMERING LES PUTTELANGE.
CT 15 was held up from the start by a large crater in the road east of the anti-tank ditch which had
been bridged the night before. As the leading tank company deployed and started around the crater
they came under exceptionally heavy artillery and mortar fire as well as direct fire from large caliber
guns, believed to be l50mm. Two tanks received direct hits and three tanks became mired in the mud.
The remainder of the tanks withdrew to defiladed position. Infantry could not advance east of the
crossroads because of heavy fire and moved southeast to REMERING LES PUTTELANGE where they
helped the other combat team capture the town.
Div Arty Comd (Riley): The l28th Armd FA Bn fired a heavy preparation in advance of the jumpoff of CT 15 and, with the 212th Armd FA Bn, continued to support the attack throughout the day.
26 November 1944
Having reached the MADERBACH River the Div now busied itself in deploying along the west
bank and occupying positions from which it could eventually launch an attack across the stream and
Qn to the SAAR.
CCA (Hii-les): CT 69 moved to the vicinity of L'UNTERHOLTZ FOREST and attacked north through
the woods toward the road junction on the north edge of the woods on the way to HOSTE-HAUT.
Strong enemy resistance was encountered in this area. Leading elements encountered a road block
about 800 yards from the edge of the woods but were able to push through it. By 1130 the team had
reached the road junction and attempted to deploy around a road block there. This effort was met
with fire from mortars, machine guns, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft and small arms. Unable to clear
the road junction by dark the team withdrew from the woods to high ground northwest of ST JEAN
ROHRBACH which it outposted for the night.
CT 68 continued holding positions before ALTRIPPE and CT 9 continued holding the position
before VALATTE.
.
CT 44 was transferred to CCB.
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CCB (Read): A combat team composed of elements of the 134th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div was organized for an attack south along the west bank of the MADERBACH River.
The composition of the Combat Teams was as follows:
CT 134 (Miltenberger)
2d Bn 134th In£ Regt
1 Plat 134th In£ AT Co
Mine Plat 134th In£ AT Co
.1 Plat 25th Armd Engr Bn
CT 44 (Brown)
44th Armd In£ Bn (- 2 Cos)
Co C 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (-2 Plats)
1 Plat CoB 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
CT 134 moved out early and occupied MORSBRONN and CUSTVILLER and early in the day had
patrols in the town of HIRBACH.
CT 44, having displaced from the vicinity of BISTROFF, moved into the area around MORSBRONN early in the afternoon. After proceeding only a short distance, however, tanks of the force
bogged down and became entirely useless to supporting infantry. It was then decided not to sacrifice
men and equipment needlessly by proceeding further, so the whole Combat Team went into bivouac
for the night.
Div Arty Comd (Riley) : 22 counterbattery missions were fired on 16 enemy batteries, 2 of which
were destroyed and the remainder neutralized. One German Mk IV tank was destroyed. The Command supported CT 134 in its attack east.
27 November 1944
CCA (Hines) : At 1245 the Command was ordered to attack north. CT 69, from its positions south
of the FORET DE PUTTELANGE, thrust forward toward the PUTTELANGE- BIDING Highway and
sent a detachment east toward HOSTE- HAUT. Both elements were seriously delayed by minefields,
road blocks and craters, and it was necessary for the armored infantry to dismount and go forward
on foot.
At 1245 CT 68 moved northwest toward LIXING, LES ST AVOLD and LANING and by evening
both towns were cleared. Only sporadic enemy artillery fire was received. Patrols, sent north to
thr vicinity of VAHL- EBERSING, made contact with Engineer elements of the 80th In£ Div just before
dark.
CT 9, from the area of ALTRIPPE, moved north toward MAXSTADT, entered the town at 1400,
and occupied it for the night.
CCB (Read): Now held a front extending from DIFFEMBACH LES PUTTELANGE south through
REMERING, LES PUTTELANGE, DIDERFING, HIRBACH and west to MORSBRONN. CT 50 was on
the left, astride the PUTTELANGE road, tying in with CCA on the left. CT 44 was on the right tying
in with elements of the 320th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div on the south. The remainder of the Command
remained in reserve in STJEAN ROHRBACH . .
Res Comd (Harris): A patrol from the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz moved north and entered the town
of LELLING.
28 November 1944
The left wing of the Div continued to advance northeast, closing into positions facing the MADERBACH River as the enemy pulled out to the east bank of the stream. All of the area south of the PUTTELANGE- VAHL- EBERSING Highway was now clear of enemy. A continuous front was achieved
when patrols of CCA tied in with the 80th In£ Div on the north at HENRIVOILE. The Div now faced
generally east from HINSING on the south to ELLVILIER on the north and was confronted by a flooded
stream impassable for vehicles and strongly defended on the east bank.
CCA (Hines): CT 69 continued its advance north, occupying CAPPEL at 1100 after overcoming
road blocks and craters just south of the town. Other elemer;tts moved east, holding HOSTE- BAS
and HOSTE- HAUT and tying in with CCB on their right.
*
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CT 9 occupied BARST-MARIENTHAL and BIDING and sent a patrol to the vicinity of HENRIVILLE where contact was made with the 80th Inf Div on the left. This contact was maintained.
CT 68 moved to the area between ALTRIPPE and LEYVILLER, leaving only a small holding force
at LIXING LES ST AVOLD.
CCB (Read): Reorganization and maintenance continued throughout the Command. Patrols
were sent north from DIFFEMBACH LES PUTTELANGE to maintain contact with CCA on the left.
29- 30 November 1944
CCA (Hines): CT 69 established an observation post in a MAGINOT LINE fort 11;2 miles southeast
of HOSIE- BAS on the road to PUTTELANGE. Aggressive patrols northeast and east maintained
contact with the 80th Inf Div. During the night 29- 30 Nov, Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz sent a patrol
to the north edge of the woods north of HOSIE- BAS. The patrol then worked northeast to FARSCHVILLER.
CCB (Read): On 29 Nov CT 50 extended the area of the Command north by sending one company to DIFFEMBACH- LES- PUTTELANGE after patrols had found the town free of enemy the night
before.
l-2-3 December 1944
The Div opened the period in a defensive position along the west bank of the MADERBACH River
with CCA on the left maintaining contact with the 80th Inf Div and CCB on the right maintaining contact with the 35th Inf Div. Res Comd remained in the vicinity of BERIG- VINTRANGE. Active patrol
operations continued. On the evening of 2 Dec the Div zone was shifte::l north in preparation for
a thrust across the MADERBACH to the SAAR on the 4th.
CCA (Hines): At 1700 on 2 Dec elements of the Command relieved units of the 80th Inf Di~dn
the vicinity HENRIVILLE. The 44th and 50th Armd Inf Bns were transferred from CCB to CCA ahd
the following composition of Combat Teams became effective at 2000 hours on 2 December:
CT 44 (Brown)
CT 50 (Wall)
44th Armd Inf Bn
Cos C & D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
lst Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 68th Tk Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co B 603d TD Bn
2d Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCA Reserve
Tns
68th Tk Bn (- )
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )
9th Armd Inf Bn
Rcn Plat 603d TD Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
l Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
CT 50 reported at 1500 on 3 Dec that all elements had closed in the area east of CAPPEL and CT
44 reported at 1630 that all elements had closed southeast of HENRIVILLE.
CCB (Read): During the night of 2- 3 Dec elements of the l34th and 320th Inf Regts relieved
the Command of positions south of DIFFEMBACH- LES- PUTTELANGE. The Command, consisting
of the 15th Tk Bn and Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 1 Plat), moved to barracks at STJEAN ROHRBACH.
Div Arty Comd (Riley): Reinforced by l83d FA Gp and the 974th FA Bn, Div Arty was organized
for the attack of 4 Dec as follows:
Div Arty (Riley)
l28th Armd FA En- Direct Support CT 44
212th Armd FA En- Direct Support CT 50
23lst Armd FA En- Direct Support CT 9
974th FA En- General Support
l83d FA Gp (Bartlett)
276th Armd FA En- Reinforcing fires of l28th
696th Armd FA En- Reinforcing fires of 212th
l9lst FA En-General Support
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4 December 1944
CCA, comprising most of the combat elements of the Div sliced through the enemy defense line
·at 3 points and forced deep penetrations east toward the Div objectives. At the end of the day the
Command had captured 6 towns and vast amounts of enemy material, and the forward elements stood
on the slopes of LA MONT DE CADENBRONN ~eady to 'seize the objective the following day.
CCA (Hines): The enemy held the position along the railroad track between FARBERSVILLER
and a point halfway to FARSCHVILLER. From there to FARSCHVILLER he was dug in on a ridge about
a hundred yards southwest of the town. CT 44 on the left of the Div zone attacked at 0730 with two
infantry companies abreast supported by tanks. Before noon this attack had overrun the enemy main
line of resistance and was pushing east through LE BUCHWALD. By noon the attack had passed this
point and shortly afterward EBERING was seized. The Combat Team continued through the woods
beyond the town, but it became apparent that CT 44 did not have sufficient weight to insure the capture of the objective. Consequently, Lt Col Davall was ordered to take CT 68 (- ),pick up tank elements with CT 44, and with this force attack TENTELING in conjunction with the attack of CT 44.
Troops of CT 44 which moved from EBERING lost their direction and disrupted operations of CT 50
somewhat when they passed through DIEBLING toward METZING. These troops, consisting of in"
fantry and medium tanks, were assembled and attacked TENTELING from the direction of DIEBLING.
A company of light tanks was sent directly from EBERING against 'I'ENTELING. This combined
attack was launched late in the day and before dark TENTELING had been captured. Both CT 44 and
CT 68 immediately moved east on CADENBRONN. A tank column was moved northeast to envelop
the town from that direction. Enemy 88mm guns on the north outskirts of METZING fired on this column from the flank at a range of 2000 yarc;ls, destroying 3 tanks and disabling 5 more before the enemy
guns were silenced. The attack of both Combat Teams continued however until the high ground
approximately 400 yards west of CADENBRONN was seized. Darkness prevented further action
and the troops were ordered to hold in place.
Launched at 0730, the attack of CT 50 promptly moved into FARSCHVILLER. One company of
infantry enveloped the town from the northwest and advanced directly with the assault troops. Two
hours were employed in cleaning out the town. At 1150 the Combat Team reported that leading elements were on the high ground overlooking DIEBLING. Enemy opposition in this sector was disorganized and at 1240 CT 50 was mopping up in the town. Following the seizure of this town, the Combat
Team attempted to take METZING by frontal assault but failed. It was at this time that enemy guns
on the north edge of METZING opened fire on CT 68, moving northeast to envelop CADENBRONN.
Darkness prevented CT 50 from enveloping its objective and plans were made to attack the next
morning. CT 69 (plus 1 company of the 9th Armd Inf Bn) attacked toward LOUPERSHOUSE. Following a heavy artillery, assault gun and tank fire concentration, the infantry jumped off at approximately
0830 and deployed under enemy fire across the flooded valley and stream approximately 400 yards
from the town. The town was enveloped from the south and a bridgehead across the river was secured.
The Combat Team then proceeded to seize and hold high ground east and south of the village. At
1230 the town was reported clear. Engineer units commenced building a new bridge at 1600 and it
was completed by 2100.
Div Arty (Riley): Participated in a Corps counterbattery mission from 0645 to 0715. A preparation in support of the attack of CCA was fired from 0716 to 0730. Fire W!J.S continmld in general
support of the Combat Teams on known enemy installations and location of troops following that.
Both time and impact fuzes were used. Battalion Commanders were ordered to reconnoiter for new
positions in the FARSCHVILLER- THEDING area and the 212th, 276th, 974th, and 191st FA Bns
displaced before dark.
5 December 1944
The Combat Teams of CCA overran the heights of LEMONT DE CADENBRONN and at the end
of the day were on commanding ground above the SAAR River overlooking GERMANY and the
SIEGFRIED LINE. The objective was seized through the combined thrusts of 4 combat teams and all
units assisted in consolidating the ground at the end of the day. The Di v CP opened at FARSCHVILLER
at 1545.
·
CCA (Hines) : The plan for the day was to have CTs 44 and 68 hold a line along the northwest
flank of the Command, maintaining contact with the 80th Inf Div. CT 9 was to continue the attack
northeast toward ROU:H:UNG and CT 50 was to operate against the towns of METZING, MOUSVILLER,
BUNDLING and IPPLING. CT 9 was composed as follows:
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9th Armd In fBn (-1 Co)
Co A 603d TD Bn
Cos C & D 68th Tk Bn
1st Plat CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn
At 1030 CT 9 effected a passage through the lines of CT 44, picking up tank destroyer elements
enroute, and launched an envelopment from the north on CADENBRONN. By 1100 it was reported
that the town was in our hands and the Combat Team pushed on toward ROUHLING. The town was
enveloped from both the north and the south and by dark the envelopment had been completed and
the town and high ground in that vicinity were captured. Troops were withdrawn at dark, on
Command order, to the high ground west of ROUHLING.
CT 50 resumed the attack on METZING at 0950, enveloping the town with two forces, one from
the north and the other from the west. The envelopment from the north proved successful and the
town was captured at 1015. A tank-infantry team was ordered north toward NOUSVILLER (which
was then outflanked by CT 9) and the town was quickly captured. One company of infantry enveloped
the town from the northwest and advanced jointly with the direct assault troops. CT 50 next attacked
HUNDLING and at 1425 word was received that mopping up operations were in progress and that
the town was in our hands. In conjunction with this attack the forces of CT 50 advanced toward
IPPLING from the north, occupying and clearing that town. When this operation was completed,
the Combat Team was withdrawn to high glound north of IPPLING for the night.
CCB (Read): The Command Headquarters with Btry B 777th AAA B~ (-1 Plat) moved from ST
JEAN ROHRBACH through DIFFEMBACH-LES-HELLIMER north through LEYVILLER, VALATTE and
west to BARST-MARIENTHAL, closing there at 1300. The 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to the
Command and began making reconnaissance preparatory to relief of elements of the 2d Cav Gp on
the north of the XII Corps zone.
,
6 December 1944
All enemy territory from SAARGUEMINES north along the SAAR Ri er to the vicinity of GROSBLIEDERSTROFF was cleared by the end of the day and the Div objective was consolidated. Elements
of CCA thrust southeast into SAARGUEMINES and were the first American troops in that town. The
area was turned over to Res Comd at 1500.
CCA (Hines): CT 50 moved out late in the day in .two columns, one to travel by way of NOUSVILLER to WELFERDING and the other by way of IPPLING to WELFERDING. The NOUSVILLER
column took the wrong route and went into ROUHLING, receiving heavy enemy artillery fire which
forced it to withdraw. The south column moved forward and by noon WELFERDING had been occupied and cleared of the enemy. Contact with the 35th In£ Div on the right flank was made in the
vicinity of SAARGUEMINES by a light tank patrol from Headquarters CCA. Members of this patrol
were the first American troops in SAARGUEMINES. CCA was relieved of command in this sector
at 1500 and withdrew to VALATTE where the CP was opened at 1535. The Command was placed in
Div Reserve until further orders with the following troops under its command:
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn
603d TD Bn
777th AAA Bn (-)
CCB (Read): The 15th Tk Bn moved from ST JEAN ROHRBACH to HENRIVILLE and the 86th
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz continued reconnaissance of the area for further movement to relieve elements of
the 2d Cav Gp the following day.
Res Comd (Harris) :· Headquarters Res Comd cleared BERIG-VINTRANGE at 1009 and closed in
• DIEBLING at 1158. The mission of the Command was to hold the line from GAUBIVING on the west
to WELFERDING on the east. ·
7-13 December 1944
Res Comd took over positions which had been won by CCA during the three previous days and
CCB relieved the 80th In£ Div, extending the line northwest.
The period was marked by vigorous patrol activity and constant artillery fire. On several days
psychological warfare was attempted with fair results.
The following was the composition of Commands:
CCA
CCB
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn
603d TD Bn
· 777th AAA Bn (- )

44th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C & 2 Rcn Plats of Hq Co 691st
TDBn
*
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Res Comd
50th Armd Inf Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
691st TD Bn (-)
Div Arty
Group Riley (Supporting Res Comd)
128th Armd FA En-direct support 9th Armd Inf Bn
212th Armd FA En- direct support 50th Armd Inf Bn
231st Armd FA En- direct support 68th Tk Bn
191st FA Bn in general support
Group Bartlett (Supporting CCB)
276th Armd FA En-direct support of 86th Cav Rcn Sq
696th Armd FA En- direct support of 44th Armd Inf Bri
CCA (Hines): Relieved by Res Comd the Command displaced to VALATIE where it went into
Div reserve, prepared to support either of the units on the line.
CCB (Read) : The mission of the Command was to hold the north half of the Div sector and to
contain SAARBRUCKEN. The 44th Armd Inf Bn relieved elements of the 80th Inf Div in the area of
FOLCKLING and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz relieved elements of the 2d Cav Gp in the area of MORSBACH. These reliefs were effected by 1500 on 7 Dec. The Command extended from the tie-in point
with Res Comd on the right about half-way between FOLCKLING and BOUSHACH to the tie-in point
with the 6th Cav Gp (XX Corps) just inside the German border directly north of ROSBRUCK.
CCB Hq moved to FARBERSVILLER on 8 Dec, closing there at 1000. The 15th Tk Bn (plus Co C
691st TD Bn) had moved to that village on the previous day. A minimum number of men were to be
on the line and a maximum number were to be in billets. Maintenance of vehicles and training of new
men were to be stressed.
Res Comd (Harris): The mission of the Command was to hold the southeast half of the Div sector
and to maintain contact with the 35th Inf Div on the right, the tie-in point to be in the vicinity of WELFERDING. Hq Res Comd was located in DIEBLING. The 50th Armd Inf Bn was holding the right
half of the Command sector and the 9th Armd Inf Bn was holding the left half.
'
At 1215 of 9 Dec a loudspeaker was set up in the vicinity of the enemy held town of LIXING LES
ROUHLING and the garrison was addressed in an attempt to procm:e their surrender. The enemy
was given 15 minutes to surrender, after which the town was to be shelled. The enemy immediately
answered with lO rounds of mortar fire in the vicinity of the loudspeaker. The town was shelled at
the (3Xpiration of 15 minutes. Eight enemy surrendered later in the day. The attempt was repeated
agatn the following day.
Div Arty (Riley): Ground and air OPs enabled the Command to inflict a heavy toll on enemy
personnel and vehicles during the period. Harassing and interdictory fires were employed on a 24hour basis. On lO Dec, for example, the following targets were fired upon: lO groups of enemy
infantry, 1 mortar position, 1 machine gun position, 4 OPs, 2 groups of enemy vehicles, 5 TOTs on "
LIXING LES ROUHLING including lO rounds of propaganda leaflets), 7 concentrations on towns,
including FORBACH, and 5 counterbattery missions.
14- 15- 16 December 1944
The composition of commands as of 15 Dec was as follows:
CCA
CCB

Res Comd

50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
15th .Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn
69th Tk Bn
777th AAA Bn
691st TD Bn (Towed)
603d TD Bn
CCA (Hines): Remained in the vicinity of VALATIE, prepared to support other elements of the
Div on order. On 15 Dec the 44th Armd Inf Bn was relieved in its sector on the line by the 86th Cav
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Rcn Sq Mecz and moved to LELLIN. The 50th Armd Inf Bn was relieved in its sector by elements
of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 9th Armd Inf Bn and moved to DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER.
CCB (Read) : The Command was relieved of responsibility in its sector by Res Comd on 15 Dec.
Upon being relieved by the 69th Tk Bn, the 68th Tk Bn moved to the vicinity of LANING, MAXSTADT
and VAHL- EBERSING and the 15th Tk Bn moved to MACHEREN. The following day order for the
above relief was rescinded and a new realignment of units placed the 44th Inf Bn in the Command
from CCA and shifted the 68th Tk Bn to CCA. The 44th did not enter the line.
Res Comd (Harris): On the 15th the Command was assigned the mission of protecting and holding
the entire Div front . The relieving elements- the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 69th Tk Bn- moved
into positions on the line on the left during the day and relief was effected by 1200. The 9th Armd Inf
and the 691st TD Bn continued to hold the right half of the line. On the 16th a patrol of Tr A 86th
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was ambushed and two men were killed.
Div Arty (Riley): Reinforced by 183d FA Gp, the Command continued to support CCB and the
Res Comd in the Div sector.
17- 20 December 1944
On the morning of 16 Dec, far to the north in the forests of the ARDENNES, German tanks and
infantry crept through the mists to attempt a breakthrough. Thus began the "Battle of the Bulge"
into which the 6th Armd was to plunge within ten days.
In the meantime the 35th and 87th Inf Divs on the right of the 6th Armd attacked across the SAAR
River south of SAARGUEMINES and were making headway in a northeasterly direction against stubborn enemy resistance. Consequently, the 6th Armd was alerted to watch for any hint of withdrawal
on the part of the enemy in its sector. Patrols were doubled, observation posts were increased, i\lnd
all troops were alerted to maintain pressure and exploit any breakthrough.
I
On 18 Dec the Div reverted to XII Corps. The Div CP opened at HOMBOURG HAUT at 191030.
The composition of commands was as follows:
CCA

CCB

Res Comd

68th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn
777th AAA Bn (- )

15th Tk Bn
44th Armd Inf ·Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co C & 2 Rcn Plats 691st TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

9th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (Rein£)

CCA (Hines): During the entire period 17- 20 Dec the Command remained in Div reserve. At
1600 on 18 Dec the 50th Armd Inf Bn closed in bivouac in MERLEBACH and the 68th Tk Bn closed
in the same town at 1430. On the 19th CCA Hq was moved from VALATIE to HOMBOURG-HAUT,
closing in the new location at 1300.
CCB (Read): Held the northwest half of the Div sector and continued actively to patrol the area.
The 44th Armd Inf Bn, reinforced by 1 platoon Co C 691st TD Bn and a reconnaissance platoon from
the same battalion, went into the line 17 Dec, occupying the right part with the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
on the left and the 15th Tk Bn in support. During the night of the 18th, 1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn relieved 1 Plat Co C 691st TD Bn (with the 44th) and the remainder of the company was attached to the
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Engifleers of the Command established a series of booby traps in the vicinity
of FLOCKLING. Patrols were dispatched daily.
Toward the end of the period heavy vehicular traffic was reported in the vicinity of OETTING and
MORSBACH. When the area was heavily shelled, the traffic ceased.
Res Comd (Harris): Throughout the period the Command held and protected the south and east
parts of the Div sector and patrolled actively. On the 18th CoB 603d TD Bn relieved the 691st TD Bn
which reverted to Corps. The relief was effected by 0900. On the 20th CoD 69th Tk Bn reported
hearing track laying vehicles moving in the vicinity of GAUBIVING. All elements were alerted for
possible counterattack.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div and answered calls from units for harassing fires.
On the 18th harassing and interdictory fires at the rate of 12 rounds per hour over a 24-hour peri()d
were placed on the following towns: KLEIN BLITTERSTROFF, GROSS BLIEDERSTROFF, ZINZING,
ALSTING, ETZLING, BEHREN, LES FORBA~H, SPICHEREN and FORBACH.
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21-24 December 1944
On the 21st the 6th A~md was transferred from the XII Corps to the XX Corps. Coincident with
this transfer, the 6th Cav Gp reinforced, known as "Task Force Fickett", was placed under the command of the Div. The 6th Cav Gp was holding a defensive sector to the left of the 6th Armd, so this
addition extended the Div sector north to the vicinity of ,WALDASSEN.
The 6th Cav Gp was composed as follows:
6th Cav Rcn Sq
5th Ranger Bn
Co C 602d TD Bn
Co B 293d Engr C Bn
Tr E 28th Cav Rcn Sq
In the north the German counterattack in the ARDENNES was becoming more serious each day
and all available assistance was being rushed to the hard pressed divisions. On 23 Dec the. 6th Armd
was ordered to move to an assembly area near METZ in preparation for movement north to the ARDENNES. Relief of Div units on the line was to be made by the 103d In£ Div; relief of the 6th Cav Gp
was to be made by 106th Cav Gp. Accordingly CCA, in Div Reserve, began movement to METZ on
23 Dec and the following day the remainder of the Div left the SAAR area.
CCA (Hines): Co A 603d TD Bn moved to the vicinity of BETTING LES ST AVOLD, closing there
at 1250 on 21 Dec. The following day the 50th Armd In£ Bn was sent to Res Comd and entered the
line. The 9th Armd In£ Bn was transferred to CCA and closed in the vicinity of MERLEBACH at 1455.
On the 23d the Command was ordered to move to METZ by the following route: ST AVOLD, BOINVILLE SUR NIED, COURCELLES- CHAUSSY, METZ. Command Hq closed at HOMBOURGHAUT at 1900 and opened in METZ at 2230. The last elements of the Command arrived in METZ
at 0045 the night of 23- 24 Dec.
CCB (Read): Patrols were sent out by the 86th Cav Rcn Sq on the night of 21-22 Dec to determine enemy strength in the vicinity of FORBACH. On the 23d plans were completed for relief on
the following day of the Command by the 4llth In£ Regt of the 103d In£ Div. The 15th Tk Bn was to
remain in its present position in Div reserve until released. Relief took place on the 24th as scheduled.
Command Hq left FAREBERSVILLER at 1200, the 44th Armd In£ Bn was completely relieved by 1410,
and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz by 1500. The last of the units closed in METZ at 2030.
Res Comd (Harris) : At 0915 on 21 Dec when an enemy patrol of about 30 men surrounded an
outpost of the 9th Armd In£ Bn, a platoon was immediately dispatched to the area. The enemy patrol
was routed and retreated into a woods where it was heavily shelled. On 22 Dec the 50th Armd In£
Bn relieved the 9th Armd In£ Bn on the line. The relief was effected by 1430. Relief of the Command
by the 410th In£ Regt, 103d In£ Div began on the morning of 24 Dec. The 69th Tk Bn was relieved at
1006, the 50th Armd Inf Bn 1455, and the 410th Inf Regt accepted responsibility for the sector at 1545.
Headquarters remained in place at DIEBLING.
l 6th Cav Gp (Fickett): The unit held the north part of the Div sector for the first three days of the
per'iod, maintaining aggressive patrols in its area. On 24 Dec it was relieved by the 106th Cav Gp at
1440 and reverted to III Corps. The 5th Ranger Bn was attached to 6th Armd and prepared to move
to METZ the following day.
Div Arty (Riley) : On 22 Dec th~ Command was reinforced by the 282d Armd FA Bn on the north
and supported by XV Corps Arty on the south and central part of the sector. On 24 Dec the Command
was in the process of being relieved by the 103d Div Arty for movement to METZ with the Div .
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CHAPTER IV
ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
25 December 1944 to 26 January 1945
When the 6th Armd was relieved from the line before SAARGUEMINES on 23-24 Dec by the
l03d Inf Div, it had completed its mission of thrusting the enemy back to the defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Spearheading the attack of the XII Corps, the Div had fought continuously from the
SEILLE River across LORRAINE to the border of GERMANY. Heavy casualties had been inflicted
on the enemy despite completely unfavorable weather, and plans were in progress for a resumption
of the offensive through the WESTWALL, when German armor staged its ARDENNES offensive.
By 21 Dec enemy Panzer units had penetrated to SAMREE, LAROCHE and MARCOURT. The
BASTOGNE-ARLON road had been cut and heavy attacks were being launched by the ll6th Panzer
Div against the l01st AB Div in BASTOGNE. In LUXEMBOURG PROVINCE the Germans had captured ETTELBRUCK but were held slightly to the south of that town. The enemy now turned to .night
attacks, particularly around BASTOGNE where a frenzy of effort to take the city was stepped up as
4th Armd began its drive north from ARLON toward the encircled city. The fighting was particularly
bitter around BASTOGNE on Christmas Day. The 6th Armd, now coming into METZ, was preparing
to enter the battle.
25 December 1944
The 6th Armd was ordered to move to METZ in strategic reserve under XX Corps. On commitment, it came under the orders of XII Corps.
XII Corps Mission: To attack north from a bridgehead over the SAUER River at DIEKIRCH and
follow the high ground along the west bank of the OUR River toward ST VITH, thus severing the salient
at its base. This high ground came to be known as the "Skyline Drive".
1
Div Mission: Orders were received to relieve elements of the 9th and lOth Armd Divs, then
occupying a sector north of LUXEMBOURG CITY on the flank of the salient. The Div was ordered
to move to MERSCH where it would be under control of XII Corps. Combat Commands were reorganized and alerted for movement.
The Div less the 15th Tk Bn closed in METZ at 1300. Composition of commands at that time was:
CCA
CCB
9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (Rein£)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (Rein£)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

Div Arty

15th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines) : Departed from METZ at 2300, going through THIONVILLE, LUXEMBOURG
CITY to MERSCH. The bivouac area one mile east of FELS was reached at 0430. The Command was
prepared to relieve CCA, 9th Armd Div and Res Comd, lOth Armd Div.
CCB (Read) : Was alerted for movement into the line on the following day to relieve elements
of the lOth Armd.. At 1445 Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, which had been attached to Res Comd, closed
at METZ.
Res Comd (Harris) : Moved from DIEBLING to METZ, closing in the new location at 1434. The
Command was alerted to move norththe following day.
Div Arty (Riley) : Was placed in general support and prepared to move to the vicinity of MERSCH.
26 December 1944
The 6th Armd entered the "Ba.ttle of the Bulge" taking over a sector on the south flank facing
north along the bank of the SAUER River. CCA went into position on the right (east) and CCB on the
*

114 *

left. Contact was established with the 5th In£ Div on the east and the 80th In£ Div on the west. The
Div now was ready to thrust north across the very base of the enemy salient. The front extended from
a point 1000 yards east of ETTELBRUCK west to MOSTROFF and then south to PLETSCHETTE.
CCA (Hines): While awaiting the withdrawal of CCA 9th Armd Div, vehicles of CCA 6th Armd
infiltrated to FELS and the advance Command Post section reached its new location approximately
1 mile south of MEDERNACH. · Official relief of the 9th 'Ari:nd Div in this sector was effective at 1400
when Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 9th Armd In£ Bn took positions facing .east along the front
line formerly held by the 9th Armd Div. At 0730 the 68th Tk Bn joined XII Corps' mobile reserve
force at LINTGEN but remained under 6th Armd control.
CCB (Read): Left METZ at 0745, moving north through LUXEMBOURG CITY. Orders were
received from the Commanding General that CCB would relieve the l09th Inf Regt of the 28th Irtf
Div and the 90th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz of the lOth Armd Div. Laision was established and the Command .
closed in its area at 1830, establishing a forward CP at STEGEN. The 44th Armd In£ Bn and the 50th .
Armd In£ Bn with elements of 86th Cav tanks and .tank destroyers attached were placed on the line
during the night. The 44th Armd Inf Bn was on the left and the 50th Armd In£ Bn was on the right.
Enemy artillery fell in STEGEN during the night causing several vehicular casualties.
·
Res Comd (Harris): In assembly near METZ, the Command prepared to move to the MERSCH ,
area.
Div Arty (Riley): Moved at 0800 to the MERSCH area. The 23l~t Armd FA Bn was placed in
direct support of CCA and marched over the CCA route to the vicinity of MEDERNCAH. Upon the
arrival of Div Arty in the NOMMEN area, the 23lst Armd FA Bn reverted to control of Div Arty.
27 December 1944
CCA (Hines): At the time CCA assumed responsibility in its sector, the front line extended approximately north and south, joining with the 5th Inf Div on the right flank. Consequently, the llth
Regt of the 5th Inf Div pushed north toward the SAUER River and at the end of the day, the sector of
the 9th Armd Inf Bn had been pinched out and the front had been straightened into an east-west line.
What remained of the Command's part of the line was held by Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Mecz.
CCB (Read): Completed relief of the l09th In£ Regt and the 90th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and assumed
responsibility for the sector at 0745. The sector was reorganized as follows: the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
(-Tr D) with one platoon of Co C 603d TD Bn attached was on the left; the 44th Armd Inf Bn with one
medium tank company of the 69th Tk Bn and one platoon of Co C 603d TD Bn was in the center;
and the 50th Armd Inf Bn with one medium tank company attached was on the right flank.
Res Comd (Harris): Moved from METZ at 1330 and closed near EISENBORN at 1815. The 15th
Tk Bn closed at MERSCH at 1815. Not being assigned a sector, the Command remained in Div reserve.
Arty Comd (Riley): Completed registration and fired harassing and interdictory missions at the
rate of 3 rounds per hour on DIEKIRCH, BASTENDORF and roads in that vicinity. The 231st Armd
FA Bn reverted to control of Div Arty. The 128th Armd FA Bn was placed in support of the 86th Cav
Rcn Sq Mecz and the 44th Armd Inf Bn while the 212th Armd FA Bn was in support of the 50th Armd
Inf&Bn. Fires of these two armored field artillery battalions were reinforced by the 183d FA Gp.
Composition of troops:
128th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
28 December 1944
The Div was to be shifted over to the BASTOGNE area where the enemy had been fruitlessly
trying to force the surrender of beleagured American troops. A narrow corridor had been punched
through to the city on 26 Dec and the opportunity now existed to bite deeply into the German flank
from that area. This was the role now slated for the 6th Armd.
CCA (Hines): During the early part of the day representatives of the 5th Inf Div arrived to discuss
the planned relief, and later that afternoon the lOth Inf Regt 5th Inf Div began the relief of Tr D 86th
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Responsibility for the sector officially passed to the lOth Regt at 2400. Earlier
iri the evening, the 9th Armd In£ Bn had been withdrawn from its defensive positions.
CCB (Read): During the morning harassing artillery fire continued to fall in the sector occupied
by the 50th Armd Inf Bn. Liaison was established with the 5th and 80th Inf Divs and plans were made
to effect a relief of the Command on the line. Two battalions of the lOth Inf Regt were to relive elements
on the right sector. One battalion of the 2d In£ Regt was to relieve the 44th Armd In£ Bn. Reconnaissance elements of the 80th In£ Div .were to relieve the left sector which was held by the 86th Rcn
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.
*
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Div Arty (Riley): Reinforced by the 183d FA Gp, the Command continued to support the Div in
its sector. During the day the l07th and l08_th FA Bns were relieved of attachment to the 183d FA Gp;
the 276th Armd FA Bn was attached and given the mission of reinforcing the 128th Armd FA Bn.
Missions during the period consisted of harassing fires on the towns of DIEKIRCH, BASTENDORF,
TANDEL, LONGSDORF, GETTENDORF, HOSDORF and AMMELDINGEN. These missions were
fired at the rate of three rounds per hour. The 231st and 212th Armd FA Bns fired on possible enemy
batteries and gun positions.
.
29 December 1944
The Div was relieved at 0230 and assigned to III Corps. The plan given the Div Comdr 28 Dec
and later modified in conference among Army, Corps and Div Comdrs was as follows: III Corps was
to attack 31 Dec through the l01st AB Div toward ST VITH (6th Armd) and HOUFFALIZE (4th Armdlater changed to 11th Armd). A number of modifications were made in the plan on 29 and 30. Dec
so that on 31 Dec only the 6th Armd attacked northeast while the 11th Armd, under VIII Corps, attacked
considerably southwest of BASTOGNE. No attack was made toward HOUFFALIZE except a limited
objective attack by a regiment of the l01st AB Div on the left flank of the 6th Armd. Commands were
reorganized as follows:
CCA

CCB

69th Tk Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A ?77th AAA Bn

68th Tk Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Btry B ?77th AAA Bn

Res Comd

Arty Comd

15tth Tk Bn
9oh Armd In£ Bn
2 th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
?77th AAA Bn (-)

231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D ?77th AAA Bn
Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 60th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): March orders were issued for movement to an assembly area north of ARLON.
The route of march was: MEDERNACH, COLMAR, BISSEN, BOWINGEN, USELDANGE, REDANGE
SUR ATTERT, ELL and ATTERT. At 1700 all troops of the Command closed in the new assembly area.
CCB (Read): On receipt of March Orders, the Command moved to its new assembly area at
LEGLISE, BELGIUM, by way of STEGEN, MEDERNACH, MERSCH, ARLON, HABAY LA NEUVE,
BEHEME and LEGLISE, closing at 1750.
Res Comd (Harris): Remained in its assembly area, reorganized, and moved to the vicinity of
ETALLE, following the same route as CCB.
Div Atry (Riley): Relieved by the 5th In£ Div Arty, the Command reorganized and moved to an
assembly area west of HABAY LA NEUVE, following CCB's route of march.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Brindle): Relieved from assignment to CCB and CCA, the 86th reorganized and moved to an assembly area near VLESSART, following the same route of march as CCA.
30 December 1944
The 6th Armd, having closed in the new assembly area, prepared to attack northeast on the night
of 30--31 Dec through the 4th Armd Div. Div Arty of the 4th Armd Div was prepared to reinforce
the fires of the 6th Armd Arty within the limit of its present range. The 35th In£ Div was on the right
flank and VIII Corps elements were on the left.
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CCA (Hines): Sent r~connaissance parties into the BASTOGNE area to determine routes and
forward assembly area.
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 69 (Kennedy)
<;::T 44 (Brown)
44th Armd In£ Bn (- Co A)
Co B 69th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Supported by 128th Armd FA Bn
Trains

69th Tk Bn (-Co B)
Co A 44th Armd In£ Bn
3d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
2d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Co A 777th AAA Bn
Supported by 253d FA Bn
Reserve

Hq CCA
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Rcn Sect 603d TD Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (-)
Security Sect 603d TD Bn
CCB (Read): Plans were made to attack northeast on 31 Dec through elements of the l01st AB
In£ Div with combat teams abreast, CT 68 on the right and CT 50 on the left. CCB was to attack on
the left of CCA.
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 68 (Davall)
CT 50 (Wall)
68th Tk Bn (- Co B)
Co B 50th Armd Inf Bn
1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

50th Armd In£ En (-Co B)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Reserve

Trains

HqCCB
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Co C 603d TD Bn (- )

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

31 December 1944
CCA oj the 6th Armd was in position to attack on schedule early in the morning but heavy traffic,
C01fpled with ice and snow on the key roads, delayed CCB until late afternoon. CCA made a limited
objective attack, therefore, and advanced approximately 1Y2 miles to await CCB. The 35th In£ Div
launched its attack on schedule but was unable to make any progress against an enemy who fought
bitterly.
CCA (Hines): Arrived on the outskirts of BASTOGNE on schedule but time of attack was postponed pending the arrival of CCB. When it appeared that CCB would be considerably delayed,
a limited objective attack was launched at 1230 to secure high ground near W ARDIN and north to the
BASTOGNE-LONGVILLY road. CT 69, on the left, advanced in this attack against heavy small
arms and artillery fire . Div Arty of the l01st AB Inf Div brought fire down on this resistance and aided
the Combat Team in securing its objective. The town of NEFFE and the stream and railroad crossing
leading into town were captured, and the Combat Team then cleaned out a heavy wooded area nearby.
Meanwhile CT 44, on the right flank, was encountering the same sort of stiff resistance. Although
numerous casualties were sustained during its advance, the Combat Team continued through heavy
woods to take some of the high ground and make contact with the 1st Bn, 134th Regt of the 35th Inf Div.
CCB (Read) : Ice and snow delayed leading elements of CT 50 on the NEUFCHATEAU-BASTOGNE road and the IP was not reached on time. After clearing the IP, these elements were blocked
by vehicles of the 11th Armd Div and the Command was unable to proceed to the development area.
This delay prevented the Command from attacking in coordination with CCA. Combat Teams of the
Command assembled in the vicinity of CLOCHIMONT and by the end of the day elements of the Command were infiltrating under the cover of darkness into the final assembly area northeast of BASTOGNE.
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Div Arty (Riley): Supported CCA in its attack by firing on enemy tanks, artillery and infantry.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Brindle): Guarded bridges along the routes of march and prepared to
protect the Div' s left flank .
·
1 January 1945
The 6th Armd resumed the attack north and northeast at 0800 with CCA on the right and CCB
on the left. The Commands advanced northeast against determined enemy resistance, clearing the
towns of NEFFE and BIZORY and occupying the town of MAGERET. Contact was maintained with
the 10lst AB In£ Div on the left and the 80th In£ Div on the right. This drive represented the first real
offensive thrust into the flank of the ARDENNES salient. BASTOGNE, now safe, was never seriously
threatened again. In the late afternoon Corps orders broadened the zone to the right in the direction
of BRAS, still retaining the railroad to BOUCRY as the left flank boundary. Such a broad objective
forced the commitment of all reserves.
CCA (Hines): At 1300 the enemy launched a strong counterattack along the sectorbet ween WARDIN and NEFFE. He was stopped, however, and by 1330 the situation was stable. CT 69 on the left
moved out from the vicinity of NEFFE at 1400 and passed through CT 68 (CCB) near MAGERET.
The part of MAGERET south of the road was cleared and the high ground to the east, up to the edge
,of the woods, was taken. The Combat Team then had control of the dominating terrain. After CT 69
commenced its attack, CT 44 on the right attacked the woods northwest of W ARDIN. Strong enemy
small arms and automatic weapons resistance prevented CT 44 from reaching its objective, although
heavy friendly artillery concentrations had been placed on the woods. At the end of the period CT 44
held approximately the same line as at the beginning. At the end of the day, combat teams had consolidated their positions along a line running approximately southwest for 4000 yards from the high
ground east of MAGERET. ·
I
At 1900 CT 69 was released to CCB and the line of the railroad was made the boundary between
the combat commands. The '15th Tk Bn and the 9th Armd In£ Bn were relieved from attachment to
Res Comd and assigned to CCA as well as Tr C and the lst Plat of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Two
platoons of Co B 603d TD Bn were also attached to CCA.
CCB (Read): Made its attack as scheduled at 0800 and at 0910 leading elements were passing
through the 10lst AB In£ Div. CT 50 initially met no difficulty, but CT 68 encountered machine gun
fire near BIZORY, which by 0940 had been overcome. At 1000 CT 50 was receiving small arms fire
from the woods south of the railroad. At 1030 CT 68 had cleared BIZORY and both combat teams
began receiving direct fire from the woods northwest of MAGERET. CT 68 jumped off and attacked
the town at 1100. By noon MAGERET was taken and CT 68 was reorganizing to push on. Reorganization was hampered by direct anti-tank fire from northeast of the town. As CT 50 passed through
the woods about one mile northeast of BIZORY, it encountered exceedingly stiff resistance consisting
of small arms, mortar and artillery fire. CT 50 continued to press the attack but made very little progress. At dusk it withdrew to the edge of the woods and consolidated its positions for the night.
CT 68 completed reorganization of its forces on the outskirts of MAGERET. CT 68 and CT 50
established mutual defenses for the night.
That evening, CT 69 was assigned to the Command and plans were made to resume the attack
as soon as combat team commanders had completed reorganization. The plan of attack was coordinated with the 10lst AB In£ Div and CCA. Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned to the Command
at 1800 but was not committed.
Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of COBREVILLE at 1245 and in the evening transferred
the majority of the Command (o CCA. Thereafter the Res Comd consisted of only a few odd companies
•and battalion headquarters which were kept alerted to meet any emergency.
·
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) (Brindle): Displaced to a new assembly area near TRAIMONT. At
1045 the Squadron was ordered to attach one troop to each combat command. Tr C went to CCA;
Tr A to CCB.
Div Arty (Riley): The Command, with the 193d FA Gp attached, supported CCA and CCB. It
fired upon a large concentration of vehicles at HEMROVILLE, tanks and infantry east of W ARDIN,
and two guns east of ARLONCOURT. ARLONCOURT was also shelled by Arty of the 6th Armd and
10lst AB In£ Div.
2 January 1945
Orders from III Corps, broadening the Div zone to include BRAS, necessitated a reorganization
of combat commands. The 6th Armd Div attacked at 0925 and advanced along its entire front for
a gain of approximately 6 square miles. Tproughout the day savage resistance was encountered.
Later, enemy counterattacks of powerful infantry and tank formations were successful in driving our
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forces out of MICHAMPS and repulsing an attack on ARLONCOURT. WARDIN was -entered afthe
end of the period, however, and the Div held firmly on the high ground-generally west of the line
MICHAMPS- ARLONCOURT- WARDIN for the night.
Compositi'on of Commands following reorganization:
CCA
,CCB
9th Armd In£ Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn (- Co A)
15th Tk Bn
Co B 69th Tk Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (-2d Plat)
1 Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 603d TD Bn (-3d Plat)
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-2 Sects)
Co C 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)
Res Comd
86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
996th Tdwy Br Co (-)
603d. TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )
Co A 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)
Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-)

50th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn (- Co B)
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co C 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (----:-)
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn ·
Co B 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)
Div Arty
l28th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn (- 1 Btry)
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): After regrouping the Command as indicated, CCA was prepared to attack in its
zone as soon as possible. Composition of Combat Teams:
~
CT 15 (Lagrew)
CT 9 (Britton)
15th Tk Bn (-Co A)
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

9th Armd In£ Bn (- Co C)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 44 (Brown)
44th Armd In£ Bn (- Co A)
Co B 69th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Reserve

1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co
Moving out at 1135, CT 15 with CT 9 began the attack.
CT 15 passed through CT 44, cleared the woods to the northwest of W ARDIN with infantry assisted by tanks, and took the high ground north and northwest of W ARDIN after overcoming strong enemy
resistance. CT 44 maintained its line during the early part of the day and when CT 15 and CT ·9
passed through this zone it yvithdrew to an assembly area east of BASTOGNE in CCA reserve.
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CT 9 advanced slowly through the woods southwest of W ARDIN and cleared enemy from the
area late in the afternoon. Heavy enemy resistance was encountered in the form of small arms, antitank and artillery fire. At the close of the period CT 9 occupied all except the northeast corner of
the woods west of W ARDIN and north of the stream.
At 1630 an attack was launched by CT 15 from the high ground northwest of W ARDIN. A company of infantry, supported by tanks from positions on the high ground, attacked down the hill to the
town after heavy artillery and air preparations and smoke were placed on the opposite ridge. Before
the infantry reached the town, eight tanks were sent down to provide close support for the attack.
This attack received heavy machine gun and anti-tank fire which destroyed four tanks. The remaining
four were withdrawn. Infantry pressed the attack, however, a:nd captured W ARDIN, destroying three
anti-tank guns and capturing 38 prisoners. A platoon was left to outpost WARDIN and the remaining
infantry troops withdrawn. At 0500 the next morning enemy entered the town in strength with selfpropelled guns and forced the outpost platoon to withdraw to the hill behind the town.
CCB (Read): Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 50 (Root)

CT 68 (Davall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (-)
Med Tk Co 68th Tk Bn
2d Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Sect Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Ar~d FA Bn (Direct Support)

68th Tk Bn (-)
Co 50th Armd In£ Bn
Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Sect Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 69 (Kennedy)
69th Tk Bn (- Co B)
Co A 44th Armd In£ Bn
Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
2 Sects 777th AAA Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)
During the night of 1 Jan enemy air was active and the 5Qth Armd In£ Bn, the 68th Tk Bn and the
212th Armd FA Bn were bombed and strafed. At 0400 the enemy launched a counterattack against
the 68th Tk Bn in MAGERET. Some enemy troops succeeded in infiltrating into town but the attack
was successfully repulsed with the assistance of supporting artillery (and with the cooperation of the
German Air Force which bombed and strafed its own troops). Strength of the counterattack was
estimated to be a reinforced company, later revealed to be the 1st Co 340th Fusileer Bn, 340th VG
Div reinforced by a heavy weapons platoon and one assault p latoon. The 50th Armd Inf Bn received
a minor counterattack early in the morning. Prisoners of war from these two attacks were the first
indication that a new division had come into the line against the Combat Command.
CT 50 attacked at 1000 and made good progress until the latter part of the day. The town of
OUBOURCY was captured and MICHAMPS was entered at 1500. About this time CT 50 received
considerable anti-tank, artillery and mortar fire from the general vicinity of BOURCY and from the
railroad embankment southwest of the town and the woods due east. Prisoners revealed that CT 50
was opposed by remnants of the 26th VG Div supported by an assault gun from the 3d Pz Regt, 2d Pz
-Divas well as the 695th Regt of the 340th VG Div. During the attack CT 68 gave direct fire support
to the right flank of CT 50. Meanwhile CT 69 cleaned out the large woods east of MAGERET without
much difficulty.
CT 68 advanced toward ARLONCOURT but as leading elements reached the outskirts of the
town, they were subjected to intense direct fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank guns (which were
well camouflaged with paint) as well as small arms fire from enemy infantry in white snow capes.
The leading elements took severe punishment and, although supporting artillery put heavy concen trations on the town, they were unable to secure a foothold and were forced to withdraw to the high
ground west of town.
At dusk, CT 69 outposted the ground gained during the day and tied in with CCA on the right
and CT 68 on the left. CT 68 (on the high ground west of ARLONCOURT) established an outpost line
for the night with CT 50 on the left. CT 50 withdrew from the area in the vicinity of MICHAMPS
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and OUBOURCY and established contact with the 50lst Para Regt, 101st AB Inf Div; Excellent air
support was very effective.
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq was attached to CT 50 to reinforce the left flank and maintain contact with
.
the 101st AB Inf Div.
Div Arty (Riley): Composition of Groups:
Group RILEY Supporting CCB

Group COONEY Supporting CCA

6th Armd Div Arty Comd
212 h Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (- 1 Btry)
776th FA Bn (155 How)

128th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
177th FA Bn (155 How)

Artillery fired on enemy infantry, tanks, assault guns, artillery and observation posts. Nine
battalions were massed to fire on enemy troops attempting a counterattack near MAGERET at 0100
and again from 0300 to 0600 on troops forming in the vicinity of W ARDIN. During the attack Artillery
fired TOTs on ARLONCOURT and massed fires of 12 battalions on MICHAMPS. Heavy concentrations were placed on W ARDIN throughout the day.
3 January 1945
At a conference at the 35th Div OP the Corps CG outlined his plans for the Corps (26th and 35th
Inf and 6th Armd Divs from right to left) to clear the large wooded pocket southeast of BASTOGNE
and destroy the large enemy concentration sheltered therein. The key .to the area was BRAS toward
which the 26th Div was attacking from the south, the 35th from the southwest and the 6th Armd from
the west, while at the same time the 6th Armd was to continue the attack to the northeast toward
LONGVILLY.
CCA (Hines): During the night of 2- 3 Jan patrols were sent out along CT 9's front but no contact was made with the enemy and aside from occasional harassing artillery fire, no other activity
was reported.
CT 15 on the left continued to consolidate its position east of NEFFE and to clear the woods along
the railroad in this vicinity.
CT 9 now in the center continued the attack east, taking the road junction and high ground south
of WARDIN.
/
CT 44 moved from its assembly area at 0830 and by 1000 was in position on the right of CT 9 .
CT 44 moved out and encountered the enemy at approximately 1030. Heavy small arms fire was
received from the woods to the southeast. After a slow start, good progress was made, a position on
the high ground southwest of WARDIN was established by dark, and contact was made on both flanks .
The remainder of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was taken from Res Comd, attached to CCA during
th13 day, and placed in position on the right of CT 44. The troop relieved elements of the 101st AB Inf
Dw and took over a part of the line at MARVIE, tying in this flank with the 134th In£ Regt, 35th Inf Div.
At 2145, Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and elements of the 134th In£ Regt fought off strong aggressive
patrols.
.
CCB (Read) : Other than sporadic artillery and mortar fire, there was no enemy action during
the night. About 1600 enemy artillery increased very considerably. CT 50 was subjected to Nebelwerfer fire. At the same time the 50lst Para--Regt was subjected to a counterattack which drove in its
right flank and caused Co A 50th Armd In£· Bn to withdraw. The counterattack was beaten off and
Co A restored its original position.
Div Arty (Riley): Fired on infantry, tanks and vehicles throughout the period and, in conjunction
with the 101st AB In£ Div Arty, fired on and stopped a counterattack. Heavy concentrations were
placed on MICHAMPS, ARLONCOURT and BOURCY.
4 January 1945
The Div withstood and dispersed 3 counterattacks during the period, inflicting severe losses on
the enemy. At this time, because of several salients, the Div front measured almost 14,000 yards
and was held by 3 Inf and 3 tank battalions with some cavalry, engineer and destroyer supportmuch too long a line against a stronger and aggressive enemy. During the day orders were issued
fragmentarily for withdrawal from the most advanced salients in order to straighten and shorten the
line and thereby create some local reserves. Unfortunately the enemy attacked strongly during the
readjustment, but our troops turned in place to beat off the attacks.
·
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During the latter part of the period, while he maintained continuous pressure on the Div' s left
flank, the enemy launched a major counterattack against the right flank . At the time front line units
were displacing to newly assigned positions which were occupied under heavy pressure until after
dark when the enemy ceased his attack because of severe punishment. This day marked the only
withdrawal of any consequence by the Div under enemy pressure during the war, and even this would
not have been forced had the line not been over-extended.
CCA (Hines): The south sector of the Combat Command line was to be withdrawn to the shorter
position occupied on 1 Jan by CT 44, approximately 1000 yards north of the present position. This
withdrawal and reorganization was to be completed immediately after dark.
At 1600 an enemy attack was launched east of the road junction south of WARDIN. Friendly
light and medium artillery concentrations were fired and a counterattack by tanks of CT 44 was
launched. Enemy troops were dispersed, but four of our tanks were destroyed and the headquarters
of Co B 44th Armd In£ Bn was cut off and captured.
At 1700, preceded by a 20-minute concentration of 150mm artillery and Nebelwerfer fire, the
enemy launched a major counterattack. It hit along the boundary between CT 9 and CT 44 and a
force of SS troops came from W ARDIN into the woods behind CT 9' s position. Smoke was placed
between the woods and CT 15. This enemy action struck our troops as they were in the midst of withdrawing to the readjusted line. Enemy tanks and other vehicles were observed at the same time
heading toward our positions along the main road from BRAS. A strong force estimated at a regiment,
spearheaded by ten Tiger Royal tanks and ten self-propelled guns, drove in against our lines. One
company of CT 44 which had not withdrawn was ordered to hold its position at the bend of the road
to allow CT 9 to occupy the new line. It maintained this position until 1800 and with artillery and
machine gun fire broke the force of the enemy attack as it came through the woods toward W ARDJN.
Five tanks of CT 9 were lost to bazooka fire while withdrawing through the woods. CT 9, howe~er,
promptly and strongly organized a defensive line. While at times the situation was precarious, at no
point was the enemy successful in making a breakthrough. The 3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
held its position stubbornly and covered the withdrawal of the infantry untis. For this heroic stand
and later for leading other troops in establishing a vital bridgehead over the PRUM River on 27 Feb
the platoon received a Presidential Citation.
CT 9 and part of CT 44 occupied the new line and after dark the remaining company of CT 44
pulled back in order to preserve a stong front on favorable terrain. CT 86 was constituted and placed
on the right flank of CT 44. This unit consisted of Trs C and D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and one section
of Co A 603d TD Bn. Its line ran south from MARVIE approximately one mile to a point where contact
was made with the 134th Inf Regt.
CCB (Read) : With the exception of sporadic artillery and mortar fire, the enemy was inactive
until about 0730 when he attacked with an estimated two companies of infantry, supported by six
tanks, from the vicinity of BOURCY astride the railroad and hit our lines at the juncture with the l01st
AB Inf Div. Tpe attack was beaten off and had subsided by 0800. A large number of casualties were
inflicted upon the enemy.
After a slight withdrawal the enemy returned with an estimated battalion of infantry supported
by eight tanks and continued to exert strong pressure at the same point. The brunt of this attack was
borne by the 50lst Para Regt. The enemy subjected the front line troops, especially those of CT 50,
to heavy artillery and Nebelwerfer fire. Under orders to eliminate the salient on the left and shorten
the line, this CT was withdrawl'l to a better and more secure position. The l01st AB In£ Div conformed
to the new line which ran generally from FOY southeast to the railroad, then just east of BIZORY and
along the high ground west of MAGERET, thence south to tie into the CCA sector.
Elements of the l01st AB In£ Div assisted in covering the withdrawal of the infantry elements of
CT 50 while the tank elements, also assisting, completed their withdrawal at dusk. This placed the
Command's front line generally in the same area as when it jumped off, except for a much more favorable position in the vicinity of MAGERET.
Div Arty (Riley) : With the 193d FA Gp attached, the Command continued to support the Div
in its sector. Gp Riley supported CCB by firing on enemy counterattacks, troop concentrations,
vehicles, observation posts and fired counterbattery fires during the period with excellent results.
The withdrawal of CCB to its new position was covered with fire, forcing the enemy to keep under
cover for the entire operation. Gp Cooney continued in support of CCA. The withdrawal of CCA
was covered by continuous fire of -the entire Group.
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5 January 1945
CCA (Hines): CoB 69th Tk Bn was attached to CT 9. At 0500 an attack by 150 enemy infantrymen was broken up at the junction between CT 15 and CT 9.
Enemy troop concentrations continued to be repor,t ed during the day and small groups of enemy
tanks were also active along the front. These targets were engaged by the supporting artillery. At
1725 CT 15 reported that an enemy armored column was moving from MAGERET to NEFFE. This
column was fired upon by CT 15 and forced to withdraw.
On the south flank of the Combat Command, Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attacked by enemy
infantry at approximately 1725. A heavy artillery concentration was placed on the woods south of our
position and on MARVIE, and the approach to the woods was smoked in the direction of the high ground
occupied by CT 15.
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, attached to the 9th Armd Inf Bn at 1750, went into position on the
left flank of CT 9 .
One platoon CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn was assigned from Res Comd to CCA, and one platoon Co
C 25th Armd Engr Bn was assigned from CCB to CCA. One platoon Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
and one platoon Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were assigned to CCA from Res Comd.
CCB (Read) : Other than sporadic shelling, the sector was comparatively quiet until about 1700.
At this time enemy infantry accompanied by tanks were observed coming through the woods south
of OUBOURCY and northeast of BIZORY, turning south and thence along our front lines. CT 69's
tanks fired at the column, knocked out two tanks, and inflicted severe casualties on enemy infantry.
Artillery fire was highly effective in knocking out two more tanks and inflicted additional personnel
casualties which caused the enemy to withdraw. Later a prisoner stated this attack was made by the
3d Bn 26th PG Regt 12 SS (Hitler Jugend) Division.
About 1820 another enemy column of tanks, half tracks, and infantry (approximately two companies) was observed moving on the west side of MAGERET, going southwest along our front. Tanks
took them under fire and Artillery placed concentrations on the column. Heavy casualties were
inflicted and several vehicles were set afire. At 1950 the situation was reasonably quiet except for
enemy patrols and artillery activity.
There seemed to be a general build up of enemy troops and armor on a line from BIZORY to
ARLONCOURT. The town of BIZORY, occupied by CT 50, received intense artillery and mortar fire
all afternoon. Meanwhile, CTs 68 and 69 reported enemy patrol activity until about 0115. At that
time strong aggressive thrusts on the left of CT 68 were followed by thrusts on the right flank. After
these initial thrusts, the entire front was engaged in warding off attempted penetrations. Finally
these patrols moved towards the right flank of CT 69 where their objective seemed to be Hill 513. All
units were engaged in fighting throughout the night and all reserve~ were committed in order to hold
their positions.
CT 15 sent one engineer platoon through CCA to the assistance of CT 69 and also covered the
ri9ht flank with direct tank fire . At 0800 in the morning the enemy withdrew while CCB mopped up.
Res Comd (Harris): The Command headquarters and Res Comd Alert Force moved to a new assembly area north of ASSENOIS, prepared to assist either combat command. The 1st platoon, Hq
Btry 777th AAA Bn .relieved Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz as bridge guard in the Div area.
Composition of Res Comd:
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
777th AAA Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Composition of Alert Force:
Hq Res Comd
Hq & Hq Co 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- 1 Plat)
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-2 Plats)
Co B 603d TD Bn (- 2 Plats)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (-1 Plat + 1 Plat Co C)
Div Arty (Riley): Heavy concentrations were placed in the woods south and southwest of WARDIN and critical points were interdicted.
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6 January 1945
The Div again successfully repulsed enemy attacks of tank-infantry assault teams committed piece
meal from dark 5 Jan until daylight 6 Jan, killed many enemy personnel, and destroyed much enemy
equipment. A final attack was successfully repulsed just before dark 6 Jan. The weather continued
to be bitter cold, making any sort of operation difficult. The 3d Bn 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was
attached to the Div at 1645 and CoB 3d Cml Bn at 1150. Since the 320th Inf had been engaged for
several days with its Div it was billeted in BASTOGNE for a 24-hour rest.
CCA (Hines): Enemy activity was observed along the entire front during the day and numerous
concentrations were fired by supporting artillery. From statements made by prisoners, this fire was
very effective. Large numbers of enemy troops were either killed or wounded and many tanks and
other vehicles were destroyed.
,
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn was released from its attachment and returned to the 44th Armd Inf Bn,
and Co A 69th Tk Bn was released to the 69th Tk Bn.
CCB (Read): The 3d Bn 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was assigned to the Command. By 1200
the units on the line had completed consolidation of their positions and necessary readjustments.
Other than sporadic artillery and Nebelwerfer harassing fires, the sector was generally quiet.
At 1600 when air observation spotted enemy infantry assembling in the northeast sector of BOIS
DE JACQUES, supporting artillery placed a TOT on the area. At about 2000 a night patol from the
69th Tk Bn picked up two prisoners who stated that the 694th Regt had planned to attack that afternoon, but that our TOT had inflicted such heavy casualties the attack was canceled.
7 January 1945
The 6th Armd maintained contact with elements of the VIII Corps on the left and the 35th Inf Div
on the right and held its line in the north sector of III Corps zone except in the salient of CT 15 whJre
a strong enemy attack late in the day forced a withdrawal from the wooded area east of NEFFE. An
unusually strong enemy attack of four columns which came out of W ARDIN and hit the center of the
6th Armd Div zone with infantry, tanks, and self propelled guns was repulsed.
CCA (Hines): Enemy vehicular activity was heard during the night 6-7 Jan and a small amount
of artillery fire was received.
At 1720 an enemy force consisting of infantry, supported by tanks, attacked CT 15 on its left flank
and hostile tanks were also seen moving toward the center of CT 15. A sharp engagement followed
and continued during the night. The enemy tanks were driven off by tank fire, but the infantry on
the left forced its way into the woods along the front of the sector. A company of the 9th Armd In£ Bn
was sent to support CT 15 as it fell back and by 1950 the attack was checked and the infantry was
holding south of the woods. An estimate as to the strength of this attacking force was 700 infantry
and 22 tanks.
Co B of the 44th Armd In£ Bn was sent to provide additional support fo CT 15 at 2030.
CCB (Read): At 1630 CT 69 reported about 100 enemy infantrymen assembling in a small woods
northeast of BIZORY. Thirty minutes later, supported by several tanks, they began to move toward
the high ground sothwest of MAGERET. Artillery, tank and automatic weapons fire dispersed the
attack and drove it back. At about the same time another attack was launched by the enemy at the
juncture between CT 69 and CT 15. This attack came along the railroad towards NEFFE. The penetration in CT 15's sector presented a dangerous threat to CT 69's right flank. With darkness approaching, it was decided to contain the enemy in these woods until dawn when CCA could attack and
reestablish its line.
In the meantime, elements of CT 69 were being harassed by several Tiger tanks which had worked
up near their forward positions and were shooting direct fire into our lines. The 68th Tk Bn cooperated with the 69th Tk Bn in trying to stalk down these tanks and destroy them. Finally, tank destroyers
attached to the 69th Tk Bn succeeded in knocking out one enemy tank and driving the rest away,
but not unt~l the Germans had destroyed three tanks from the 68th Tk Bn.
Div Arty (Riley): Fired TOTs on MAGERET and the woods .northeast of FOY. During the day
considerable counterbattery fire w_as received.
8 January 1945
The 6th Armd swung back early in the morning in a strong counterattack by elements of CCA
and quickly reestablished the line from which it had been driven the previous day. A weak enemy
attack in another sector was successfully repulsed and at the end of the day the Div held its former line
in even greater strength than before. The 2d Bn 320th In£ Regt, 35th In£ Div was attached to the Div
during the day and attached to CCA.
'
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CCA (Hines): At 0845 CT 15 attacked on its left flank with infantry and tanks to recapture the
bitterly contested woods east of NEFFE. Large numbers of prisoners were taken. By 0945 CT 15 had
reestablished its old line and positions were being consolidated.
CCB (Read): At 0825 the 69th Tk Bn reported a tank attack of unknown strength which was
broken up by artillery and tank fire.
The CCB sector was reorganized as follows:
CT 69 (Kennedy) on the right

CT 3, 320 In£ (Alexander) on the left

69th Tk Bn (-Cos A & B)
Co K 3d Bn 320th In£ Regt
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

3d Bn 320th In£ Regt (- Co K)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)
CCB Reserve
Co B 69th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (~)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-)
776th FA Bn (General Support of CCB)

Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- ) was given missions as follows:
2 Sects with CCB trains
Btry B (-) to guard bridges.
By 1715 relief of the 68th Tk Bn and the 50th Armd In£ Bn was completed"and both were placed
in Div reserve.
Div Arty (Riley) : Continued to support the 6th Armd Div in its zone. All battalions were constantly engaged in firing on observed enemy troop concentrations and movements. Direct support was
given CT 15 in its attack.
9 January 1945
The turning point in the ARDENNES campaign had now arrived. After its initial gains which
relieved pressure on BASTOGNE, the 6th Armd absorbed bitter punishment as the enemy launched
the heaviest attacks of which he was capable. In an attempt to retake BASTOGNE the Germans
exhausted themselves in unavailing and constant assaults. Now the Div was ready to punch back
and while the enemy was able to put up stubborn resistance he was never able to stop the 6th Armd.
Under a new Corps plan tied in with VIII Corps and coordinated in conference at the lOlst AB
Dit CP at 1100, the 4th Armd was to pass through the left half of our zone 10 Jan and attack south
of the railroad toward BOURCY; the 6th Armd was to continue the attack on the right. CCA lent the
35th Diva company of tanks from the 68th Tk Bn which greatly helped the 134th In£ on our right in
its fight through woods southeast of MARVIE and protected our flank.
Late in the afternoon a conference was held with commanders of the 4th Armd Div and arrangements were made for their elements to attack through our lines the following day. Combat commanders and battalion commanders from the 4th Armd Div met our CT commanders and conducted a
reconnaissance of the front lines. CT 69 was to assist CCA 4th Armd Div in protecting its right flank
by direct fire.
Composition of Commands:
CCA

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn
2d Bn 320 In£ Regt (atchd)
Cannon Co 320th Inf Regt (atchd)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co

69th Tk Bn
3d Bn 320th In£ Regt (atchd)
·Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (rein£)
Btry B (-1 Plat) 777th AAA Bn
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CCA

Res Comd

Trs B, C, D, Plat Tr E and 2 Plats Co F
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn Reinf
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-3 Sects)

50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
996th Tdwy Br Co (- )
603d TD Bn (- )
777th AAA Bn (- )

Div Arty
320th Inf Hq
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn (-1 Btry)
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
CoB 3d Cml Bn (atchd)

AT Co 320th Inf Regt
Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 2, 320th (Hannun)
2d Bn 320th Inf Regt
Co C 68th Tk Bn
Regtl Cannon Co 328th Inf
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
231st Armd FA Bn and Co B 3d Cml
Bn in direct support

CT 44 (Brown)
44th Armd In£ Bn (- 1 Co)
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
CT 86 (Bridges)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 9 (Britton)
9th Armd Inf Bn (- A & C Cos)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 15 (Lagrew)
15th Tk Bn (- Co A)
Cos A & C 9th Armd In£ Bn
CoB 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

The 128th Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CTs 44, 9 and 86. Group COONEY was in
general support of CCA.
CCA Reserve
CCA Tns
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-)

Co A 603d TD Bn (-2 Plats)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
68th Tk Bn (- Co C)

CCA's plan for the day was to attack in its zone with the main effort on the right flank, closely
coordinated with the attack of the 35th Inf Div, to seize the high ground and parts of the woods to the
southeast along the main road south of W ARDIN. CT 2, 320th In£ Regt was to make the attack, supported on the left flank by the fires of CTs 9 and 44. CT 15 was to make a demonstration and cover
the enemy lines of communications by fire.
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The attack began at 1000, preceded by smoke laid by the chemical company, artillery and the
supporting weapons of CTs 44 and 9. The attack moved along rapidly meeting little resistance other
than some mortar and artillery fire. CT 15 created a diversion by moving tanks, shooting flares and
laying a smoke screen southwest of W ARDIN. It supported the operations of the attacking CT by fire
on all enemy movement that could be taken under observation. CT 2, 320th Inf Regt continued to
make good progress and by noon the objective was reached with the new line extending along the
high ground to the southeast of MARVIE.
At 1300, CoB 68th Tk Bn was sent to assist 134th Inf Regt of the 35th Inf Div in their zone in reducing strong points east of LUTREGOIS which had held up the 35th Inf Div for several days.
CCB (Read): The sector remained quiet during the night of 8- 9 Jan. By approximately 1340
readjustment of the line was completed and all elements of the 68th Tk Bn had been taken out of the
line.
Composit~on of Combat Teams:
CT 3, 320th (Aleander)

CT 69 (Kennedy)

3d Bn 320th Inf Regt (- Co K)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

69th Tk Bn (- Cos A & B)
Co K 320th Inf Regt
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Reserve
Co B 69th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (- 2 Plats)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Div Arty (Riley): With the 193d FA Gp attached, the Command supported CCA in its attack.
and fired two missions for the 10lst AB Inf Div attack. Fires were also placed on BOURCY, COBRU
and NOVILLE for the 10lst AB Inf Div. Two TOTs were fired on MAGERET.
10 January 1945
The attack of the 4th Armd with combat commands abreast passed through CCB' s front at 0900
and advanced about 1000 yards before resistance stiffened. At 1345 orders from Corps directed the
6th Armd not to advance but to continue to hold its present front. The 4th Armd was withdrawn rapidly through our lines and sent on another mission out of the BASTOGNE area. The front as it existed
at 0900 was held. CCB which was ready to advance on MAGERET cancelled its attack and instead
se~ up an OPL. No advance was planned for the next day and flank security was strengthened to
repel any possible enemy threat. The 320th In£ Regt (less 1st Bn) was attached to the Div. The 2d Bn
remained attached to CCA; the 3d Bn, to CCB. ·
CCA (Hines): Considerable artillery was received during the day along the entire front. CT 2,
320th adjusted its positions and established contact on both flanks, having released Co C 68th Tk Bn
to battalion control. CoD 68th Tk Bn was attached in place of Co C.
CoB 68th Tk Bn continued operations with the 35th Inf Div and succeeded in blasting the enemy
from his positions by dark.
CCB (Read): With. the exception of harassing Nebelwerfer, artillery and 120mm mortar fire,
the night of 9- 10 Jan was relatively quiet. The 4th Armd Div passed through CCB at 0900 and
launched an attack toward BOURCY. In conjunction with this attack it was planned to attack and
seize MAGERET and the woods east thereof. Meanwhile CCB was to re-occupy its former positions,
with the exception of maintaining an OPL 800 meters farther to the front and tying in with the 50lst
Para Regt, 10lst AB Div.
CTs 3, 320th and 69 were given orders to re-establish their lines and effect a tie-in with the 50lst
Para Regt. One rifle company from the 50th Armd In£ 'Bn was attached to CT 3, 320th.
Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparatory and supporting missions for the 4th Armd and the 10lst AB,
In£ Divs. Usual counterbattery, TOT, harassing and interdictory missions were fired with excellent
results.
*
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11 January 1945

Plans to maint:~t11 defensive positions for the day were cancelled when patrols reported that the
enemy was making a partial withdrawal along the front of CCA. The Comm_a nd attacked at once
and drove forward taking key terrain in its zone.
CCA (Hines):
Composition of combat teams:
CT 9 (Britton)
CT 15 (Lagrew)
15th Tk Bn (-Co A)
Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn
l Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

9th Armd In£ Bn (-Co A)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 86 (Bridges)

CT 44 (Brown)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
l Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn (-Co B)
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCA Reserve

CCA Tns

68th Tk Bn (-Co B) .
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (-3 Plats)
Co A 603d TD Bn (-2 Plats)

Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 9 attacked at 1220 and advanced steadily through the woods southwest of W ARDIN, clearing
them of the enemy. CT 44 pushed out at 1300, maintained contact with the left flank of CT 9, and
advanced through the woods along the highway southwest of W ARDIN. Heavy small arms fire was
encountered and many enemy were killed or taken prisoner- in the advance through these areas.
By 1600 the woods were clear and reorganization was started.
Throughout the day CT 15 employed tank fire against enemy personnel and vehicles which were
frequently observed at MAGERET and vicinity. At 1635 this CT attacked through the small woods
to the left front and by 1710 cleared it of the enemy.
At dark Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to CT 86 and Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
was attached to CT 9. CT 44 went into command reserve.
CCB (Read): During the day, eight enemy tanks appeared on the left of the Combat Command's
front. Sup:r:;orting artillery knocked out two of these tanks and the remainder withdrew.
Div Arty (Riley): Fired harassing and interdictory fires during the night of lO-ll Jan on road
junctions and towns to the front. One hundred rounds of propaganda shells were fired on BENONCHAMPS, MICHAMPS, ARLONCOURT, and WARDIN during the day.
12 JanuarY" 1945
Enemy defenses in the Corps zone weakened and crumbled on the 4th day of the offensive. The
Div attacked east, captured W ARDIN and the high ground south and east of the town, and advanced
to a point only a few hundred yards west of BRAS. Between the 6th Armd and the 90th Inf Div there
remained only one infantry battalion from the 35th Inf Div-the pocket had been completely eliminated with terrible losses to the enemy. In the late afternoon the balance of the 320th Inf was attached
to the Div and set up as a separate RCT on the left flank with tank and other elements. It took over
.
its zone on 13 Jan.
CCA (Hines): At 0925 CT 44 and CT 9 began the attack, meeting slight resistance. The two
main obstacles to the advance were difficult terrain and heavy snow. By 1345 CT 44 held the ridge
south from W ARDIN and CT 9 held its line prior to the counterattack of 4 Jan.
CT 86 attacked W ARDIN from the high greund west of town and at 1515 W ARDIN was in our hands.
CT 15 remained in position during the day, holding its line, and assisting the remainder of the
Combat Command with supporting fires. Co D 68th Tk Bn was released to the 68th Tk Bn from CC~
and one platoon Co A 603d TD Bn went to CCA reserve. The 68th Tk Bn was attached to 320th In
Regt at 1830.
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Contact between the Combat Command's right flank and elements of the 35th Inf Div was made
and relief of troops begari.
CCB (Read): Received an order at 1130 from the Div Comdr to attack on our left flank to the
immediate front and maintain contact with the 50lst Para Regt on the left. CT 50 was reassigned
to the Command and 1 Company of the 50th Armd Inf J?n was added to CT 3, 320th. Two platoons of
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn were detached from the Command.
CT 3, 320th attacked at 1400 against small arms and automatic weapons fire. By 1800 the unit
had secured the high ground, making contact with the 50lst Inf Regt. CTs 50 and 69 supported this
attack and aided in the consolidation of gains by maintaining contact with the 501st and securing
CT 3, 320th's rear.
Div Arty (Riley): Fires were conducted against an enemy infantry assembly area, an enemy CP,
artillery batteries, entrenched infantry and AT guns which were harassing CCA.
13 January 1945
The Div with 3 commands abreast resumed its attack meeting considerably heavier resistance
than on the previous day. The direction of attack was shifted toward the north. MAGERET, originally
taken and lost on 1 Jan, was retaken by CCB but intensive street fighting continued in the town throughout the night and it was not finally secured until the following morning.
The general plan of the Div was to push the attack in the center (MAGERET) and north at first
to secure commanding ground and then to drive northeast with CCA on LONGVILLY while CCB
and RCT 320 pushed through MICHAMPS and ARLONCOURT and the woods beyond to the
LONGVILLY- BOURCY road. In the meantime the l01st AB Div was granted permission to put one
regiment through CT 320 in its attack on BOURCY. It later developed that this maneuver greatly
delayed CT 320 which finally had to pass through the 502d In£ to make its attack.
Composition of Commands:
CCA
CCB
9th Armd In£ Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
2 Plats CoB 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
RCT 320 (Byrne)

69th Tk Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
l Plat each Cos A & C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-1 Plat)

1st Bn 320th In£ Regt 35th In£ Div
3d Bn 320th Inf Regt 35th Inf Div
Co C 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
2d Bn 320 In£ Regt (atchd)

Div Tns

Div Arty

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
l28th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
(-2 Sects)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
216th FA Bn (atchd)
CoB 3d Cml Bn (atchd)

Res Comd

Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn
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RCT 320 (Byrne): Awaited the attack of the 502d Para Regt, 101st AB Inf Div. When leading
elements of the 502d cleared the forward areas, the Combat Team attacked at 1100 and by the end
of the period had gained a strong foothold in the southeastern edge of the woods north of MAGERET.
CCA (Hines) : Remained in its position and consolidated its installations while forces on the north
captured the high ground around MAGERET and straightened out the line. Aside from receiving
the usual harassing artillery fire, no contact was made with the enemy. Numerous targets were observed and fired upon by supporting artillery.
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 9 (Britton)

CT 15 (Lagrew)

9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

15th Tk Bn (- )
Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat CoB 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 86 (Brindle)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

Co A 603d TD Bn (- )
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )

CT 44 (Brown)

CCA Tns

44th Armd Inf Bn (- Co B)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )

CCA Reserve

CCA (Read): At 1245 CT 50 moved out when CT l, 320th was clear of the MLR. By 1415 CT 50
was receiving heavy artillery fire, but upon reaching MAGERET two hours later this artillery fire was
greatly intensified. At 1930 the unit assaulted the town and was still engaged in mopping up a formidable infantry force armed with bazookas in cleverly concealed positions. Stubborn resistance by
the enemy caused heavy casualties to our infantry and tanks and the town was not cleared until the
following morning.
CT 69 on the right flank furnished supporting fire for CT 50 and also for CT 15 of CCA on the
south flank.
·
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 69 (Kennedy)

CT 50 (Wall)

69th Tk Bn (- Co A)
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Arrrrd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support) ·

50th Armd Inf Bn (- Co C)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
231st Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCB Reserve

CCB Tns

Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

14 January 1945
The Div continued its advance, clearing the towns of MAGERET and BENONCHAMPS and the
woods due east of W ARDIN and MAGERET. Elements of the 6th Armd made physical contact with
the 90th Inf Div, thus pinching out the 35th Inf Div on the right. Although resistance was still quite
heavy, the 6th Armd was gaining momentum in its drive toward the "Skyline Drive" and the OUR
River.
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RCT 320 (Byrnes): Attacked at 0800 and cleared the southern section of the woods northeast
of BIZORY during the morning. At 1330 it attacked through and cleaned the woods north of MAGERET and by dark had consolidated its posit-ions and -made contact with elements on its flanks.
CCA (Hines): The plan for the day was to attack north and northeast with CT 44, clearing the
woods to the east of W ARDIN and attacking the town, of BENONCHAMPS. CT 15 was to attack the
high ground approximately 1500 meters northeast of BENONCHAMPS. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz,
one plat of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and one Sect Co A 603d TD Bn reverted to control of CCA
Reserve; and Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz reverted to Squadron control after CT 44 passed through.
By 1155 CT 44 reached and entered the edge of the woods. Within an hour this wooded area had
been cleared and CT 44 moved north in the direction of BENONCHAMPS.
CT 15 made good progress, meeting light resistance, and occupied the high ground northeast
of BENONCHAMPS. This town was taken at 1330 and CT 44 moved on toward the high ground
beyond. This high ground north and northeast of BENONCHAMPS was reached during the after·
noon by both CT 44 and CT 15 where positions were consolidated. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz held
a small sector on the right flank of CCA, maintaining contact with the 2d Bn 358th In£ Regt, 90th In£
Div.
CCB (Read) : Co C 50th Armd In£ Bn reverted from CT 69 to CT 50 because of the heavy losses
sustained during the attack on MAGERET the previous night.
CT 50 jumped off at 1035 to clear the BOIS ST LAMBERT and tecure the high ground directly
east of MAGERET. Initially the CT met very little resistance but as the attack progressed, opposition
increased. CT SO's attack was supported by fire from CT 69. CT 69 remained in position and tied
in with RCT 320 for the night.
XIX Tac: Fighter Bombers hit MICHAMPS, OUBOURCY and LONGVILLY with Napalm and
Fragmentation bombs and bombed and strafed a motorized column estimated at 50 vehicles.
15 January 1945
The 6th Armd gained momentum in its drive eastward, smashing •into OUBOURCY and ARLONCOURT and thrusting as far as the high ground southwest of LONGVILLY. The number of prisoners
being taken increased, but deep snow and continuing cold weather made operations extremely diffi·
cult. The 1st Bn, 134th Inf Regt, 35th In£ Div joined the Div and was assembled near MARVIE in Res
Comd .
Composition of Commands after reorganization for the attack of 15 Jan:
CCA

CCB

9th Armd In£ Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co (Direct Support)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- 3 Sects)

69th Tk Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co (Direct Support)
1 Plat each Cos A & C 603d TD Bn
Btry B ?77th AAA Bn (- 1 Plat)
Res Comd
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
996th Tdwy Br C (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
?77th AAA Bn (- )
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt (Atchd)

RCT 320
320th In£ Regt
68th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Div Arty

Div Tns

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hasp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
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193d FA Gp (Atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
216th FA Bn (Atchd)
CoB 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-2 Sects)
Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn
CCA (Hines):
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 15 (Lagrew)

CT 44 (Brown)

15th Tk Bn (-Co C)
Cos B and C 44th Armd Inf Bn
l Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
•
l Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

44th Armd Inf Bn (- Cos B andiC)
Co C 15th Tk Bn
I Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
I Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
I 28th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 9 (Britton)

CCA Reserve

9th Arind Inf Bn
l Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
l Sec Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
l Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
l Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat & I Sect)

The Command's plan was for CT 15 to attack LONGVILLY, followed in column by CT 44 which
was to cover the right flank of CT 15. CT 9 was to follow CT 44, occupy the latter's position, and
protect the right flank of CCA.
CT 15 continued the attack northeast, moving out at 0900. CT 15 moved very rapidly, making
it difficult to maintain contact with flank elements. Many prisoners were taken during the advance
and at 0955 CT 15 had npached its objective on the high ground south of ARLONCOURT and on the
high ground overlooking LONGVILLY.
CT 44 remained in position near BENONCHAMPS to protect CCA's right flank. At 1000 CT 44
advanced to the high ground to the northeast, a distance of 600 yards. The final position of CT 44
was on the general line along the high ground 600 yards north of BENONCHAMPS.
CT 9 moved to an assembly area near W ARDIN and BENONCHAMPS, prepared to support either
CT 15 or CT 44.
CCB (Read):
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 69 (Kennedy)

CT 50 (Wall)

69th Tk Bn (- Co A)
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
I Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

50th Armd Inf Bn (- Co A)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
I Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
I Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
I Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
I Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

The objective for the day was to cut the north-south highway from BOURCY to LONGVILLY,
with CT 69 on the north and CT 50 on the south. CT 69 was to maintain contact with RCT 320 on
the north and CT 50 was to maintain contact with CCA on the south.
CT 50 jumped off at 0830 and met light opposition until reaching the woods about I mile east of
MAGERET, where the CT was stopped by direct fire, artillery and small arms.
CT 69 jumped off at 0920 and by ll30 was well into the woods south of ARLONCOURT. At 1230
CT 69 had taken ARLONCOURT.
RCT 320 (Byrnes):
*
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CT 3, 320th (Alexander)

Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 1, 320th (Walton)

3d Bn 320th In£ Regt
1st Bn 320th In£ Regt
Co C 68th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn

, RCT Reserve

68th Tk Bn (-)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Bn 320th In£ Regt
Co C 603d TD Bn (-)
At 0630 the RCT resumed the attack with CTs 1 and 2. CT 1, 320th secured OUBOURCY after
bitter house-to-house fighting; made contact with CCB by patrols to the south of OUBOURCY. CT 2,
320th moved northeast and secured the quarry area due north of OUBOURCY and made contact with
elements of the 101st AB Div in the vicinity.
· 362d Fighter-Bomber Gp, XIX TAC: Flew close support missions on MICHAMPS and armored
reconnaissance on the road northeast of LONGVILLY. Flak, emplaced guns, tanks and motor vehicles
were located in the HAMIVILLE-LULLANGE- TROINE area. Targets were bombed and strafed
continuously during the late morning and afternoon.
CT 2, 320th (Hannun)

16 January 1945
Across rough and wooded terrain, heavily drifted with snow, the Div forced an advance of 1500
yards along its entire front. Enemy resistance was stubborn. The Div objective was secured on the
right (LONGVILLY) but the advance on the left ended in the dense woods a few hundred yards short.
In a skillfull double envelopment CT 15 surrounded the town of LONGVILLY while infantry cleared it.
The town of MICHAMPS was also added to the advance.
CCA (Hines): The mission of CCA was the secondary road south and southeast of MOINET. CT 9
attacked at 0945 along the left flank of CCA and succeeded in taking its first objective along the rising
ground northwest of LONGVILLY and northeast of RAU DE MICHAMPS by 1045. CT 9 was assisted
in this phase by CoD 15th Tk Bn. When the 1st objective fell, CoD reverted to 15th Tk Bn control.
After cleaning out the woods northwest of LONGVILLY, one company of CT 9 became separated and
lost its direction. Some delay in the continuation of the attack was caused, but by 1245 the Combat
Team launched another attack for the final objective. This attack was met by heavy fire from tanks,
SP guns and small arms coming from the woods north and northeast. The Combat Teams captured
and cleaned out the woods northeast of LONGVILLY and consolidated positions along the high ground
west of the objective. Outposts were placed just short of the crossroad and contact was made with
CT 15 on the right and elements of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz on the left. Tr D established contact
.
with CCB.
CT 15 attacked at 1010 and was passing LONGVILLY by 1145 with tanks on both sides of the town.
'Jthis attack was coordinated with the attack of the 90th Inf Div on its right. CT 15 continued to advance
ahd reached the objective in the early afternoon. Heavy anti-tank and small arms fire was received
from the woods north and east. Artillery fire placed on these targets neutralized them. CT 15 consolidated its positions and strengthened contact with both flanks.
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 9 (Britton)
CT 15 (Lagrew)
15th Tk Bn (-Cos C & D)
Cos B & C 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

9th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Co C 15th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)
CT 44 (Brown)

CCA Reserve
44th Armd In£ Bn (- Cos B & C)
CoD 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn (-1 Plat)
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat & 1 Sect)

CCA Tns
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )
*
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CCB (Read): Augmented by the 1st Bn 134th In£ Regt (CT 1, 134th) the Command attacked at 0930
to seize the objective astride the BOURCY- LONGVILLY Road. CT 50 jumped off at 0930, cleared
the woods, and consolidated the new position about one mile northeast of ARLONCOURT by 1330,
prepared to attack further. CT 1, 134th moved up into position, prepared to continue the attack, and
jumped off at 1445 against small arms and direct AT fire to a point about a mile short of RAU DE
MICHAMPS. There the Battalion halted for the night and consolidated the position on the right of
CT 50. The Command CP moved to ARLONCOURT during the morning. Elements of the lOth Pz
G Regt, lOth Pz Div were identified on the Div front.
·
RCT 320 (Byrne): Attacked at 0800 with CTs 2 & 3, captured MICHAMPS at 1010 and advanced
east over 200 yards through the dense woods northwest of MOINET. It received heavy AT fire from
the south edge of BOURCY and small arms fire from the woods.
17 January 1945
Having failed to stop the advance of the Div for several days by determined defensive measures,
the enemy threw a counterattack against elements of CCA which had enveloped LONGVILLY the
previous day. The counterattack, which included armored units, was thrown back and less than an
hour after it was launched was fully under control. The Div held fast on the right and gained its
objective, the LONGVILLY- BOURCY road, ort the left where RCT 320 crossed the road and CCB
reached it. Plansweremadetorelieve the 320th Inf with the 134th Inf (the 35th Div had been pinched
out) which would also take over the CCB zone leaving CCA on the right and RCT 134 on the left with
CCB in reserve, pending resumption· of the attack.
CCA (Hines): CT 15 supported by heavy artillery fire threw back a strong counterattack consisting
of tanks, SP guns and infantry. Launched from high ground east of LONGVILLY, it also hit on th~
front of CT 9 . ··By 1030, hardly more than an hour after it started, the attack was fully under control.
CCB (Read) : Continued to attack to take its objective astride the BOURCY- LONGVILLY Road.
CT 50 and CT 1, 134th (Craig) jumped off at 0830. CT 1, 134th on the right encountered considerable
difficulty in the way of direct AT, tank, and small arms fire and sporadic artillery. Contact was maintained with CCA on the right. At 1015, about a mile from the objective, contact was established on
the ~left with RCT 320. At 1130 both CTs were about 500 yards from the final objective. Both CTs
received fire support from CT 69. At 1500, just short of the objective, positions were dug in and consolidated for the night.
The CTs lined up as follows:
CT 50 (Wall)

CT 1, 134th (Craig)

50th Armd In£ Bn
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat (Med) 69th Tk Bn
231st Armd FA Bn in direct support

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat (Med) 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn direct support

CT 69 (Kennedy)

CCB Res

69th Tk Bn (- )
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )

Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )

RCT 320 (Byrne) : Jumped off at 0830 and continued to work slowly through the woods delayed
as much by snow and fallen trees as by the enemy rear guard. Late in the afternoon the LONGVILLY
- BOURCY road was crossed and outposted.
18 January 1945
RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Relieved CT 320 (Byrne) and CCB in the forenoon during a heavy fog
followed by snow squalls. This tciok care of the left of the Div zone. On the right, CCA held lightly
with a reinforced battalion. The relieved troops' were pulled back to rest, refit, and get warm and dry.
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Composition of Commands:
CCA (Hines):

CCB (Read):

9th Armd In£ Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Trs C & D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- 3 Sects)

50th Armd In£ Bn
'6 9th Tk Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-1 Plat)
Res Comd
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
996th Tdwy Br Co
603d TD Bn (- )
777th AAA Bn (-)

Div Arty
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B ?77th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A ?77th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (Atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
696th Armd FA Bn (Atchd)
161st FA Bn (Atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

RCT 134 (Miltonberger)
134th In£ Regt •
68th Tk Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Flat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
Plat Co A 60th C Engr Bn (Atchd)
Div Tns
76th Med Bn A
Co A llOth Med Bn
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (-2 Sects)

Div Hq (Fwd)
2 Sects Btry C ?77th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): Spent most of the day relieving front line units and consolidating positions in the
area northeast of LONGVILLY. CT 44 relieved CTs 9 and 15, accomplishing the relief by 1810. Both
of the relieved combat teams released their attachments which then reverted to their parent organizations except Co D 15th Tk Bn which was attached to CT 44. CT 44 made contact with friendly
elrments on both flanks. · CT 44 composed of
'

44th Armd In£ Bn
Co C & D 15th Tk Bn
Tr C 86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz
1st and 2d Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
AG Plat 15th Tk Bn
1 Sq, Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

was supported, directly, by CT 86 consisting of
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
lst Plat Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
lst Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
The enemy, who was not aggressive during the day, threw in some artillery and mortar fire. Activity
was observed in MOINET during the morning.
CCB (Read): Was relieved at llOO by CJ' 3, l34th In£. Attached troops reverted to parent organizations except the 69th Tk Bn and 50th Armd In£ Bn which went into bivouac southwest of BASTOGNE
for refitting and reconditioning. The advance CP returned to BASTOGNE.
RCT 134 (Miltonberger)
*
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Composition of Troops:
CT 1, 134th (Craig)

CT 2, 134th (Wood)

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co B 68th Tk Bn

2d Bn 134th In£ Regt
Co A 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 3, 134th (McDaniel)

3d Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co D 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat 603d TD B~
CT 3, 134th relieved CT 320 in its zone by 0930 and carried on active patrolling throughout the
remainder of the day. At the end of the period plans were being made to advance the line to a position northeast of the BOURCY-LONGVILLY road and maintain contact with CT 2, 134th on the right
and elements of 11th Armd on the left. CT 2, 134th relieved CCB by 1ll0 and carried on active patrolling throughout the period, at the end of which 3 outposts were established northeast of the BOURCYLONGVILLY road.
19 January 1945
The day was marked by a regular North Dakota blizzard which drifted the snow several feet deep.
All engineer equipment was on road maintenance and yet only a few routes could be kept open for
wheeled vehicles.
CCA (Hines): Closed the CP in BASTOGNE and, moving by infiltration, opened the new CP in
MAGERET at 1300. CT 44 generally supported by CTs 86 and 15 was the only unit actually in the
front lines. Aggressive patrols were sent north and an OP was established on high ground ab&ut
a mile north of LONGVILLY. Later in the day the front lines were pushed to the crossroads between
LONGVILLY and MOINET.
RCT 134 (Miltenberger) : Conducted vigorous patrolling through the wwds to its front.
20 January 1945
Two days of little activity on the Div front came to an abrupt end late in the day when it became
obvious that the enemy was withdrawing. CT 44 attacked against light opposition and took MOINET.
The outpost line was pushed forward 11;2 miles on the left. Plans were at once drawn up for a continuation of the attack the following day, and elements were regrouped. The plan of attack for the Div
was for CCB to advance between CCA on the right and CT 134 on the left to seize the high ground
north of TROINE and thus take over the left half of the zone. CCA on the right was to attack parallel
to seize objectives in the area around TROINE; CT 134 was to attack through the woods about 2 miles
and then be pinched out into reserve.
CCA (Hines): Held positions during the early part of the day but on receiving information from
patrols north and east that the enemy was withdrawing hastily issued orders to CT 44 to attack as soon
as)possible. The objectives were MOINET and Hill 510 east of the town. The CT attacked at 1703
and moved forward with slight opposition. A few prisoners were taken as the troops entered MOINET.
By 1920 the lines were well established in MOINET and south of Hill 510 from which heavy fire had
been received. The main difficulties attending this operation were deep snow on all roads and the
fire from Hill 510.
CCB (Read): Plans were .made for an attack northeast. The troops attached to the Command
were formed into the following combat teams:
CT 69 (Kennedy)
CT 50 (Root)
69th Tk Bn (-Co B)
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn (- Co A)
Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Res

CT 1, 134th (Craig)

Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (-2 Sq)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 2 Sects)
Co B 603d TD Bn (- 2 Plats)

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
CCB Tns
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
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On Div order, the plan of attack was by columns of CTs to pass between RCT 134 (Miltonberger)
and CCA to seize the objective in zone. CT 69 on the right of the Command zone was to attack on
order and seize the objective. CT 50, initially to follow CT 69, was to move to left and seize the objective. CT 1, 134th initially in reserve, was to move on order. The 253d Armd FA Bn was in direct
support of CT 69, and the 231st Armd FA Bn was in dir;ect support Of CT 50.
RCT 134 (Miltonberger) (less 1st Bn 134th Inf and plus Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq): Patrols found the
woods to the front abandoned for a distance of 1lf2 miles where the outpost was established late in
the day. Preparations were made to push through to the objective on 21 Jan.
21 January 1945
The Div, following the plans drawn up the previous day, thrust swiftly northeast in the largest
advance yet made in the campaign. The enemy was now admittedly withdrawing but the powerful
thrust of the 6th Armd overran his rear guards, inflicted heavy casualties, and seized six towns. By
evening the Combat Commands stood on the high ground looking toward ASSELBORN and TROIS
VIERGES.
CCA (Hines): Regrouped as follows:
CT 44 (Brown)
CT 9 (Britton)
9th Armd Inf Bn (-B Co)
Co B 15th Tk Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co D 15th Tk Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
' 1 Sq Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
l28th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Res
CT 15 (Lagrew)
Co A 603d TD Bn (- 3 Plats)
15th Tk Bn (- Cos B & D)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (- 3 Sqds)
Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn
CCA Tns
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Sq CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-)
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)
CT 15 on the left jumped of at 0830, meeting no opposition at first but encountering some small
arms fire at about 1030 when tanks reached the high ground beyond TROINE. CT 15 picked up CoD
of the 15th Tk Bn as it passed through CT 44. CT 15 was then ordered to send light tanks and infantry
to capture HACHIVILLE and HOFFELT. As the tank team approached HOFFELT, small arms and
AT fire was received. CT 9 on the right jumped off at 0840 abreast of CT 15, but because of unfavorable terrain it was necessary to go outside the Combat Command's right boundary and take the towns
o~ CRENDAL and LULLANGE before proceeding to the objective. Little resistance was met until
reaching the cross roads northwest of LULLANGE where heavy small arms and AT fire was received
from the high ground to the nort}:least. Tr C of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was ordered early to pass
through CTs 15 and 9 to gain contact with the enemy, but the difficult road conditions delayed this
action. The platoon in the vicinity of CT 9 gained contact on the high ground north of LULLANGE
while the platoon in advance of CT 15 outposted the zone northeast of HOFFELT. BARAQUES DE
TROINE, CRENDAL, TROINE, HOFFELT, HACHIVILLE and LULLANGE fell to the Command. The
CP moved from MAGERET at 1600, opening at TROINE at 1635.
CCB (Read): Early in the morning the advance CP was moved to MICHAMPS. CT 69 jumped
off at 0930 and shortly after ran into a minefield which, in addition to terrain and weather difficulties,
slowed the attack. By 1245 the CT was on the objective, however, and it continued the push to the
vicinity of HOFFELT where defensive positions were set up for the night. CT 50 moved out at 1030,
initially in rear of CT 69. Likewise slowed by weather and terrain conditions, CT 50 gained the high
ground north of TROINE and then went on to take the high ground to the north of HACHIVILLE,
tying in with the 11th Armd Div on the left rear and CT 69 on the right. CT 69 tied in with CT 15 on
its right flank. CT 1, 134th, held in reserve, moved up to TROINE where the CP was now located.
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned to the Command.
Res Comd (Harris): Moved to BASTOGNE from ASSENOIS.
RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Cleared the remainder of the woods to its front, assembled, and followed
in Div reserve to TROINE.
The Div CP displaced to TROINE at 1700.
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22 January 1945
Continuing its thrust northeast, the Div advanced 5500 yards to seize three key towns: ASSELBORN, WEILER and BASBELLAIN. Enemy resistance was moderate as CCB on the left thrust deep
into enemy held territory to enter BASBELLAIN. The attack of CCA toward TROIS VIERGES was
halted by minefields, blown bridges and unsuitable terrain, but important terrain was seized from
which the next day's attack could be launched.
CCA (Hines): Resumed the advance at 0830 -employing reconnaissance in force along two
routes. The northern route was east from HACHIVILLE through WEILER towards TROIS VIERGES.
CT 15 advanced to high ground l mile northeast of WEILER where,positions were taken in readiness
for an attack. The southern route was along the main highway northeast towards TROIS VIERGES.
It was covered by Tr C (-1 Plat) plus l platoon of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. This team was held
up initially by a blown bridge at STOCKEM, but foot elements were pushed across and a by-pass was
found. The reconnaissance unit proceeded to the road junction l mile southwest of TROIS VIERGES
where it met the northern units. CT 9, meeting little resistance, captured the town of ASSELBORN,
cleared a minefield, and proceeded to organize the high ground northeast. It made contact with
elements of the 90th In£ Div on their arrival in the town of ASSELBORN.
Reconnaissance patrols were sent to the vicinity of TROIS VIERGES to locate possible tank crossings over the HOFFENBACH River and observe the damage to the bridges that had been blown.
CCB (Read): Continued to push northeast early in the morning. CTs 50 and 69 moving out at
0815. Progress was slow and difficult because of snow, streams, and minefields. At 1115 CT 50
reported that it had met with a dead-end trail and was hunting for a suitable by-pass. Having found
one by 1235, the Combat Team moved up to give support to CT 69. CT 69 made fair progress but
ran into a minefield 1500 yards southwest of the objective and at 1145 encountered enemy infantr~.
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was sent north to make contact with elements of the llth Armd Div arld
the 17th AB Div. Both CTs were advancing on BASBELLAIN by 1600. An infantry company from
each CT moved in on the objective and took it by 1730 but because stream crossings and terrain made
it impossible to get sufficient tanks and TDs across to give the infantry the proper support, the infantry
was withdrawn with the exception of patrols left to report enemy action. Booby traps and mines were
encountered in BASBELLAIN. Reconnaissance elements of CT 69 were sent south to make contact
with CT 15 of CCA on the right. CT l, l34th, still in reserve, moved to HACHIVILLE where the Command's CP had been set up during the afternoon.
Res Comd (Harris): Moved to TROINE.
· RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Advanced to the HACHIVILLE area. CT 2, l34th moved to assembly
area near HACHIVILLE, closing at 1530. CT 3, l34th moved to an assembly area near HOFFELT
and WEILER, closing at 1200. CT 68 moved from BASTOGNE to the old assembly areas of CTs 2 & 3,
l34th and transported them to the new assembly areas near HACHIVJLLE.
23 January 1945
The Div zone boundary on the right (south) split TROIS VIERGES. A mutual arrangement was
made with the 90th Div for a temporary boundary giving all of the city to the 6th Armd which was
leading at the time and in a better position to attack, while the 90th Div was to cross the river further
south and take the town of BINSFELD.
The Div finally blasted its way into TROIS VIERGES and the high ground surrounding that village
and came in virtual sight of its final objective- the "Skyline Drive" . The attack of CCA was delayed
by many enemy-made obstacleS, blown bridges and culverts, and minefields.
CCA (Hines): At 1255 CT 9 attacked the high ground south of TROIS VIERGES and was met by
heavy atrillery fire between ASSELBORN and the road junction about l mile southwest of TROIS
VIERGES. The objective was seized and consolidated by 1340. The Combat Team then supported
CT 15 by fire. CT 15 pushed out a force of light tanks and infantry at 1400 which captured the town
of BIWISCH. The CT then proceeded east toward TROIS VIERGES but was held up by minefields
and blown bridges. In conjunction with CT 15, CT 44 jumped off at 1400 with the mission of crossing
the HOFFENBACH Rive r, securing the high ground north of TROIS VIERGES, and clearing the town.
Two companies, supported by tank fire from BIWISCH, attacked TROIS VIERGES and obtained
a crossing. Heavy fire of all types was received during this action but by 1830 most of the enemy had
been cleared from the town. One company of CT 44 which had advanced to capture the high ground
north of BIWISCH was pinned down in a draw northwest of TROIS VIERGES. Under cover of darkness, this company was pulled back into TROIS VIERGES and outposted the town. Engineer crossings_
started at dark over the HOFFENBACH River were completed by 0100 the following morning.
*
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CCB (Read): Held its positions prepared to attack on order. During the morning the CO of the
1st Bn 134th In£ Regt with hfs Co Comdrs and the COs of the 69th Tk Bn and 50th Armd In£ Bn reconnoitered terrain on the enemy's front. Construction of a tread way bridge over the stream south of
BASBELLAIN was completed by 1600 and another bridge was found.
RCT 134 (Miltenberger): At 1300 the Command pa,ssed through CCB, resumed the attack east,
and secured the town of BASBELLAIN and the high ground south and east. CT 2, 134th advanced
northeast from its assembly area, meeting slight opposition. At the end of the period Co K occupied
BASBELLAIN; Co I outposted the area. CoL remained in CT reserve on high ground southeast of
BASBELLAIN. CT 3, 134th followed CT 2, 134th, passing through and occupying the high ground
southeast of BASBELLAIN. Co A 68th.Tk Bn attached to CT 2, 134th crossed the water barrier near
BASBELLAIN and moved to support positions.
24 January 1945
On Corps order the zone of the 6th Armd advance was shifted from northeast to due east toward
the town of WEISWAMP ACH. Accordingly, elements of CCB on the left were shifted south and
behind CCA. While the balance of the Div was shifted south to pass through TROIS VIERGES, CCA
continued the attack.
CCA (Hines): At 0830 CT 44 pushed out from TROIS VIERGES wj.th the mission of seizing high
ground north of the town. This mission was accomplished by mid-afternoon, after overcoming light
resistance. CT 15 also jumped off at 0830 to capture DRINKLANGE and WILWERDANGE. Heavy
artillery and AT fire was received from the towns and from the woods south of HULDANGE. Heavy
concentrations of our artillery neutralized this fire and our tanks enveloped the objectives from the
east.
At 0800 CT 9 moved through TROIS VIERGES to BINSFELD and prepared to attack at night to
seize HOLLER and BREDFELD. Heavy artillery fire was recived during the movement, but it was
neutralized by artillery smoke placed on the high ground to the east. The 1st Bn 134th In£ was attached
to the Command from CCB which, assisted by tanks of CT 15, attacked east from TROIS VIERGES
at 0930 with the mission of clearing the woods and trail leading from WIL WERDANGE to BINSFELD.
Overpowering moderate resistance, CT 1, 134th accomplished this mission by 1507. A platoon of
tanks from CT 9 was attached to attack on the right where the greatest resistance had developed.
At 2245 CT 9 attacked HOLLER and BREIDFELD. HOLLER was cleared and occupied by 2350
and by 0200 25 Jan the CT had cleared, occupied, and outposted BREIDFELD. The Combat Commad CP opened at TROIS VIERGES at 1235.
CCB (Read): Released CT 1, 134th to CCA for the day's operation. Recalled from its contact
mission with the 17th AB Div, the platoon of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz rejoined its troop. CTs 50
and 69 pulled back from their positions to an assembly area in the vicinity of HACHIVILLE, prepared
to attack east in the morning through CCA. Co C of the 50th Armd In£ Bn and one Co from the 69th
Tk Bn were sent to relieve elements of CCA in the vicinity 'of WILWERDANGE and ordered to be in
position when other elements of the Command moved up to launch the attack. The advance CP moved
to 1ROIS VIERGES, openeing at 2100.
RCT 134 (Miltenberger): Remained in place and held positions gained the previous day. By
2000 CTs 2 & 3, 134th ~Arere in the process of being relieved by elements of the 17th AB Div. This
relief was necessary because of the change in Div zone and objectives. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
was relieved and attached to CCB.
25 January 1945
Constant pressure on the rear of the withdrawing enemy brought the Div up against strong defenses in the area of WEISW AMPACH as an attempt was made to reach high ground on the west bank
of the OUR River. The attack of CCA toward the high ground ran into the flank of a strong enemy
troop movement and in the resulting battle the Combat Teams were unable to enter the key village.
CCA (Hines) : Released CT 1, 134th at 0800 which then rejoined CCB. At 0930 CT 44 attacked
through CT 9 with the mission of taking the high ground north of LAUSDORN and cutting the highway
at that point. Heavy artillery and AT fire from WEISWAMPACH and the high ground east of LAUSDORN slowed the attack considerably, but by 1745 the objective was gained and consolidated for the
night. CT 9 remained in the vicinity of HOLLER and BREIDFELD prepared to assist the attack on
order. CT 15 was relieved at 1335 in its zone by CT 69 of CCB, whereupon CT 15 withdrew to an
assembly area near TROIS VIERGES.
CCB (Read): CT 1, 134th rejoined the Command at 0800. Some changes were made in the
composition of the CTs. CT 50 gained a platoon of tanks from CoD 69th Tk Bn plus the direct support
of the 231st Armd FA Bn. CT 1, 134th was reinforced to include:
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1stlBn 134th Inf Regt
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
Sqd Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
253d and 161st Armd FA Bns (Direct Support)
CCB Res was left with:
69th Tk Bn (-)
Co B 603d TD Bn (-)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
The attack to seize WEISWAMPACH and to cut the " Skyline Drive" highway east oftown was
launched at 0900. CT 50 on the left moved to the development area in the vicinity of WILWERDANGE
during the darkness of early morning. At 0900 with CT 1, 134th on the right, the attack was launched.
Both CTs were on line approximately one mile east of the jump off point by 0950. At 1650 CT 1, 134th
ran into moderate to intense mortar, small arms, AT and direct artillery fire about 1000 yards short
of the objective. By dark CT 1, 134th had tanks within 400 yards of the town and CT 50 was on a northsouth line approximately abreast of CT 1, 134th, also halted by intense mortar fire. CT 1, 134th pulled
back about 1000 yards and consolidated positions for the night, tying in with CT 50 on the left (north)
and with CCA elements on the right. CT 69 made contact on the left with elements of the 17th AB Div.
26 January 1945
A complete reshuffling of divisions preparatory to resumption of the attack by VIII Corps was
started. To throw infantry weight to the north flank, the 90th Div switched zones with the 6th Armd
and the latter took over part of the 26th Div zone still farther south while the 17th AB Div switched to
our south from the VIII Corps on our north to the III Corps. The relief and movement of units began
with CCA and then CCB was relieved later in the day after it had secured its objective.
Through a short early morning thrust, CCB firmly seized the area about WEISWAMPACH and
at last stood on its final objective. The last of the enemy had been driven back behind the SIEGFIRED
LINE; the ARDENNES salient was completely collapsed.
CT 134 (Miltenberger): Which had been in reserve for several days, relieved the 90th Div while
reserve troops of the latter were relieving CCA and CCB.
CCA (Hines): During the morning CT 44 was relieved by elements of 1st Bn 358 Regt, 90th Inf
Div. At 1330 the Command was relieved in its sector by the 90th Div and went into Div reserve.
The CTs moved to rear assembly areas: CT 9 to NIEDERWAMPACH, CT 44 to SELSCHEID, and CT 15
to OBERWAMPACH.
CCB (Read) : Attacked at 0600 to secure WEISWAMPACH and the area north and east with CT
50 on the left and CT 1, 134th on the right. The town in which only a rear guard was left was taken
by 0900 and the high ground and area east and north was secured. CT 69 established contact by
patrols between CT 50 and 17th AB Div. The Command was relieved on the objective by the 2d Bn
358th Regt, 90th Inf Div and displaced to assembly areas in the vicinity of LULLANGE, DONNANGE
and DEIFFELT.
CT 134 (Miltenberger): Tne 1st Bn remained attached to CCB and was relieved by elements of
the 90th Inf Div from positions in WEISWAMPACH. At the end of the relief the Bn was to relieve
elements of the 26th In£ Div near FISCHBACH. CT 3, 134th moved on tanks and trucks and effected
the relief of the 3d Bn 357th Inf near HEINERSCHEID at 2055. CT 2, 134th moved on tanks and trucks
to the civinity of HUPPERDANGE and GRINDHAUSER and by 1650 completed relief of the 2d and 3d
Bns 359th Inf. CT 68 (-Co A) assembled near HUPPERDANGE.
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CHAPTER V
DASBURG-PRUM RIVER CAMPAIGN
27 January to 8 March 1945
The enemy, who was now operating only patrols west of the OUR. had gradually been driven
into SIEGFRIED LINE defenses from which he had launched his ARDENNES offensive 6 weeks earlier.
Although he was revealing definite signs of strain and his defenses were believed inadequately manned,
his skillfully prepared positions were situated in mountainous terrain ideally suited for defense and
the OUR to his front afforded a natural protection. Flowing at the rate of lO to 15 MPH, it was:about
ten feet deep and swollen to several times its normal width. The approaches were steep and the
terrain was very rough, permitting vehicular movement only on primary and secondary roads.
Corps Mission: (l) Continue attack to clear enemy from the west bank of the OUR. (2) maintain
an "aggressive defense", and (3) prepare to attack to the east on Army order.
Division Mission: (1) Patrol to and across the OUR River, (2) prevent enemy infiltration across
the OUR, (3) prepare plans to cross the OUR, and (4) be prepared to attack northeast or east to the
KYLL River.
Composition of Commands:
CCA

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- )

50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt (Atchd)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (-)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
Det 996th Tdwy Br_Co

CT Miltenberger (Atchd)
134th Inf Regt (-)
68th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (-)
1 Plat Co A 60th C Engr Bn

Res Comd
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
996th Tdwy Br Co(-) (D/ S)

Div Tns

Div Arty

76th Med Bn A
Co A llOth Med Bn (Atchd)
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (- )

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
183d FA Gp (Rein£)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
161st FA Bn (Atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

27 January 1945
The Div CP opened at BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX at 1530.
CCA (Hines): Remained in assembly areas. Headquarters CCA displaced from the vicinity of
TROIS VIERGES to OBERWAMPACH, closing at 1200.
CCB (Read): Displaced to LULLANGE and commenced relief of elements of the 328th Inf Regt,
26th Inf Div.
CTM (Miltenberger): Occupied the left (north) sector, actively patrolling.
I
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Res Comd (Harris): Elements of the Command displaced from VIII Corps to III Corps zone, prepared to support other elements of the Div.
Div Arty (Riley) : Continued firing normal harassing and interdictory fires; then displaced to new
locations to continue its support of the 6th Armd.
28 January 1945
CCB (Read): Maintained a defensive set-up, sending active patrols to its immediate front. The
69th Tk Bn displaced to ESELBORN, closing at 1700. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz displaced to CLERVAUX, closing at 1700.
CT M (Miltonberger): Continued to hold within its sector and sent active patrols to its front.
Res Comd (Harris) : Headquarters moved from temporary quarters in BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX to permanent quarters in the same town at 1048. 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (- ) left BASTOGNE
for WEICHERDANGE and MECHER at 1130 and closed at 1600. Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn left TROINE
at 1100, closing in BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX at 1400. 777th AAA Bn (-) left BASTOGNE at 1130,
closing in BENONCHAMPS at 1345 . .
Div Arty (Riley): Continued support of the Div, with its fires reinforced by the l83d FA Gp.
29 January 1945
CCB (Read): Continued to hold within its sector and sent aggressive combat patrols along its
front, but encountered no enemy.
CT M (Miltonberger): Attacked at 0530 to secure the town of KALBORN. Supported by tanks,
the Combat Team advanced rapidly across open terrain against light enemy resistance, and by 0750
the town was taken with negligible losses and positions were consolidated.
Res Comd (Harris): Remained in position prepared to support other elements of the Div. ifhe
603d TD Bn (- )moved to KLEINHOSCHEID, closing at 2015.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued support of Div elements, with the 161st FA Bn and Co C 3d Cml Bn
attached and the 183d FA Gp in general support.
30 January 1945
The Div held its line, continued aggressive patrolling action, and prepared for future operations
by pushing its rehabilitation program.
CCB (Read): Held within the south sector and aggressive patrols to its front met no resistance.
The OUR was reconnoitered and reported to be 100 feet wide and very shallow with a soft, muddy
bottom which would not permit vehicles to ford without considerable engineer work.
CT M (Miltonberger) : Held within its sector and continued patrol action.
Res Comd (Harris): Commanders made reconnaissance of front lines.
Div Arty (Riley): Fired harassing and interdictory fires during the night on the town of DAHNEN
and the road junction to the northeast.
31 January 1945
The 6th Armd reorganized its Commands. CT M (Miltonberger) and CCB were relieved on the
line by Res Comd; Co C 15th TkBn was attached to 17th AB Div, departing for MUNCHAUSEN at 1655.
Composition of Commands:
CCA
CCB
44th Armd In£ Bn
15th Tk Bn (- )

50th Armd In£ Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
996th Tdwy Br Co (- )
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )

Res Comd
9th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
1st Plat Rcn Co 603d Bn

Div Arty
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
183d FA Gp (Rein£)
*
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177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
Co C 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

Div Tns
76th Armd Med Bn
3d Plat 16th Field Hasp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C ?77th AAA Bn (-)

CT Miltonberger (Atchd)
134th In£ Regt
161st FA Bn
Co A llOth Med Bn

CCA (Hines): Continued its extensvie program of training and rehabilitation and prepared to
support Res Comd.
CCB (Read) : Held the southern part of the Div sector until relieved by CT 9 at 1650. Upon relief
the Command prepared to support Res Comd.
CT M (Miltonberger): Held the northern part of the Div sector until relieved by CT 86 at 1600.
Res Comd (Harris) : Moved to the line and relieved CT M with CT 86 a:t 1600, and CCB at 1650
with CT 9 in place. At 1650 the Command assumed responsibility for the Div sector and prepared
to send patrols and establish observation posts along the entire front. •
Composition of Combat Teams:
CT 86 (Brindle)
86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn (D / S)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 9 (Britton)
9th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn (D / S)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Plat Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Arty Support
128th Armd FA Bn

Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparatory fires for friendly patrols and harassing and interdictory fire
missions on enemy tanks, infantry, observation posts and vehicular activity.
1 February 1945
The Div held within its sector, sent aggressive patrols to its front, continued clearing enemy from
the west bank of the OUR. and prepared for future operations. CT (Miltonberger), 134th Inf Regt
Combat Team of the 35th In£ Div was relieved from attachment to the 6th Armd at 0800 and commenced movement to rejoin its parent unit.
Res Comd (Harris) : Sent active patrols to its front and defended the Div sector . Light enemy
m~rtar and artillery fire were received.
.
.
Div Arty (Riley): Supported the Res Comd. Propaganda shells were fired on the town of DAHNEN and enemy troop shelters along the SIEGFRIED LINE.
2- 3 February 1945
The 6th Armd held within its seCtor, maintaining contact with flank elements, and sent aggressive
patrols to the west bank of the OUR.
I

4 February 1945
Orders were received from III Corps to extend the 6th Armd sector approximately one mile to
the north beyond LIELER. This increase in sector was caused by movement of the VIII Corps to the
north in order to permit them to assault frontally SIEGFRIED defenses after crossing the OUR. Tr D
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz of Res Comd relieved the Rcn Tr 90th In£ Div. Co C 3d Cml Bn was released
from attachment to the Div. At 0900 the 183d FA Gp, consisting of 253d Armd FA Bn, 696th Armd
FA Bn, and 177th FA Bn, was relieved of mission of reinforcing Div Arty. Considerable flare activity
during darkness was observed.
5 February 1945
The Div continued to improve its defensive positions. Preliminary patrolling and reconnaissance
for a crossing of the OUR began the night of 6- 7 Feb on Corps order. It appeared thatthe SIEG* 143 *

FRIED LINE was inadequately manned on the Corps front. The Res Comd was to be used to establish
a bridgehead since it was familiar with the terrain. Propaganda leaflets were fired into the towns
of DAHNEN, DALEIDEN, and LANGFUHR by Div Arty.
Composition of Res Comd:
44th Armd In£ Bn
9th Armd In£ Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn (- )

50th Armd In£ Bn (D / S)
212th Armd FA Bn (D/ S to 44th
Armd In£ Bn)
231st Armd FA Bn (D / S to 9th
Armd In£ Bn)
128th Armd FA Bn (G/ S)
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co C 76th Armd Med Bn

6 February 1945
The 6th Armd continued to hold positions west of the OUR. Planning and reconnaissance were
maintained in accordance with orders issued 5 Feb. Beginning the night of 6-7 Feb the Res Comd
was to cross with two infantry battalions and establish a bridgehead on the high ground north of
DAHNEN.
Construction of a Bailey bridge across the OUR on the KALBORN-DAHNEN road was to be completed in order to enlarge and make permanent · the bridgehead by using the entire Res Comd.
Crossing sites Nos 1 and 2 were found on the north in the vicinity of KALBORN and Site No 3 was
located on the south near DAHNEN. Assault boats were obtained for the after-dark crossings and
Bailey bridging material was made available upon order. Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn, assisted by the
ll23d C Engr Gp, was assigned the task of constructing the bridge. Co A was to support CT 9, crobing on the south; Co C was to support CT 44 on the north. Footbridges were constructed at all sites
to facilitate crossing.
The 128th Armd FA Bn moved to GRINDHAUSEN and the 212th Armd FA Bn moved to BREIDFELD to support the crossings. The 231st Armd FA Bn remained in position between URSPELT and
CLERVAUX. Enemy artillery fire fell intermittently in the 6th Armd zone.
Crossing operations started at 1900 when CT 9, with supporting engineers, moved to Site No 3.
By midnight no troops had succeeded in crossing the river. Troops of CT 44, after carrying heavy
assault boats 2 miles by hand through the hills to the river bank, fared no better at Sites 1 and 2. Site
No 1 was abandoned early in the evening as unsuitable. Repeated attempts to launch boats failed and
by midnight no troops were across the river. No enemy were met but the river was at a flood stage,
caused by heavy rains and melting snows of the past few days, and made crossing operations unusually
difficult.
7 February 1945
In successful crossings on 7 Feb the 6th Armd encountered little resistance since dense fogs
assisted in achieving surprise. In an exceptionally well conducted operation, the difficult stream was
crossed at two places, above and below the KALBORN- DAHNEN road by two reinforced companies,
followed by other companies prepared to cross and exploit any ground gained. During the day 18
assault teams consisting of engineers equipped with flame throwers to reduce pillboxes were formed.
Work was being rushed on footbridges behind the two shallow bridgeheads, and troops were he ld in
readiness on the west shore to render assistance to troops east of the river in the event of a major
counterattack by the enemy from the SIEGFRIED LINE. Co C 15th Tk Bn of CCA was detached from
the 17th AB Div; CoB 603d TD Bn of CCB was attached to the 17th AB Div.
·
Work on footbridges progressed very slowly due to loss of equipment. The 603d TD Bn (- ) was
attached to Res Comd.
Res Comd (Harris): Sent a reconnaissance in force across the OUR to secure a permanent bridgehead. At 0345 the first man of the 6th Armd to enter Germany on a tactical mission reached the east
bank and by 0650 a company of CT 9 had been ferried across the river at Site No •3 and pushed to
a point 800 yards west of DAHNEN. At this time the crossing ceased to b e a secret and the crossing
site was subjected to heavy fire. At site No 2 two men from CT 44 who capsized in one of the boats
landed on the enemy shore at 0400 and at 0715 a boatload of ten men was across. A cable was strung ·
across the river and a footbridge was built.
CT 44 crossed the river at Site No 2 with one reinforced infantry company. These elements
received no enemy fire but experienced extreme difficulty because of the swiftness of the river
current and the steepness of the banks.
·
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Div Arty (Riley): Fired upon mortars, machine guns, enemy pillboxes and personnel and continued harassing and interdictory missions during the hours of darkness. Enemy artillery activity was
light.
8 February 1945
Although rising waters hampered bridging operations- at midnight 7 Feb the river had increased
15 feet in width during 24 hours- three footbridges, two pontoon, and one suspension bridge were
established. The suspension bridge was short-lived, however, for enemy mortar fire knocked it out
shortly after it had been placed in operation. Work was under way on the Bailey bridge.
Orders were received from Corps to take over the entire zone of the 17th AB Div on ll Feb, giving
the 6th Armd a sector of approximately 20,000 yards. The 1252d C Engr Bn was attacked to the Div.
CCA (Hines) : Continued operations to take over the 17th AB Div zone when it moved out on the
lOth, leaving no other combat troops in the Corps except the 6th Armd and the 6th Cav Gp.
CCB (Read): Prepared to assume command of troops east of the OUR after a firm bridgehead had
been established by elements of the Res Comd.
Res Comd (Harris): Continued to enlarge the bridgehead across the OUR. By 1030 the entire
CT 44 had crossed the river, enlarged its bridgehead to a depth of about 1Y2 miles with a width of
2 miles, and secured the west bank of the Bailey site. Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz took up a position
on the north flank . By midnight the battalion had completed organization of its bridgehead in front
of the two sites. One company of CT 44 attempted, without success, to break open an occupied
pillbox with flame throwers and bazookas. After dark the enemy laid formidable machine gun, mortar
and artillery fire on the company, causing serious casualties.
Late in the afternoon CT 9 completed its crossing at Site No 3 in the southern zone, but because
of darkness no attempt was made to enlarge the bridgehead.
Div Arty (Riley) : Supported the Res Comd in its crossing and fired upon enemy artillery locations.
Propaganda leaflets were fired on enemy troop shelters. Enemy artillery activity increased considerably.
9 February 1944
The Div continued to enlarge and strengthen its bridgeheads and made plans to relieve the 17th
AB Div. Four foot bridges and a Bailey bridge across the OUR were completed as the stream decreased in width about 35 percent. A juncture was made with the 17th AB Div at 0300 by CT 9 and
the troops east of the river were reinforced with tank and tank destroyers. A small counterattack was
repulsed on the south flank . The l6lst Cml SG Co and the 284th C Engr Bn were attached to the Div.
CCA (Hines): Prepared to relieve elements of the 17th AB Div in its zone. The 1252d C Engr Bn
was assigned to the Command.
CCB (Read): Made preparations to assume command of the bridgehead east of the OUR. The
284th C Engr Bn was attached to the command. CT 50 moved to the vicinity of HEINERSCHEID after
dark, prepared to move across the OUR before dawn to relieve CT 44.
Res Comd (Harris): Continued to enlarge and strengthen its bridgehead. Co B 68th Tk Bn, Tr B
8()th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 1 Plat Co A and 1 Plat CoB 603d TD Bn moved across the river . At 1800 CT 9
r~pulsed a small counterattack which caused no damage. Moving north along the east side of the
river, CT 9 joined CT 44 which had extended south and west to cover the road from KALBORN, and
by midnight the consolidated bridgehead was firmly established.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support elements of the Div by firing harassing and interdictory
fires during the night on enemy gun locations, road intersections and the towns of DALEIDEN and
REIPELDINGEN. At 1335 a TOT was placed on DAHNEN.
lO February 1945
The 6th Armd held its bridgehead over the OUR, protected the north flank of the III Corps zone,
and started relief of the 17th AB Div with elements of CCA. CCB relieved Res Comd and assumed
responsibility for the bridgehead zone at 1545 . Res Comd assembled and prepared to support CCB.
The 161st Cml SG Co was relieved from attachment.
Composition of Commands:
CCA

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
184th C Engr Bn (Atchd)

50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
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1252d C Engr Bn (Atchd)
Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

284th C Engr Bn (Atchd)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )

Res Comd
Div Arty
9th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (- )
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (- )

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Div Tns
76th Armd Med Bn
3d Plat 16th Field Hasp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (- )

CCA (Hines): Was in process of relieving the 17th AB Div in the southern part of the Div' s new
zone.
CCB (Read): Relieved the Res Comd at 1545. The Command CP opened at HUPPERDINGE at
1000. CT 44 was relieved by CT 50 at 1300 and assigned to CCA. Under control of CCB Cf 9
remained in position to revert to Res Comd upon relief. CT 86 established contact with the 11th Armd
Div on the north flank at the junction of LUXEMBOURG and German border just west of the OUR.
Res Comd (Harris): Prior to relief of the Command, the Bailey bridge, weakened by mortar fire
and heavy loads, gave way but reconstruction was started immediately.
11 February 1945
With its southern boundary changed to include the new zone, the 6th Armd continued its relief
of the 17th AB Div and at 0950 assumed responsibility for its zone. CoB 603d TD Bn was detached
from the 17th AB and assigned to CCA.
The very small bridgehead north of DASBURG, established by the 17th AB, was abandoned since
it had never been expanded sufficiently to include an approach. The Div bridgehead, however,
was further consolidated and at 1024 VIII Corps assumed control of the Div and attached units. The
41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 11th Armd Div and the l84th C Engr Bn were attached at 1800.
CCA (Hines): CT 44 shifted from KALBORN to MARNACH and started relief of the 50 7th Prcht
Regt. The 184th C Engr Bn was attached at 0945 in place.
CCB (Read): Continued to hold within its zone and maintained contact with flank elements.
The 110 foot Bailey bridge was rebuilt by the 178th C Engr Bn and was opened for traffic at 1500 although the bridge site and vicinity were subjected to indirect machine gun fire. Enemy reaction
was negligible during the day.
Res Comd (Harris): Remained in its present locati~n and prepared to support either CCA or CCB.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support elements of the Div holding the bridgehead. The 212th
Armd FA Bn moved to the vicinity of BOCKHOLZ to give direct support to CCA. All Bns were reorganized as follows:
128th Armd FA Bn- D/ S CCB
212th Armd FA Bn-D/ S CCA
231st Armd FA En- General Support-reinforcing fires of 6th Armd Div Arty
The 193d FA Gp, in general support of Corps, reinforced the fires of the Bns with the following elements:
179th FA Bn) 212th Armd FABn
776th FA Bn)
256th FA Bn 128th Armd FA Bn
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12 February 1945
Reinforced with the 1252d, 284th and 184th C Engr Bns and the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, the Div
held within its sector and continued to improve defensive positions. Relief of elements of the 17th AB
Div within the 6th's sector was completed during the night 11-12 Feb. CCB 11th Armd Div relieved
the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz north of the bridgehead at' 2300. The Div CP opened at CLERVAUX at
1300. CT 9 was assigned to CCA as of 0900.
CCA (Hines): CT 44 completed relief of the 507th Prcht Regt at 0230. The 41st Cav Rcn Sq
Mecz, llth Armd Div was attached to the command and closed at KNAPHOSCHEID.
CCB (Read): At 1420 CT 9 was relieved in place by the 284th C Engr Bn and assembled in the
vicinity of WEICHERDANGE. Elements of CT 86 west of the OUR River and north of the Div bridgehead were relieved by elements of CCB llth Armd Div at 2300.
13 February 1945
CT 44 was relieved from CCA and assigned to CCB. Enemy activity was negligible.
CCA (Hines): CT 69 closed at NEIDHAUSEN at 1100. At 1600 the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz relieved
part of CT 44; CT 69 relieved part of the 184th C Engr Bn and the remainder of CT 44; while CT 15
relieved half the sector of the 184th C Engr Bn within its zone.
•
CCB (Read): Continued to hold and defend its bridgehead east of the OUR.
Res Comd (Harris): Command headquarters displaced to CLERVAUX, closing at 1130.
14 February 1945
The Div continued its defensive activities and reorganized its commands. Enemy activity consisted of harassing artillery and scattered small arms fire.
Compcsition of Commands:
CCB
CCA
15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Atchd)
603d TD Bn (-)
1252d C Engr Bn
184th C Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

9th Armd In£ Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn
284th C Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

•

-Res Comd
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)

CCA (Hines): Consolidated and improved defensive positions all along the sector. Upon relief
by the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and CT 69 at 0415, CT 44 moved to BOXHORN, closing at 1200. After
being relieved by CT 15 and CT 69, the 184th C Engr Bn displaced to TROIS PONTS in the FIRST
ARMY area.
CCB (Read): Continued to hold its bridgehead east of the OUR with no enemy contact. CT 9
was enroute from WEICHERDANGE to relieve the 284th C Engr Bn which was detached and sent
to the FIRST ARMY. CT 44 was attached to the Command and remained in Command Reserve. Construction of a footbridge across the OUR 1000 yards north of Site No 3 was completed at 1800.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div in the defense of its sector. Assault guns of CT 15
were functioning as a fourth battery for the 212th Armd FA Bn. Missions were fired ori enemy mortars
and machine gun positions and upon pillboxes.
15-16 February 1945
The 6th Armd continued to hold within its sector and consolidate its positions. Contact was
maintained with the 11th Armd Div on its left and the 6th Cav Gp on its right flank. The 184th and
284th C Engr Bns were relieved from attachment at 1425. Planning was begun for an VIII Corps
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attack by the 6th Armd Div and the 6th Cav Gp. This attack which was to be launched on I8 Feb was
designed to clear enemy west of the PRUM River and effect a junction with XII Corps at MAUEL. Air
OPs were active during daylight hours.
17 February I945
Rotation of troops in the defensive line continued to be carried out. After extensive reconnaissance throughout the day, Commanders and General Staff Officers held a conference for planning
and estimates. Harassing Nebelwerfer, artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the day with
little effect.
CCA (Hines) : Continued to hold and defend its assigned sector as several small enemy patrols
were broken up by friendly artillery.
CCB (Read): At 0830 CT 44 completed relief of CT 50 in place and CT 50 then moved to the
vicinity of DEIFELT-DONNAGE-LULLANGE, closing at I2I5.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div in defense of its sector. Air OPs were grounded
because of a heavy haze. Harassing and interdictory fires were maintained, and missions were fired
on enemy infan.try, mortars, artillery positions and vehicles.
18 February 1945
The 6th Armd continued to hold and defend its bridgehead and prepared for future operations.
Oral orders for an attack at H-hour 20 February on the SIEGFRIED LINE were issued by the Div
Comdr. Task forces and assault teams were organized and instructed, and reconnaissance continued.
The 16th Cml Smk GenCo was attached to CCA as of 1200.
19 February 1945
The Div held and defended its bridgehead and made final preparations for the attack on 20 Feb.
By taking advantage of the bridgehead held by CCB on the left flank, an assault could be made against
the SIEGFRIED LINE defense without the necessity of forcing a crossing of the OUR in the face of
pillboxes that lined its bank from north of DASBURG to the south boundary. The plan called for an
initial penetration by CCB and an envelopment from the north. In the meantime, two of the Corps
Engr Bns had been detached, and orders from higher authority prohibited the use of the 41st Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz east of the OUR. This left CCA too weak to effect a crossing on its front until the line had
been turned.
CCA (Hines): Continued preparation for the attack. The I61st Cml Gen Co was moved into
position to smoke the river floor to create diversion. Co C 1252d C Engr Bn was attached to the 41st
Cav Rcn Sq Mecz assault teams for the pending mission of neutralizing pillboxes east of the river.
CCB (Read): Continued reconnaissance for and instruction of all combat and assault teams.
Troops were positioned for the attack, as enemy artillery and mortar fire increased. Composition of
Combat Teams:
CT 9 (Britton)
CT 44 (Brown)
9th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 68th Tk Bn (-)
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
I Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 68th Tk Bn (-)
I Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 50 (Ward)

CT 86 (Brindle)

50th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
I Plat Co A 68th Tk Bn
I Plat Co B 68th Tk Bn
I Engr Sqd Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 68 (Davall)

Supporting Arty (Gp Bruce)

68th Tk Bn (-)
Co A 603d TD Bn (-)
CoB 25th Armd Engr Bn Rein£(-)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-)

l28th Armd FA Bn (D/S CTs 44 & 86)
23lst Armd FA Bn (D /S CTs 9 & 50)
257th FA Bn (G/S)
VIII Corps Arty reinforcing
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CCB Trains
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd (Harris): Remained in assembly areas prepared to support combat commands.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued its mission of defense in the Div sector. Plans were prepared for
supporting artillery fire in the coming attack.
20 February 1945
CCB made the main effort on the north flank with Combat Teams 9, 44 and 86. CT 50 prepared
to exploit the gains, while the remainder of the Command constituted the reserve. CCA, reinforced
by the 161st Cml Smk GenCo, made a diversionary attack by fire, smoke and movement on the south
flank.
At 0645 Artillery laid an intensive preparation over the entire front for 20 minutes, then lifted
for 10 minutes to allow the enemy to come out of their pillboxes and man their outside defenses to meet
a probable attack. Then for one minute all of the artillery concentrated on the small area of the first
objective with a terrific TOT which was the signal for the assault parties to attack. The diversion by
CCA served its purpose by attracting much of the enemy artillery anq mortar reaction.
Assaulting troops found their greatest obstacles to be mines, wire and booby traps and the physical
difficulty of breaking into pillboxes. Enemy fire was comparatively light. The first pillbox fell by
0830, and by noon the first two objectives had been taken. Then Combat Teams 9 and 44 fanned out
to the right and left to clean up the remainder of the line from DAHNEN to the northern edge of the
zone. In the meantine CT 86 on the north flank captured the pillboxes on its front and sliced through
to secure high ground along the Div boundary.
Initial gains against the SIEGRIED LINE were approximately 2 miles in depth and 2 miles in
width. A total of 40 pillboxes was taken with a loss of only two of our troops killed. One pillbox
(No 9) held out all day and night and was finally blown 21 February when 450 pounds of TNT were
placed against the door. One officer and ll EM were dragged out in a stunned condition.
CCA (Hines) : Commenced its diversionary attack at 0700 west of the OUR in support of CCB's
attack to the east. After the area had been sufficiently screened, one platoon of tanks from CT 69
created diversion by movement along the MARBURG-DASBURG road. The remaining tanks of
CTs 15_and 69 were displaced through the area to simulate attack. This attack drew considerable
small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. A combat patrol entered UNTER EISENBACH at 1130
where it was pinned down by machine gun fire but withdrew under cover of darkness. The scheduled fires continued until 1700, when normal defensive fires were resumed.
CCB (Read): Launched its attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses at 0715, prececed by an
artillery preparation over the entire front. The attack made good progress meeting light opposition
from pillboxes. The first pillbox was seized by CT 9 at 0830, and supporting tanks and tank destroyers
were brought up to cover the advance of the assault parties.
_
l By 1200 objectives 1 and 2 had been taken with only about two thirds of the pillboxes found to be
manned. CT 9 drew up 300 yards north of DAHNEN and sent a strong patrol into the town. CT 86
on the north placed a tank fire on pillboxes in its zone and moved up assault parties to assist in clearing
the northern part of the Combat Command's zone. Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn began clearing the
main supply route behind the advancing troops. By 1800 CCB had successfully forced through the
heaviest portion of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses in this zone . .
CT 44 pushed east and northeast to the vicinity of LANGFUHR, halted and dug in for the night.
Patrols were sent to the northeast and later its lines were readjusted to occupy evacuated pillboxes.
CT 50 infiltrated units through KALBORN and across the bridge to the reverse slope of the hill just
west of the line of pillboxes during the night. CT 9 tied in with CCA and CT 44 north of LANGFUHR
as CT 86 tied in with CCB llth Armd Div east of KALBORN and with CT 44 on the south near LANGFUHR. Plans were made to continue the attack on the following day.
Div Arty (Riley): Supported the attack of CCB and participated in the "attack by fire" of CCA.
Preparation for the attack lasted for 20 minutes over the entire front, then a lull of 10 minutes, followed
by an intense one-minute TOT by every available artillery piece. All Corps artillery in the sector
fired a counterbattery program during the preparation.
21 February 1945
The Div resumed its advance at 0400 and DAHNEN, the first town in Germany to be captured
by the 6th Armd, was cleared at 0745. An hour later, the Civil Affairs Officer of CCB had posted
* 149 *

his first military government proclamation in an enemy town. CT 86 and CT 44 continued to mop up
and secure the north boundary, awaiting the arrival of the llth Armd Div attacking from the north.
The 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was relieved from attachment at 1200.
CCA (Hines): Continued preparations for operations across the OUR at DASBURG. CT 69
relieved the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz as of 1200, and at 1220 was ordered to move tanks to positions
overlooking DASBURG. Co C 1252d C Engr Bn was attached to the Combat Team in place.
CCB (Read): Continued its determined onslaught against SIEGFRIED LINE defenses. CT 9
resumed the attack at 0400, captured DAHNEN, and drove rapidly south to smash into DASBURG
from the rear, by-passing the pillboxes facing the river between the town. The town was secured
by 1700. The bridge with the Div sign welcoming visitors into Germany was erected beginning that
night. CT 50 jumped off at 0845 to the east and seized REIPELDINGEN against light opposition about
1200. Continuing the attack south to DALEIDEN, the Command captured the town at 1600. The
bridge on the main highway from DASBURG to DALEIDEN had been blown by the enemy. This cut
the main road east of DASBURG and placed CT 50 well ea~t of the SIEGFIRED LINE defenses and in
a position to outflank the important crossing at DASBURG. CT 44 sent its reserve rifle company to
REIPELDINGEN to relieve elements of CT 50. CT 86 relieved CT 44 which then sideslipped down
to the area of REIPELDINGEN. 208 PWs were taken during the day.
Res Comd (Harris): Remained in assembly area prepared to support either combat command.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div attack. "On Call" fires were placed on enemy
personnel, pillboxes, gun positions, mortars and OPs. Harassing and interdictory fires were continued.
22 February 1945
The Div continued its attack against the SIEGFIRED LINE defenses, advanced east and southv.test
in the north part of its zone, and enlarged its bridgehead in the south part. Contact with the l'lth
Armd Div was made north of LANGFUHR and south of ERIFF, and later with the 90th In£ Div east of
IRRHAUSEN. 45 pillboxes were taken during the day.
CCA (Hines) : Composition of CTs:
CT 69 (Kennedy)

CT 15 (Lagrew)
15th Tk Bn
2 Plats Co B 603d TD.Bn

69th Tk Bn
-Co C 1252d C Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn

CT 1252 (Costinet)
CCA Reserve
1252d C Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (- )
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCA Trains
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

212th Armd FA Bn in direct support
By 0145 CT 15 completed relief of CT 1252 which then prepared for operations across the river.
Elements of CT 69 followed by CT 1252 crossed the footbridge at DASBURG and relieved elements
of CCB in the town. CT 15 initially supported the operations by fire from its positions along the west
side of the river. Elements of CT 69 crossed the OUR over the Bailey bridge and moved south to
-DASBURG. There it combined with CT 1252 and pushed south with the engineers mounted on light
tanks and covered by fire from medium tanks. PREISCHEID was captured by 1500. The two Combat
Teams then swept south to seize AFFLER at 1700. CT 15 crossed the river and made contact with
CT 69, then swung south to clear UBER EISENBACH by 1800, thus securing the whole of the SIEGFRIED LINE positions on the 6th Armd front. Enemy resistance and artillery fire during the day's
operation were moderate and only about half of the pillboxes encountered were manned.
CCB (Read) : Patrolled during the night 21- 22 Feb and cleared the area to the west, pushing
just south of the DASBURG--DALEIDEN road and consolidating positions gained the previous day.
CT 9 was relieved at DASBURG at 0330 by CCA. CT 50 spearheaded east and seized a bridgehead
at llOO across the IRSEN River southeast of DALEIDEN. CT 44 jumped off at 1300 to the east, capturing intact the bridge at IRRHAUSEN by 1530. In the meantime CT 50 drove south and southwest to
clear the main supply route. In heavy fighting two enemy tanks were knocked out and others were
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driven off, and by 2000 OLMSCHEID was occupied. CT 44 forced a bridgehead east of IRRHAUSEN
and by 2100 was smashing on southeast to the final objective. CT 86 cleared the woods southwest of
REIPELDINGEN and made contact with the llth Armd Div northwest of IRRHAUSEN at 2315. 269
PWs were taken by the Command.
23 February }945
The 6th Armd continued its advance to the east and occupied its final objective, the high ground
in the vicinity of JUCKEN and OLMSCHEID. The bridgehead in the southern part of its zone was
strengthened, and new operations were started to the southeast. The advance CP opened at DAS. BURG at 1400.
CCA (Hines): Elements of CTs 69 and 1252 continued clearing scattered enemy from the area
taken the previous day and sent patrols to reconnoiter bridges spanning the IRSEN. CT 15 crossed
the OUR over a Bailey bridge at UBER EISENBACH and proceeded to clear the area south between
the IRSEN and OUR Rivers. At 1600 a patrol sent to secure SEVENIG encountered no opposition.
The advance CP closed at PREISCHILD at 1245. 81 pillboxes were taken during the day's operation.
CCB (Read): Continued its attack east and south. At 0045 CT 86 made contact with elements
of the 90th In£ Div east of IRRHAUSEN. CT 9 drove east from DAHNEN toward OLMSCHEID and
passed through CT 50 at 0220. CT 50 ploughed through light opposition to take the high ground
southeast of DALEIDEN, opening the DALEIDEN-DASBURG highway which was to be the VIII Corps
main supply line. CT 9, after crossing the IRSEN River on foot, surrounded JUCKEN before daylight
and in conjunction with CT 44, which was dug in on the final objective, consolidated on the Div
objective by 0740. CT 68 raced south at 1630, by-passing KARLSHAUSEN to the east, and headed
for OBERGECKLER to contact the left flank of the XII Corps. A force was dropped off to contain
KARLSHAUSEN. Contact was made with elements of the 6th Cav Gp at KARLSHAUSEN at 1900.
CCB's CP moved from DAHNEN to DALEIDEN, closing at 1700. 252 PWs were taken during the day.
24 February 1945
The Div continued clearing its zone and contact was established with elements of the XII Corps
north of OBERGECKLER. The towns of NEUERBERG, KARLSHAUSEN, LEIMBACH and MUXERATH
were cleared. Pinched out in its present zone by the 90th In£ Div and the 6th Cav Gp, the 6th Armd
prepared to take over its new zone. The 1252d C Engr Bn and 161st Cml Smk GenCo were relieved
of attachment.
During the period 20-24 Feb the 6th Armd captured 32 towns and 253 pillboxes, took 1033
prisoners, and inflicted heavy personnel and material losses upon the enemy. Brig Gen Read was
assigned as Asst Div Comdr and Col Hanson became CO of CCB.
CCA (Hines): Continued clearing enemy from its zone. At 1450 the 1252d C Engr Bn was re·
lieved from the Command. A strong patrol of light tanks and combat engineers entered and cleared
the town of SEVENIG at 2230, completing the mission of the Command.
CCB (Read): CT 68 swung south to contact elements of the left flank of the XII Corps at OBERGfCKLER. Elements advancing on LEIMBACH swept through the town after a small fire fight and
headed southeast to KREUZDORF where a patrol was sent to KOXHAUSEN to contact the 6th Cav Gp.
Another patrol to the southwest secured the town of MUXERATH. Continuing southeast, the Command
established contact at 0740 with elements of the 80th Inf Div, 1200 yards north of OBERGECKLER.
CT 44 raced from JUCKEN to relieve elements of CT 68 at KARLSHAUSEN and LEIMBACH. At 1300
NEUERBURG was taken by CT 69 which turned the entire area over to the 6th Cav Gp and assembled
near LEIMBACH awaiting further orders. 61 PWs were taken during the day, making a total of 939
prisoners taken by the Command during the past five days.
25 February 1945
The 6th Armd reorganized its command and, in compliance with VIII Corps order, relieved the
357th and 359th In£ Regts, 90th In£ Div within its new zone west of the PRUM. CCB on the north
and CCA on the south assumed responsibility at 2225. The Div CP closed in ARZFELD at 1030.
Aggressive pafrolling was continued.
Composition of Commands:
CCA
CCB
Res Comd
9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

50th Armd In£ Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Ca v Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
*
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44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
603d TD Bn (-)

Co C 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)

CCA (Hines): Reorganized its Command. CT 15 completed relief by 21:30 of the 357th In£ Regt
along the PRUM between MERLSCHEID and MANDERSCHEID. CT 9 remained in place at OLMSCHEID. The Command CP closed at LICHTENBORN at 1600.
Composition of CTs:
CCA Trains
CT 9 (Britton)
CT 15 (Lagrew)
15th Tk Bn
Co A 9th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 9th Armd In£ Bn
Mort Plat 9th Armd In£ Bn

9th Armd In£ Bn (-)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecq

Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CCB (Hanson): Reorganized its command and completed the relief of the 359th Inf Regt along
the PRUM at 2230. CT 86 moved by infiltration to the northwest of MASTHORN, completing its
relief by 2045. Contact was maintained with the 4th Inf Div on the north flank. CT 50 assembled
near EUSCHEID and completed relief of the 359th on the south flank of CCB at 2230. CT 69 remained
in its present positions and prepared to move to the Command's new sector early 26 Feb.
Composition of CTs:
CT 86 (Brindle)
CT 50 (Ward)
CT 69 (Kennedy)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
l Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

50th Armd In£ Bn
l Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
l Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

69th Tk Bn (-)
)
Co A 603d TD Bn (-)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Res Comd (Harris): Prepared to move east of the OUR to PREISCHEID.
Div Arty (Riley) : Moved to new positions with the CP at ARZFELD to take over artillery support
in the old sector of the 90th Inf Div.
26 February 1945
The Div maintained its line in its new defensive sector, conducted aggressive patrolling and raids
to locate crossings on the PRUM, and prepared for operations to the east. The Div CP opened at
ARZFELD at 1030.
CCA (Hines): Held its line and sent 3 combat patrols across the PRUM. Contact was maintained
with the 6th Cav Gp on the south.
CCB (Hanson): Held its line and maintained contact with the 4th Inf Div on the north. CT 69
moved from PREISCHEID to BINSCHEID without enemy interference and closed at 1500. At 1800
a combat patrol from CT 50 went into LUNEBACH but was forced to withdraw under formidable
enemy pressure. The patrol crossed the PRUM at KINZERBURG, ran into booby traps, heavy small
arms, mortar and artillery fire, and withdrew after suffering heavy casualties. The bridge there was
completely destroyed.
Res Comd (Harris): Moved to PREISCHEID, closing at 1030.
Div Arty (Riley): Firing was very light during the period. Wire communication was improved
and liaison with the 4th Inf Diy was established.
27 February 1945
Shortly before midnight, three patrols of 15 men each from Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz crossed
the river with the mission of securing the high ground to the east. Supported by Co A 9th Armd In£
Bn. the objectives were seized and consolidated. Though depleted by heavy casualties the Troop
withstood heavy artillery and mortar fire, wiped out enemy patrols, and defeated counterattacks by
numerically superior forces .
For forty hours without food and water they held the most advance point of the bridgehead,
enabling other forces to cross the river and secure the bridgehead. For this action Troop A was given
a Presidential citation
Elements of CT 86 were moved north to relieve elements of the 4th Inf Div.
CCA (Hines): Elements of CT 9 crossed the river shortly before midnight, followed by the remainder of the force, and at 0545 seized the high ground northeast on the crossing site near MANDERSCHEID. Smoke was laid on the crossing' by the 212th Armd FA Bn, and by 1630 Combat Teams
*
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9 and 15 began their coqrdinated drive to the south. At 2000 they had advanced beyond HEILHAUSEN against light resistance. All bridges in the Combat Command zone were found to be blown,
so arrangements were made with the 6th Cav Gp to use their crossing in the vicinity of WAXWEILER.
CCB (Hanson): Elements of CT 50 crossed the PRUM south of LUNEBACH at 0105 but were
forced to withdraw because of heavy enemy artillery and small arms fire. During the day the Combat
Command boundary was extended north approximately 2 miles along the west bank of the PRUM
to MATZERATH inclusive. Tr E and Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz dismounted and pushed north,
relieving elements of the 12th Regt 4th In£ Div by 2230.
Res Comd (Harris): Took over bridge guards near FALKEN, DASBURG, UBER EISENBACH
and GEMUND.
Div Arty (Riley): Supported the Div in its crossing, firing upon enemy strongpoints, gun locations,
and suspected installation with TOTs and defensive fires.
28 February 1945
The 6th Armd continued its attack, enlarginig the bridgehead across the PRUM and capturing
six towns. CT 44 was attached to CCA from the Res Comd and the 161st Cml SG Co was attached
to Res Comd.
CCA (Hines): CT 9 continued the attack, seizing high ground to 'the east of the crossing site by
1630. The light tanks of CT 15 had started crossing the river at the 6th Cav Gp crossing, but because
of the poor condition of the ford and the fact that one of the lead tanks had thrown a track and blocked
the crossing, they were held up until noon.
The Bailey bridge near MANDERSCHEID was finished at 1630 and CT 44 commenced its attack.
Passing through Combat Teams 9 and 15, it shifted southeast and swept through DACKSCHEID by
1930, reorganized and captured EILSCHEID at 2200. The Combat Team consolidated its position
for the night and prepared to resume the attack east at daybreak. CT 15, upon being passed through
by CT 44, remained in place ready to support either the bridgehead or CT 44. CT 9 assumed command of the bridgehead. Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was released to Squadron control.
CT 44 (Brown

CT 15 (Lagrew)

CCA Res

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (D /S)

15th Tk Bn (-)

Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
Co C 603d TD Bn (-)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 9 (Morse)
9th Armd Inf Bn

CCB (Hanson) : CT 50 jumped off at 0430, forded the river south of LUNEBACH and raced to
the east, securing MERLSCHEID by 0810 and LIERFELD by 0955. Opposition was light, consisting
mostly of small arms and artillery fire, and the Combat Team had taken LUNEBACH by 1220. On
t}$ north flank CT 86 met fairly stiff opposition in capturing the high ground northeast of LUNEBACH,
thEm outposted the town of PRONSFELD to be cleared of mines and booby traps the next morning.
Construction of a Bailey bridge at LUNEBACH was started at 1400.
1 March 1945
The bridgehead across the PRUM was enlarged and strengthened in preparation for a coordinated attack to seize the Div's first objective-a bridgehead across the NIMS River.
CCA (Hines): CT 44 continued vigorous patrolling to the east and further strengthened the
bridgehead. Contact was made with the 6th Cav Gp on the right near PINTESFELD. CT 9 and CT 15
remained in reserve, but a force of light tanks from CT 15 cleared enemy infantry from the high ground
east of MERLSCHEID by 0800. These same enemy troops had earlier forced CCT' s OP east of the
town to withdraw. The CP opened at MANDERSCHEID at 1200.
CCB (Hanson): The Bailey bridge at LUNEBACH was completed at 0500 without any enemy
reaction. CT 86 jumped off at 0630 and was just short of the proposed extent of the Div bridgehead
when pinned down by very heavy machine gun fire. About 1515 the Combat Team was ordered to
improve its position, dig in for the night, and keep probing enemy positions.
CT 50, with tank and TD support, jumped off at 0700 against moderate small arms and mortar
fire. At 1605 MATZERATH was captured and strong combat patrols drove to the south. CT 69 moved
from BINSCHEID to the vicinity of MERLSCHEID, closing at 1940. During the day Tr A 86th Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz which was relieved by CT 9 moved into CCB's area, rejoining CT 86.
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Res Comd (Harris): Elements of CT 68 reliev~d elements of CT 86 in its defensive positions north
of PRONSFELD and maintained contact with CCB on the right and the 4th Inf Div on the left.
Div Arty (Riley) : TOTs were fired on Nebelwerfer positions, enemy batteries and areas of activity.
Heavy harassing and interdictory fires were executed during the night.
2 March 1945
The 6th Armd after further patrolling and preparation, attacked to the east in its zone against
light and disorganized resistance, seizing five towns and a crossing site on the NIMS River. The 161st
Cml Smk Gen Co was attached to CCB.
CCA (Hines): During the early morning, patrols from CT 44 reconnoitered the road net 1 mile
to the northeast of DACKSCHEID and found dug-in infantry, machine guris, a tank and mines. At 1300
the artillery supporting the Command smoked the high ground just south of HEISDORF and at 1310
CT 44 attacked to the east. By 1400 the objective on the high ground northeast of DACKSCHEID
was reached where positions were consolidated. Elements of CT 44 then by-passed HEISDORF.
Other elements of the Combat Team captured HEISDORF by 2300.
CCB (Hanson): During the night and morning strong patrols were active. At 1430 CCB attacked
with CT 69 on the left (north) and CT 50 on the right. CT 69, against light opposition, jumped off
from MATZERATH and seized its objective, WINRINGEN, and high ground just to the northeast. CT
50 captured its objective, the high ground east of MATZERATH, and against little opposition took
DINGDORF at 1725. Probing into the dense woods east of PRONSFELD, CT 86 advanced to capture
OBERLAUCH at 1700.
CT 69 continued its attack, capturing the town of NIEDERLAUCH, while CT 50 improved its
positions.
Composition of CTs:
CT 50 (Ward)
CT 86 (Kennon)
50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 69 (Kennedy)

CCB Reserve

69th Tk Bn (-)
Co A 603d TD Bn (- )

Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris): CP opened at PREISCHEID at 1200. The 603d TD Bn was relieved of bridge
guard at UBER EISENBACH and GEMUND and given the mission of guarding the bridges at LUNEBACH and HEILHAUSEN.
3 March 1945
The Div continued its attack to the east and captured five towns and two bridges intact across
the NIMS. At the end of the day the 90th Inf Div was in the process of relieving the 6th Armd.
CCA (Hines) : Attacked at 0416 with CT 44 leading to capture WETTELDORF by 0830. Elements
of CT 44 crossed the ANNA River and seized the high ground west of SCHONECKEN. CT 9 followed
CT 44 across the NIMS and C<)ptured the high ground to the east and southeast. CT 44, supported
by the fires of CT 69, drove the enemy from SCHONECKEN to capture the town by 1200.
_
A force of light tanks dashed from west of the NIMS to secure the SCHONECKEN bridge intact,
as disorganized enemy streamed to the east to escape. Two flights of fighter-bombers were called in
to strafe and bomb enemy columns of tanks and vehicles with excellent results. Having attained its
objective, CCA consolidated its positions and awaited relief by the 90th Inf Div.
CCB (Hanson): During the early morning CT 69 moved to take up tank defilade firing positions
on the high ground west of SCHONECKEN and support by fire the attack on the flanks of both combat
commands throughout the day. CT 50 spearheaded east, crossing the NIMS at its junction with the
SCHOLKEN River, and captured the high ground to the east, encountering heavy artillery and rocket
fire .
CT 86 blocked to the north and captured the town of GIESDORF by 1700 against stubborn resistance. Other elements of the Combat Team cleared the dense woods in the northern zone by 1230
and made contact with the 128th Inf Regt 4th In£ Div on the north at ELLWERATH. At the end of the
day the Command was relieved by elements of the 90th Inf Div.
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Res Comd (Harris): Elements of CT 68 held and patrolled west of the PRUM between CCB and
the 4th In£ Div until relieved at 1700. PINTESFELD was entered and occupied during the morning.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div by firing on targets of opportunity. Harassing
and interdictory missions were fired during the night.
4 March 1945
At 0600 the 90th In£ Div assumed responsiblility for the Div zone and the 6th Armd assembled
in the ARZFELD area north of LUXEMBOURG, passing to SHAEF Reserve. For the first time since
it entered combat 27 July 1944, the entire Div was out of the front lines. From COUTANCES to
AVRANCHEX (spearheading the breakthrough) and the 230-miles race alone to BREST; at LORIENT;
from the NANCY bridgehead to the SIEGFRIED defenses of SAARBRUCKEN; and from BASTOGNE
through the SIEGFRIED LINE to SCHONECKEN on the NIMS River, the 6th Armd had continuously
faced the enemy.
5-8 March 1945
The 6th Armd remained in its assembly area in SHAEF Reserve and prepared for future operations. An extensive program of training, maintenance of equipment and rehabilitation of personnel
was carried on. The 161st Cml Smk GenCo was relieved from attachment, effective 5 March.
On 8 March the Div received orders that it had been attached to the SEVENTH ARMY and would
march, commencing at 091000, to the SEVENTH ARMY zone. Advance parties departed immediately
for SEVENTH ARMY Hq to make arrangements for and selection of assembly areas prior to the movement.
CHAPTER VI
GERMANY CAMPAIGN
9 March to 8 May 1945
In March the entire Div was pulled out of the front lines for the first time since it entered combat
on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA 27 July 1944. For over seven months (221 consecutive days) the
6th Armd had engaged in continuous action which covered hundreds of miles of France, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Germany. From the beginning the enemy had fought stubbornly to stabilize his
front, sometimes almost succeeding before added Allied strength created another breach. At the
time of the 6th Armd' s relief new penetrations had been made in the enemy's lines and he was again
retreating.
After a week in SHAEF reserve the 6th Armd received orders on 8 March 1945 assigning it to
the SEVENTH ARMY and directing it to move to an assembly area in the SEVENTH ARMY zone.
These plans gave the 6th Armd about a week to rest and refit, some 50 miles in rear of the line,
and then to move forward to be ready to jump off on Corps order.
l
'
RHINELAND
9 March- 24 March 1945
9- 11 March 1945
Attached to the XV Corps and placed in reserve, the Div began marching to its assigned assembly
area at 090900. Headquarters was to be at VIC SUR SEI:(.,LE (FRANCE) . Shoulder patches and all
vehicle markings were removed; radio silence was imposed. With the exception of one Ordnance
company and the Administrative Center, the 6th Armd closed in its assigned assembly area at 110200.
Route of March: ARZFELD-DASBURG to junction N16, N16 to junction No 27, to junction No 7,
to LUXEMBOURG, N3 and N53 to THIONVILLE to junction GC 2 to junction N52 to PONT-A-MODSSON, N4l0 to N399 to assembly area. The average distance traveled by the units was 165 miles.
12 March 1945
The Div assembled by battalion in the area surrounding CHATEAU SALINS. Combat commands
and combat teams .were not assembled in their tactical groupings until the 6th Armd moved forward
on March 18. This disposition facilitated maintenance and administration and enabled a proper
grouping to be made after the detailed plan was completed. Shortly after arrival in the rear area,
Div Arty was committed to reinforce the artillery of the 3d Div in its assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE.
The artillery remained with the 3d Div until the 6th Armd passed through and picked it up.
*
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13-17 March 1945
The Div received orders to be prepared to move to a forward assembly area from which it would
exploit the attack of the XV Corps through the SIEGFRIED LINE and secure exits to the RHINE Plain
at BAD DURKHEIM, GRUNSTADT and DREISEN. On Corps order, it was also to seize the west bank
of the Rhine and secure a bridgehead across the River. The 3d and 45th Divs were to jump off at
150100 to penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE.
The 6th Armd made meticulous plans to initiate and execute its orders. CCA, followed by the
86th CC, was to move on the left (west); CCB, followed by the Res Comd, was to move on the right
(east).
Div Arty (Riley): Moved from an assembly area near CHATEAU VOE to positions near ACHEN
to reinforce the artillery of the 3d Inf Div. The 128th Armd FA Bn moved to the vicinity of ACHEN,
the 212th Armd FA Bn to the vicinity of ETTING, and the 231st Armd FA Bn to the vicinity of KULHAUSEN. All units closed by 142315 and completed registration at 1745.
On 15 March the Div, less artillery, assembled dismounted on the COTE DE DELME. This hill
offered a splendid view of the SEILLE River valley in which the 6th Armd had fought from the middle
of September until the beginning of the SAAR Campaign in November. Following a memorial service
on this vantage point, the general plan of operation for the forthcoming campaign was outlined by
means of a big chart for the benefit of all personnel. This was the first time during the war that an
opportunity had occurred to explain the big picture to everyone in the Div prior to a battle.
18 March 1945
The 6th Armd, less Div Arty, displaced from its assembly area near VIC SUR SEILLE to a forwqrd
assembly area near OERMINGEN. The Div CP opened at OERMINGEN at 1415. Div Arty continul;d
to support the attack of the 3d Inf Div by reinforcing its artillery fire .
CCA (Hines): Cleared the IP at DIEUZE at 0655 and closed in a forward assemlby area at 1300.
The CP was located near KULHAUSEN.
CCB (Hanson): Commenced movement at 0900 and closed in the vicinity of DEHLINGEN at 1415.
Res Comd (Harris): Commenced movement at 1142 and closed in the vicinity of VOELLERDINGEN.
86th CC (Brindle): Commenced movement at 1000 by the north route and closed in bivouac
near HERBITZHEIM.
Div Arty (Riley): Participated in a harassing, preparatory and post-preparatory program in
support of the attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE.
19 March 1945
The attack of the 3d and 45th Inf Divs of XV Corps met considerable resistance; however, the
XXI Corps of the SEVENTH ARMY appeared to be approaching a breakthrough, due in part to pressure by THIRD ARMY units moving south. By SEVENTH ARMY order, . CCA with the 212th Armd FA
Bn was attached to XXI Corps at 1530 and moved northeast at once to the vicinity of SAARGUEMINES.
After the breakthrough the Command was to revert to Div control in the vicinity of HOMBURG.
20 March 1945
When the "Break" came at about 1000, Corps ordered the 6th Armd to begin its exploitation.
News that the THIRD ARMY was advancing south across the SEVENTH ARMY front caused no change
in plan except direction for greater speed. There was no opportunity to effect coordination with
THIRD ARMY units. Although the SIEGFRIED LINE south of ZWEIBRUCKEN had been completely
broken, the second line north of ZWEIBRUCKEN was still manned and had not been reached by the
3d Div when the 6th Armd passed through. However, the line was not held solidly and resistance,
while determined in spots, was not coordinated. In the HOMBURG area to the west- in front of XXI
Corps- CCA found practically no resistance.
The Div, less CCA, passed through the 3d and 45th Inf Divs during the afternoon in the vicinity
of ZWEIBRUCKEN and EINOD and advanced approximately 12 miles to the northeast. CCA attached
to XXI Corps advanced at 1215 and reverted to Div control at 2000. The Div CP opened at ZWEIBRUCKEN at 2000.
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21 March 1945
The 6th Armd continu"ed its advance east against light to moderate resistance, reached the west
bank of the RHINE River at WORMS at 0900, and captured RHEIN-DURKHEIM on the RHINE at 1200.
Leading elements of the Div drove 60 miles in 18 hours and were the first elements of the XV Corps
to reach the RHINE. The Div CP opened at EBERTSHEIM at 2100.
Although WORMS had been entered by THIRD ARMY troops prior to the time CCA patrols
reached it, the town of RHEIN-DURKHIEM to the north had been by-passed by THIRD ARMY and
offered sharp resistance before it was captured by CCA. The same situation occurred in a number
·of towns in the GRUNSTADT area.
22 March 1945
The Div, less CT 9 and CF Berg of CCA which were on the west bank of the RHINE River near
RHEIN-DURKHEIM, assembled in the vicinity of EBERTSHEIM.
23 March 1945
The 6th Armd was reassigned to TWELFTH ARMY GROUP, THIRD ARMY, and XX Corps effective at 1800. CCA (Hines): now including the 86th CC, operated a counter-reconnaissance screen
from RHEIN-DURKHIEM through WORMS to the Autobahn on the soyth.
24 March 1945
Elements conducting the counter-reconnaissance screen along the west bank of the RHINE River
were relieved by elements of the 3d and 45th In£ Divs. At 1800 the Div was assigned to XII Corps.
CCA (Hines): CT 9, holding the line from RHEIN-DURKHEIM to WORMS, was relieved at 1300
by elements of the 45th In£ Div.
86th CC (Brindle): Holding the line from WORMS south to the Autobahn, the Combat Command was relieved by elements of the 3d In£ Div:
FRANKFURT--DRESDEN
25 March--9 May 1945
The XII Corps had established two bridges across the RHINE River at OPPENHEIM and was
holding a bridgehead with elements of the 5th and 90th In£ Divs. The 6th Armd remained west of
WORMS in the vicinity of GRUNSTADT. Composition of Commands remained unchanged.
Corps Mission: XII Corps was to exploit the breakthrough across the RHINE River with armor,
using the 6th Armd on the left (north) and the 4th Armd Div on the right (south).
Division Mission: Cross the RHINE River in one column, following the 4th Armd Div, and drive
northeast to cross the MAIN River at or just east of FRANKFURT.
25 March 1945
The 6th Armd assembled near DEXHEIM and then crossed the RHINE River at OPPENHEIM·
Ortier of the single column which passed through the 5th and 90th Divs' bridgehead was: CCB,
CCA, Div Hq, Div Arty, 86th Reserve and Tns.
,
Although plans called for CCA to operate abreast of and to the left of CCB, crossing of the_RHINE
in one column placed CCA to the rear initially. When CCB passed through the infantry bridgehead
near GROSS GERAU and was slowed by enemy resistance, it developed toward the right (east) .
This enabled CCA to develop to the left (northwest) and come up abreast CCB. Both Commands used
the main road through GROSS GERAU and MORFELDEN for part of their forces.
CCA (Hines) : Reached the vicinity of DEXHEIM at 0900, crossed the RHINE behind CCB and
then swung northeast to drive through the infantry bridgehead northwest of GROSS GERAU. Continuing on, CT 9 seized MORFELDEN. CT 15 raced north to the MAIN River between RUSSELSHEIM
and RAUNHEIM. The most formidable resistance was offered by the anti-aircraft defenses of FRANKFURT. With command of the roads, these weapons were quickly sighted for ground fire which forced
all movement on trails through an extensive wooded area south of the city.
CCB (Hanson): Moved at 0030, closed in the vicinity of DEXHEIM at 0700, and started across
the RHINE at 0920 to pass through the infantry bridgehead. CT 69 made first contact with the enemy
just west of MORFELDEN when it encountered artillery, small arms and bazooka fire. By-passing this
resistance, the Combat Team sliced northeast and halted for the night just south of WALLDORF in
contact with CCA on the left and elements of the 90th In£ Div on the right. CT 44 followed the route
of CT 69 to GROSS GERAU, east to WIXHAUSEN, then north to establish contact with elements of
the 90th In£ Div west of LANGEN.
&
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Res Comd (Harris) : Followed the route of CCA and assembled in the vicinity of GROSS GERAU.
The Div CP opened at GROSS GERAU at 2000.
86th CC (Brindle): Followed the route of CCB and assembled northeast of GROSS GERAU.
26 March 1945
The Div continued its attack northeast, seized a partially destroyed bridge in FRANKFURT, and
forced a bridgehead across the MAIN River against extremely heavy resistance. This was the first
bridgehead to be established in FRANKFURT. Later the 5th Inf Div crossed through the bridgehead
to complete the capture of FRANKFURT. The 6th Armd's crossing was accomplished under the
heaviest artillery fire the Div had encountered since entering FRANCE 27 July 1944. The nearby
city of OFFENB.ACH was captured by CCB. At 1345 the Div CP opened at MORFELDEN, and at the
end of the do.y Combat Commands A and B were each reinforced by a battalion from the Reserve
Command. Although the original plan gave the Div the option of securing a crossing east of FRANKFURT as far as HANAU, the 4th Armd and the 90th Inf Divs, meeting less resistance to the east, had
already captured HANAU and the area west as far as OFFENBACH. This caused Corps to change
its instructions to the 6th Armd, limiting the Div front to OFFENBACH and FRANKFURT, a particularly
difficult front for an armored division. All bridges over the MAIN River, in the Div area, were partially
or completely destroyed. Only the one bridge referred to above was sufficiently intact to permit the
crossing of dismounted men. Considerable repair was necesasry before even %. ton vehicles could
cross.
CCA (Harris): Continued its attack at 0400 and forced a bridgehead across the MAIN River.
At 0400 CT 9 jumped off to the north, encountered stiff resistance in the form of small arms and
artillery fire, and by-passed on the north the enemy airfield southwest of FRANKFURT. CT 15 ploughed
northeast through heavy forests along the MAIN River and reached SACHSENHAUSEN during the
afternoon. Finding a partially destroyed bridge in the vicinity of NIEDERRAD, a company of infa:nvy
was immediately pushed across to secure a bridgehead. Two additional companies of CT 9 followed
to strengthen the bridgehead as intense artillery fire continued to fall on the site. CT 68 was attached
to the Command at 2030.
CCB (Hanson) : CT 44 smashed northeast to capture !...ANGER in conjunction with elements of
the 359th Inf Regt. The Combat Team raced on to capture SPRENDLINGEN and was then met by
heavy AT fire from the woods to the north. CT 44 split into two columns. One force (Roth) attacked
along the SPRENDLINGEN-NEU-ISENBURG road; the other force (Tillman) drove northeast on
OFFENBACH. A reconnaissance force sent east from LANGEN by-passed resistance at GOTZENHAIN, then shifted to DIETZENBACH, and returned to the main axis via HEUSENSTAMM. The Combat Team captured OFFENBACH against light resistance and. drew up before the MAIN River at 1530.
CT 69 pushed generally northeast against scattered resistance, reaching the Main near SACHSENHAUSEN.· CT 50 was detached from Res Comd and attached to CCB at 2030.
Res Comd (Lagrew) : Closed in bivouac 2 miles south of NIEDERRAD at 2030. CT 50 was attached to CCB, CT 68 to CCA.
86th CC (Brindle): In a swift enveloping move to the east through OBER RODEN and JUGESHEIM,
the Command approached from the southeast. Upon reaching the MAIN, it conducted reconnaissance
for possible routes and crossing sites.
Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div, concentrating on counterbattery fire.
27 March 1945
The Div continued to protect its bridgehead at FRANKFURT against increased enemy resistance.
Intense artillery fire prevented' repair of the bridge. Elements in the bridgehead were relieved by
the 5th Inf Div which assumed control of the bridgehead at 1300. The Div CP opened at NEU-ISENBURG at 1340.
CCA (Harris): Continued to hold its bridgehead at FRANKFURT against increased enemy resistance. At 0900 construction of a Bailey bridge was started, but intense artillery fire prevented its
continuance. It was estimated that approximately 4,000 rounds of artillery fire fell on the construction
site during the morning, the rounds falling 5 to 6 yards apart. At 1300 Companies A, B and C of the
9th Armd Inf Bn were relieved by the 2d and 3d Inf Bns of the lOth Inf Regt and the 3d Bn of the llth
Inf Regt. At this time the 5th Inf Div assumed control of the bridgehead. By 1630 all elements of the
Command had assembled south of the MAIN and were prepared to pass through the 5th Inf Div upon
completion of a bridge.
CCB (Hanson): Patrols of CT 44 made contact with the 359th Inf Regt, 90th Inf Div near BURGEL.
The Combat Team also sent patrols to reconnoiter the south bank of the MAIN. CT 69 remained in
assembly south of NIEDERRAD and prepared for future operations.
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86th CC (Brindle): Displaced to NEU-ISENBURG and prepared to cross the MAIN.
Div Arty (Riley) : Was active with counterbattery fire and continued to support the 5th In£ Div
bridgehead after the 6th Armd Div was relieved.
28 March 1945
The 6th Armd moved from its assembly area soutH of the MAIN to cross the 90th In£ Div bricige
near DORNIGHEIM and advance north and northwest. Resistance was light and scattered, and the
rapidly moving columns seized many towns and prisoners before reaching the southwest vicinity of
FRIEDBERG near the end of the day. At 1800 the Div was relieved from attachment to the XII Corps
·.· and attached to XX Corps. The Div CP opened south of HOCHSTADT at 2200.
29 March 1945
The Div continued its relentless drive north, the Cavalry leading and Combat Commands abreast
slashing through unorganized resistance to capture many to~ns and many prisoners. Numerous
Allied prisoners were liberated as the 6th Armd drove approximately 32 miles to overrun enemy
rear installations.
CCA (Harris): Advanced north rapidly against disorganized enemy resistance. CT 15 moved
out at 0545, passing through OCKSTADT at 0810. GROSSEN-LINDEN was captured at 1250. CT 68
sliced through FRIEDBERG, met some opposition which was quickly 0ealt with, and then continued
through GARBENTEICH. CT 9 followed CT 68 through FRIEDBERG and then, pressed on to capture
BAD NAUHEI-M. Both CT 9 and CT 68 halted in the vicinity of BURKHARDSFELDEN at approximately
1900.
CCB (Hanson) : Continued its drive northward and by 0605 leading elements had raced through
NIEDER WOLLSTADT. At 0845 CT 50 was in the vicinity of OCKSTADT. Upon reaching the Autobahn the Combat Team sped north against no opposition. The Command liberated 800 Allied prisoners of war in HATTENROD, where it halted at 1730. CT 44 stormed through NIEDER WEISEL and
continued to meet little organized resistance as it drove northeast of STEINBACH. CT 69 met some
resistance at FRIEDBERG but overran it to move on to the Command's objective for the day northeast
of STEINBACH.
86th CC (Brindle) : Elements of the Command, spearheading the 6th Armd advance, by-passed
resistance when possible and split into columns to pass through WILSSESHEIM and DORF GULL.
At 0915 its leading elements swept through STEINBACH and GARBENTEICH. Fleeing enemy columns with artillery were overrun and destroyed or captured. By late evening the leading elements
had driven northeast to ROMROD, smashing light resistance.
Div Arty (Riley) : The 193d FA Gp with the 689th and 176th FA Bns and the 274th Armd FA Bn
was attached to the Div and closed in the Div assembly area near REISKIRCHEN. The Div CP opened
at STEINBACH at 1645.
30 March 1945
The Div received new orders to exploit its breakthrough northeast toward KASSEL. Gains of
awroximately 47 miles were made since only scattered enemy resistance was encountered by all
leading,elements, the heaviest being in the vicinity of ALSFELD and WABERN. The day's action was
marked by an exceptionally large number of German prisoners and a large number of uncovered
Allied prisoners. The 26lst Regimental Combat Team of the 65th Inf Div, attached to the 6th Armd
at 0100, was further assigned so that the 3d Bn went to CCA, the 2d Bn to CCB, and the remainder
to Res Comd . The Div CP opened at HOMBERG at 1900.
CCA (Harris): Composition of Troops:
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn (- Cos A & D)
Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
9th Armd In£ Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-1 Sect)
3d Bn 26lst In£ Regt (Atchd)
·Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
.
At 0600 the Command continued its attack north. CT 15 attacked for ALSFELD, the Div's initial
objective, from their assembly area at ALBACH. CT 9 moved down the Autobahn to the road junction
north of EHRINGSHAUSEN where it turned north and seized the towns of HEIMERTSHAUSEN,
BILLERTSHAUSEN and ANGENROD. At 0840 CT 15 had to reduce a road block protected by AT
guns before entering and capturing ALSFELD. This action caused some delay, so the Command later
followed CT 9 to the north. CT 9 initially followed CT 15, but at ANGENROD CT 9 whipped rapidly
to the north. The following towns were entered and secured: HEIDELBACH, SCHRECKSBACH,
NEUKIRCHEN, NIEDER GRENZEBACH, OBER GRENZEBACH, FRIEDLENDORF, HOMBERG, UNS* 159 *

HAUSEN and HARTE. The Combat Team then halted east of HARTE. CT 9 found a bridge blown
at NIDER MOLLRICH and another at ALTENBURG. CT 68, moving abreast and to the left flank of
CT 9, seized and secured the following towns: BEUREN, GEILSHAUSEN, WEITERSHAIN, OBER
GLENN, SEIPELSDORF, TREYSA, BORKEN, ZIEGENHAIN, UNDEBORN and ZENNERN. In the
vicinity of KAPPEL a bridge was captured intact. Light resistance in the CCA sector centered mostly
in towns and along the EDER River. At the river a bridgehead was formed by Tr A 86th Cav Rcn
Sq Mecz. The 3d Bn of RCT 261 was attached to the Command early in the morning and gathered
up prisoners to the rear.
CCB (Hanson):
Composition of Troops:
69th Tk Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn
Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn (-Cos A and C)
Co C 603d TD Bn and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2d Bn 261st In£ Regt (Atcl'ld)
Co A 68th Tk Bn
At 0600 the Command moved from its assembly area near BURKHARDSFELDEN. CT 44 advanced by the south route; CT 50 in rear of CT 44; CT 69 by the north route. Enemy resistance consisting of small arms and bazooka fire was cleared. CCB moved on the Autobahn to the vicinity of
ALSFELD where it was held up by a blown bridge. When the road was cleared, the Command moved
on against scattered resistance and halted near OBER BEISHEIM. The 2d Bn, RCT 261 was attached
to CCB early in the day and followed to pick up prisoners.
Res Comd (Lagrew) : Marched via KERZENHEIM- KONGERNHEIM- GROSS GERAU- FRIEDBERG to REMSFELD, closing at 0145. Composition of Troops:
Btry D 546th AAA Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
603d TD Bn (- '
Co A 691st TD Bn
777th AAA Bn (- )
Rcn Tr 65th In£ Div
261st CT 75th In£ Div (Atchd)
Co C Blst Cml Bn
261st In£ Regt (- )
lst Plat Co C 265th Engr C Bn
869th FA Bn (T)
Co C 365th Med Bn
Cannon Co 261st In£ Regt
318th CT 80th In£ Div (Atchd)
86th CC (Brindle): At 0630 CC Brindle moved down the Autobahn to ROMROD where the
column -met resistance from ground troops and was bombed and strafed. The Combat Command bypassed ROMROD to the north and kept on minor roads to HOMBERG, meeting scattered resistance
along the route. After leaving HOMBERG, resistance increased until at W ABERN all types of small
arms, mortar and artillery fire were received. CT 9 relieved pressure on the right flank and CT 68
came up on the left. A heavy fire fight lasted for several hours.
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Rein£) led the advance on W ABERN and SENNERN. Resistance
became fanatical, but realizing that the only remaining bridge across the now swollen EDER River
was between ZENNERN and NIEDER MOLLRICH the platoon plunged recklessly across. Enemy fire
of all types was concentrated on the column but it drove on in spite of the murderous fire and took
· its toll of enemy personnel, guns and vehicles as it blasted its way into NIEDER MOLLRICH. The
enemy had no opportunity to set off the prepared demolitions on the bridge and it was thus saved.
Other 6th Armd forces continued to pour across the bridge to establish a bridgehead for the attack
on KASSEL. For this gallant action Tr D and its attachments of infantry, engineers and tank destroyers
were given a unit citation.
Composition of Troops:
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co D 68th Tk Bn
Div Arty (Riley): The 128th Armd FA Bn moved from BURKHARDSFELDER to NIEDERBEISHEIM,
closing at 2030. Marching north on the Autobahn, the 212th Armd FA Bn moved via ALSFELDHOMBERG to UNSHAUSEN, after it fired a mission on enemy in ALSFELD. The 231st Armd FA Bn
fired on targests of opportunity at OLRAU. Then it displaced to OBERSHEIM in support of CCB.
Composition of troops:
l28th Armd FA Bn (D / S CCB)
193d FA Gp (Rein£)
212th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCA)
274th Armd FA Bn (D/ S CCA)
231st Armd FA Bn (D / S CCB)
689th FA Bn (155 How Trac j D)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
176th FA Bn (4.5 Gun Trac / D)
Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn
*
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31 March 1945
On this date it became apparent that KASSEL was strongly defended. To capture it would mean
a serious delay for the Div. Therefore, operations of the 6th Armd on 31 March had two objectives.
The first was to attack and capture KASSEL with CCA and use the town as a jump-of£ point for further
advance east. The second, in the event KASSEL proved too strongly defended, was to secure a crossing of the FULDA River, south of KASSEL and generally east of HOMBERG, by-pass KASSEL, and
move the entire Div east. Reconnaissance during the day revealed that all bridges except one on the
FULDA River were destroyed. Over this railroad bridge north of MALSFELD, though it was partially
· ·destroyed, the 86th Cav was eventually routed. It was necessary, however, to select a br.i dge site
and build a bridge for other units. MALFELD was chosen and construction of a bridge was started
during the night of 31 March.
At 1800 the Corps Commander changed the objective from LEIPZIG to WEIMAR, adding a particular mission of capturing Nazi Government Agencies which were believed to have moved to
WEIMAR. The directive did not change the immediate Div plan since, in either case, the initial
objective was MUHLHAUSEN.
l April1945
It was apparent after an all-night fight that it would be impossible to capture KASSEL quickly.
When the bridge at MALSFELD was completed during the morning, the Commanding General of
the 80th Div was notified that no further attack would be made to the north against KASSEL and that
the 6th Armd would move east, crossing the FULDA River at MALSFELD. Whereupon the 80th Div
undertook the capture of KASSEL, moving up the remainder of its forces to reinforce the 318th In£
which had been operating with CCA.
To the east the Div expanded its bridgehead over the FULDA River, passing CCB across the bridge
at MALSFELD and the 86th CC across the railroad bridge just north of MALSFELD. By darkness
the Div bridgehead across the FULDA River extended approximately 6 miles. At 1030 318 J.<CT
reverted to control of the 80th Inf Div.
2 April1945
The 6th Armd completed crossing the FULDA at MALSFELD and resumed its advance east with
CCB on the right and CCA on the left. Advances north met heavy resistance, particularly at HESS
LICHTENAU and QUENTEL which were cleared during the afternoon after heavy fighting. Resistance came from small groups of infantry supported by self-propelled guns and bazooka fire. In a day
marked by the greatest enemy air activity of Div history, all units were subjected to bombing and
strafing attacks. There were 3 raids by about 20 aircraft and many small raids by single planes.
These attacks were directed against forward troop concentrations and artillery, not against rear installations. At the end of the day the Div had a small bridgehead across the WEHRE River near
REICHENSACHSEN. The Div CP opened at FRIEMEN at 1500.

~

3 April 1945
The Div continued its attack east, crossed the WERRA River and its tributary the WEHRE, and
advanced approximately 16 miles against moderate resistance. Because of blown bridges, all traffic
had to be funneled across one bridge just southwest of REICHENSACHSEN and another over the
WERRA River at GROSS BURSCHLA. CCB led the advance northeast. The Div CP opened at ESCHWEGE at 1645.
CCA (Harris): Throughout the day, the Command conducted unsuccessful patrolling for bridge
sites along the WERRA River, particularly in the vicinity of BAD SOODEN, and it was finally decided
to move across bridges at REICHENSACHSEN and GROSS BURSCHLA behind CCB.
CCB (Hanson): Crossed the WEHRE River through its bridgehead near REICHENSACHSEN to
attack east. ESCHWEGE and REICHENSACHSEN were cleared and a large airport on the west side
of ESCHWEGE was captured. CT 44, from its bridgehead across the WEHRE River, attacked and
secured REICHENSACHSEN and ESCHWEGE after moderate resistance. It then pushed east. At
1400 CT 44, assembled in the vicinity of W ANFRIED and reconnoitered for crossings on the WERRA
River. CT 69 drove south, crossing through the infantry bridgehead at REICHENSACHSEN, and
assisted the 44th in clearing ESCHWEGE. Afterwards it moved southeast to a bridge at GROSS
BURSCHLA which had been captured intact by CT 50. From the bridge CT 69 continued north and
east. CT 50 passed through the 44th's bridgehead near REICHENSACHSEN and advanced east
against moderate resistance to the WERRA River. At GROSS BURSCHLA 1t captured a bridge intact
and continued northeast. By nightfall the Command had passed through WENDEHAUSEN and
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DIEDORF and halted 2 miles north of the latter town. By this time CT 69 had closed up behind CT 50
near FAULUNGEN. CT 44, having found no other crossing on the WERRA, passed across the bridge
at GROSS BURSCHLA and advanced east to HEYERODE with Combat Command Headquarters.
Res Comd (Lagrew): Sent forces to guard the river line between WANFRIED and HELDRA.
WANFRIED was captured and cleared by the 2d Bn 261st In£ Regt. Part of the Command remained
in ESCHWEGE to protect Div installations.
86th CC (Brindle): Continued reconnaissance along the WERRA River near BAD SOODEN and
as far north as ELLERSHAUSEN but was unable to secure a crossing on the WERRA River.
Div Arty (Riley): With 193d FA Gp, the Command continued to displace forward and support
the Div."
4 April1945
Having secured a bridge across the WERRA River at GROSS BURSCHLA, the Div continued east
to encircle and enter the city of MUHLHAUSEN. CCB entered the city from the southwest, the south
and southeast; CCA entered the city from the west, the north and northeast. Other elements of CCB
spearheaded east to capture SCHLOTHEIM. In its advance the 6th Armd encountered scattered
enemy resistance consisting of small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire. Enemy air was active but
ineffective throughout the day. Friendly supporting fighter-bombers gave cover and performed
bombing and strafing missions during which 6 enemy aircraft were shot down. The 777th AAA Bn
accounted for 14 enemy aircraft during the operation. At 1910 the Div CP opened at STRUTH.
5 Aprill945
The 6th Armd, after having blocked all exits to the city of MUHLHAUSEN, cleared the city of
enemy resistance by 0905. The 86th CC raced north and northeast to screen the Div's north flank,
and Combat Commands A and B, now holding sectors to the east, prepared to assemble. Res Cqnd
was given the task of maintaining law and order and guarding all installations and supply stores in
MUHLHAUSEN. Corps orders stopped further advance pending arrival of FIRST ARMY troops on
the north flank . They were now 40 to 50 miles to the rear. At 1400 the Div CP opened at MUHLHAUSEN.
CCA (Harris) : Blocked roads leading into MUHLHAUSEN from the north and west and in conjunction with CCB cleared the town. CT 68 advanced from the northwest and west to enter and assist
in the capture of the city. CT 9 entered from the west and CT 15 pushed in from the east, and after
the city was cleared they moved southeast of MUHLHAUSEN to attack and enter the town of LANCENSALZA. Other elements of CGA assembled in the vicinity of GROSSENGOTTERN.
CCB (Hanson): Blocked the main roads leading into MUHLHAUSEN from the south and east
and together with CCA continued the attack to clear the town. CT 44 attacked from the southeast
in force and assisted by CT 50 entered the city from the northwest. All elements of CCB then began
to move to the vicinity of SCHLOTHEIM.
Res Comd (Lagrew): Moved into MUHLHAUSEN and put all utilities, supply installations and
transportation facilities under guard. CTs 50 and 68 were assigned to the Command to assist in the
task of maintaining law and order.
86th CC (Brindle): Maintained its screening mission to the north and cleared KEULA, HOLZTHALEBERN, GROSSBRUCHTER, WEIDERMUTH and EBELEBEN. After clearing the towns along
this line, the Squadron maintained the line with Headquarters at URBACH. Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq
Mecz was with CCA; Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz which was with CCB reverted to Squadron control.
6 April1945
The Div cleared the city of LANCENSALZA, maintained law and order, guarded supplies in
MUHLHAUSEN, and prepared for future operations. Now holding approximately a 38 mile front
north and east of MUHLHAUSEN, the 6th Armd patrolled actively. As a result of operations near
the city, CCA and CCB had been reversed so that the former was now on the right (south) flank. The
Res Comd was reinforced for its task in MUHLHAUSEN while CCA and CCB on the east and the
Cavalry on the north protected the front pending resumption of the advance on Corps order.
Later in the day, orders were received from the Corps to assist the 76th In£ Div in clearing the
area east of BAD SOODEN and north of ESCHWEGE. In view of the extensive front to the east and
north, the only troops available for this mission was Reserve Command; therefore, it was ordered to
move early 7 April. Advantage was to be taken of the favorable ground northwest through DINGELSTADT, after which the Command was to swing south toward ESCHWEGE to clear rough, hilly
country east of BAD SOODEN where a considerable enemy force was holding up the 76th In£ Div
and the 3d Cavalry.
· ·
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7 April1945
Holding a front of approximately 40 miles, the 6th Armd continued to defend the MUHLHAUSEN
area. The Res Comd, consisting of two combat teams, moved northwest in two columns to clear the
area east of BAD SOODEN and north of ESCHWEGE and to make contact with elements of the 76th
In£ Div near RUSTUNGEN. One column passed through DINGELSTADT and on to KEFFERSHAUSEN;
the other passed through KULLSTEDT and on to W ACHSTEDT. Both columns advanced rapidly
against light resistance. Upon reaching KEFFERHAUSEN and KULLSTEDT, however, the Combat
Teams established contact with enemy retreating from the west. Enemy who had been opposing the
76th In£ Div along the WERRA River began withdrawal during the night 6- 7 April in the direction
of MUHLHAUSEN. Before daylight, this enemy force of considerable strength attacked the 3d Battalion, 261st Infantry at STRUTH and threatened to defeat it. Information that 86th CC Trains in
STRUTH were overrun reached Div Hq at 0730. Fortunately the 3d Battalion, 304th Infantry, mounted
in trucks, was on the road just southeast of MUHLHAUSEN. Reinforced by a company combat team
of the 69th Tk Bn, the battalion was rushed west through MUHLHAUSEN to EIGENRIEDEN to attack
northwest, restore the situation at STRUTH, and contact and cooperate with the Res Comd further to
the northwest. This action advanced three columns northwest, all commanded by the Commanding
Officer of Res Comd. The enemy force of about 1,500 troops reinforced by tanks and self-propelled
guns was completely destroyed and the area west and southwest was' later found evacuated. At the
end of the period all elements made contact in the KULLSTEDT-DINGESTADT area. At approximately 1700 the. 86th CC passed to control of CCB.
CCB (Hanson) : Composition of Command:
69th Tk Bn (-Co) (To Div control at 0830)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Cos B, C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
44th Armd In£ Bn (-Co)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 2 Sects)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
At 0830 CT 69, less a company with Res Comd, was ordered to move to the eastern exits of
MUHLHAUSEN in Div Reserve, prepared to operate to the north.
After CT 69 had been released to 6th Armd control, the Combat Command moved CT 44 back to
SCHLOTHEIM and regrouped to cover the Div front to the east and northeast against obviously increasing enemy activity. There were two counterattacks during the morning and both were repulsed.
Res Comd (Lagrew): Composition of Command:
68th Tk Bn
50th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Combat Teams 68 and 50 attacked northwest at 0730. ,CT 68 pushed through AMMERN, following the main road to DINGELSTADT. The column met light opposition until approximately 1015 when
it established contact with enemy at KEFFERHAUSEN, believed withdrawing from the STRUTH area.
The Combat Team was forced to deploy and fight. While thus engaged, enemy troops from the north
er\tered DINGELSTADT and made it necessary for the Combat Team to reenter the town. It engaged
in clearing the town and vicinity until 1800. The 3d Bn 304th In£ Regt Reinforced passed through
KULLSTEDT and continued north to DINGELSTADT where it aided CT 68 in outposting DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN. CT 50 raced through HOLLENBACH, BICKENRIEDE and BUTTSTEDT without opposition, but it met enemy in the vicinity of KULLSTEDT at about 1015. There the
Combat Team received considerable small arms and some anti-tank fire. Many prisoners were taken
and by 1630 the situation was well under control. CT 50 then pushed on to WACHSTEDT. By 1655
the Combat Team had secured the town where it consolidated its positions and prepared to continue
northwest in conjunction with CT 68. The 23lst Armd FA Bn was assigned to the Command and at
2000 was moving into position on Hill 424 southwest of DINGELSTADT.
86th CC (Brindle) : Continued to screen the north flank of the Div zone. Aggressive patrols
reported that the entire front showed increase.d enemy activity and vehicl.).lar movement. Fire was
received from the wooded area north of the Command's sector near HOLTZTHALEBEN. Tr B met
considerable heavy fire at ABTSBESSINGEN. By the end of the period, however, the situation was
well under control and the Squadron continued to hold its line. All elements were prepared to fall
back to the main defense line KEULA- URBACH- SCHLOTHEIM, should it be deemed necessary
in the face of an overwhelming enemy attack.
Div Arty (Riley) : Composition of Command:
128th Armd FA Bn (D / S CCB)
193d FA, Gp (rein£)
212th Armd FA Bn (D/ S CCA)
274th Armd FA Bn (D/ S CCA)
*
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689th FA Bn (155 How Trac /D)
23lst Amrd FA Bn (D /S Res Comd)
176th FA Bn (4.5 Gun Trac/D)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Div Arty reinforced by the 193d FA Gp continued to support the 6th Armd in both its defensive
and offensive operations.
3d Bn 304th Inf Regt, 65th Inf Div Reinf by Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn and Co B 69th Tk Bn:
The Battalion, reinforced by CoB 69th Tk Bn and two Platoons 44th Armd Inf Bn, moved north
from EIGENRIEDEN on the axis EIGENRIEDEN-STRUTH-KULLSTEDT, assisted in the relief of the
3d Bn 26lst Inf Regt which was almost surrounded in STRUTH, and cleared out the enemy along the
axis from STRUTH to KULLSTEDT. At 1800 it pushed in two columns from KULLSTEDT to DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN to clear enemy in this zone. It then outposted the north flank of the Res
Comd north of DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN. The Ba~talion and CoB 69th Tk Bn were
attached .to Res Comd at 1730.
CT 69 (Downs): Under Div control, elements of the Combat Team displaced to the vicinity of
MUHLHAUSEN and went into position to support the Res Comd on short notice. Major Downs, CCB,
S-3, was put in command.
Air Support: The Div was supported by numerous fighter-bomber squadrons from XIX TAC on
missions that destroyed enemy tanks, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and infantry. Communication and control were excellent and all requested targets were dealt with effectively. Continuous
air cover was provided throughout the day.
8 April1945
The 6th Armd front to the east, from south of LANCENSALZA through SCHLOTHEIM to KEULA
west through DINGELSTADT, was held without change except that the 76th and 80th Inf Divs, comlng
up along the southern flank, took over the LANCENSALZA front in the late afternoon. To the west,
Res Comd completed its mission of clearing out the pocket north of ESCHWEGE. By the time contact
had been made with friendly elements northwest of MUHLHAUSEN, the Div front measured 50 miles.
Upon its relief on the right flank, CCA assembled in the LANCENSALZA area.
9 April1945
The mission for Res Comd, based on new orders from Corps, was extended to clear the entire
area up to the WERRA River, if necessary, until contact with the 3d Cav Gp and FIRST ARMY troops
was established. There proved to be no enemy resistance left in this area and contact was made with
elements of the 69th Inf Div near UDER at 1500 and the 3d Cav Gp at approximately 1400. The Command then continued to clear enemy within the zone. Late in the afternoon, Corps orders for continuation of the advance were received. The 6th Armd, placed initially in Corps Reserve, prepared to
pass through the 76th Inf Div after its attack lO April and break resistance on the immediate front.
The Div CP opened at LANCENSALZA at 1115.
lO April 1945

Troops spent the day in preparation for continuation of the exploitation, orders for which were
received from Y.X Corps at 1930. These orders called for the Div to pass through the 76th Div on the
morning of ll April to secure a bridgehead over the ELBE River in the vicinity of DRESDEN, unless
the Russian Army was met first.
ll April1945
The 6th Armd advanced rapidly from its assembly area to pass through the 76th Inf Div in four
columns. By nightfall it had raced east approximately 60 miles against only moderate and spotty
resistance to seize and secure three bridgeheads across the SAALE River. Resistance was mainly
from small groups of infantry attempting to defend some of the towns in the zone; blown bridges somewhat impeded the movement. Many enemy installations were captured. 3,000 Allied prisoners
were liberated and the infamous concentration camp at BUCHENWALD was overrun. The Div CP
opened at BAD SULZA at 2300.
CCA (Harris): Composition of Command:
Det 993d Tdwy Br Co
9th Amrd Inf Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn
15th Tk Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (- 2 Sects)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
*
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The Command advanced east in its zone, encountering only moderate resistance. Small arms
fire was met in towns and villages. In its rapid advance on the southern route CT 9 overran the large
concentration camp at BUCHENWALD where 21,000 political prisoners were being held. It then
continued east to assemble at CAMBURG just west of the SAALE River. CT 15 on the northern route
advanced rapidly against light resistance, captured a bridge at CAMBURG, and established a small
bridgehead on the other side. During its advance a large Allied prisoner oc war camp near BAD
SULZA was liberated. Enemy air was active with numerous attacks, but friendly fighter-bombers,
in addition to assisting the advance, drove off the enemy aircraft.
CCB (Hanson): Composition of Command:
Det 993d Tdwy Br Co
44th Armd In£ Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
69th Tk Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- 2 Sects)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
The Command moved out at 0700 and, passing through the 304th In£ Regt, 76th In£ Div, continued
its rapid advance east against moderate resistance. Many enemy installations were captured and
many Allied prisoners of war were released. CT 69, moving on the south route, pushed rapidly to
the east and secured a road bridge west of KLEONHERINGEN over the SAALE River. By 2200 the
Combat Team had one medium tank and one infantry <;::ompany across the river. CT 44, marching
parallel to CT 69 on the north route, also advanced rapidly east, sweeping through moderate resistance in villages. A bridge across the SAALE at KOSEN was secured and by 2200 the majority of
the Command had crossed the river.
Res Comd (Lagrew): Composition of Command:
50th Armd In£ Bn
603d TD Bn (-)
68th Tk Bn
(Co A atchd 3d Cav Gp)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
?77th AAA Bn (-)
The Command advanced east behind CCA and CCB, protecting Div Tns and the Div flanks.
CT 68 moved behind CCA, CT 50 behind CCB.
86th CC (Brindle): Advanced on the Div left (north) as flank protection.
12 April1945
Having secured three bridgeheads across the SAALE, the Div continued its advance east against
stiffening resistance. House-to-house fighting was reported in several towns. The enemy utilized
anti-aircraft defenses for direct fire. Bridgeheads were secured on the WEISSE-ELSTER River approximately 28 miles to the east. On ~the south, CCA crosssed the bridge at ROSSENDORF while
elements of CCB on the north captured a bridge intact at PEGAU. The Div CP opened at OSTERFELD at 1900.
~

13 April1945

The 6th Armd continued its attack to establish four bridgeheads across the WEISSE-ELSTER.
Stubborn resistance was in the form of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire, small arms and mortar fire.
Four bridgeheads were secured and expanded as all elements of the Div crossed to the eastern side.
In the ZEITZ area resistance was particularly stiff and construction on a bridge was interrupted many
times by direct anti-aircraft fire. Elements already across continued their advance to knock out those
enemy batteries. Under Corps instructions, the 6th Armd was expected to make all possible speed
and to by-pass strong resistance. The area in the vicinity of ZEITZ was heavily defended by large
caliber anti-aricraft batteries which were sited for ground fire and constituted formidable strong
points. The large number of these batteries (about 150 88mm and larger guns were destroyed by
the Div) made them practically mutually supporting with the result that envelopment was impossible.
However, attempts to envelop the ZEITZ defenses by CCB resulted in the Command's swinging well
to the north and entering the FIRST ARMY zone. There was no confusion on this day since FIRST ARMY
troops had not advanced that far, but the delay caused by crossing the river and knocking out enemy
resistance enabled the 9th Armd Div to close on CCB. XX Corps thereupon directed that elements
of the Div in the V Corps zone would come under orders of V Corps (9th Armd Div) . Actually, no
serious confusion resulted, and after penetrating the enemy defenses and destroying them, CCB
advanced rapidly southeast and regained its position in its own zone on 14 April. Thus the Div cleared
not only some 25 miles of FIRST ARMY zone in the vicinity of MUHLHAUSEN but also made a bridgehead north of ZEITZ for the 9th Armd Div which materially assisted its advance.
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All elements in the V Corps zone were subject to V Corps orders until they cleared the zone.
This resulted in direct orders being given CCB and the 86th CC but actually did not alter any plans
and these orders ceased to be effective as soon as the troops returned to the Div zone.
The 6th Armd broke the WEISSE-ELSTER River defense line and continued its attack, advancing
approximately 28 miles. Since resistance was stiff in towns and small villages, a great many were
by-passed as CCB advanced to reach the ZWICK-MULDE River at ROCHLITZ. Other elements of
the Div met heavy resistance in the form of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire used as artillery. At 2100
the Div CP opened at ZEITZ.
CCA (Harris): Attacked at 0700 with CT 15 on the north and CT 9 on the south. Strong resistance consisted chiefly of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire. CT 15 met stiffening resistance along its
route to SPORA and in one locality thirity-five 88mm guns were destroyed. CT 9 encountered heavy
enemy resistance in the vicinity of WILDENBORN but by-passed it to the south to LINDENBERG, then
east to KAYNA before being held up by anti-tank defense. CT 9 swung further south in its endeavor
to by-pass heavy enemy resistance and by nightfall had reached OBER KOSSA where it halted prepared to continue the attack east the following morning.
CCB (Hanson): Moved southeast and then advanced east in its zone, by-passing all heavy resistance. Enemy opposition was mostly in towns which were by-passed. CT 44 began movement southeast at 0500, and by 0900 closed into a combat command assembly area northeast of LUCKA. At
1200 ·the Command drove southeast until it came within the Div zone near LEHMA. It then raced
east on the north (left) flank of the Div zone and reached the ZWICK-MULDE at ROCHLITZ. Advances
were bold and aggressive and during the night, against stubborn resistance, a bridge across the river
at ROCHLITZ was secured by the Command. Infantry and tanks were sent across the river to establish a bridgehead. CT 69 moved southeast at 1000 and met enemy bazooka :teams and small ar~s
fire at LEHMA and WINDISCHLEUBA. CT 69 continued its speedy advance east, passing through
many towns and villages. It then halted for the night near CARSDORF.
Res Comd (Lagrew): CT 50 completed crossing the WEISSE-ESLTER and pushed southeast
through ZEITZ to destroy many enemy anti-aircraft batteries and capture numerous prisoners. When
these.batteries were destroyed, pressure was relieved from the ZEITZ area where the 76th Inf Div had
taken over responsibility. CT 68, finding it impossible for the remainder of its tanks to cross in the
vicinity of ZEITZ, moved southwest to cross the WEISSE-ELSTER near ROSSENDORF. It then advanced northeast as far as WILDEN before nightfall, and established contact with CT 50. CT 68 then
continued its advance to the outskirts of ALTENBURG and waited infantry reinforcement to attack
the city.
86th CC (Brindle): Moved southeast on the left flank of CT 44, complying with instructions from
V Corps under whose control it had temporarily come. Within the 6th Armd zone, it then advanced
along the north route of CCB, maintained contact with the 9th Armd Div, and protected the Div' s left
(north) flank.
15 April 1945
The Div continued its rapid advance east and not only established bridgeheads across the MULDE
river with three combat commands abreast but also seized three bridges across the ZACHOPAU
River east of MITTWEIDA. The 6th Armd stopped at the limiting line established by higher headquarters and opened its CP at ROCHLITZ at 151700.
CCA (Harris): Met heavy resistance north of GROSS RODA, particularly 88mm AA guns, but
after destroying 33 of these flak guns and sideslipping to the south it advanced very rapidly against
light resistance. CT 9 seized a bridge intact across the MULDE River at LUNZENAU and three bridges
across the ZACHOPAU River. When elements of the Combat Team reached LUNZENAU, sirens
were turned on and leading elements plunged through the town to the bridge. The enemy scattered
before them and the bridge was captured intact.
.
CCB (Hanson): Cleared the town of ROCHLITZ and secured a bridgehead across the MULDE
River against heavy anti-aircraft and bazooka fire. Both CT 44 and CT 69 pushed out to the limiting
line.
Res Comd (Lagrew): While waiting for the battalion from the 76th Inf Div to arrive and attack
ALTENBURG, the Res Comd sent patrols into the city where it was learned that practically all enemy
troops had left. The Burgomeister surrendered the city unconditionally and the Command moved
through with no opposition. CT 50 advanced without resistance along the axis: ROSITZ-ALTENBURG-NEUENMORBITZ-PENIG-LUNZENAU-WIEDERAU-THALHEIM, and assembled at 2030
near LAUENHAIN. CT 68 advanced without. resistance from the vicinity of ALTENBURG along the
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general axis: WINDISCHLEUBA-KOHREN-RATHENDF-LUNZENAR-WIEDERAU-THALHEIM
-ERLAU. The Command assembled near ERLAU.
86th CC (Brindle): Troop A on the north flank was to establish contact with the 9th Armd Div
and the troop on the south flank was to establish contact with the 4th Armd Div. Contact was established with the 9th Armd Div near LASTAU.
Div Arty (Riley): Displaced forward and continued to support the 6th Armd advance east.
16 April 1945
The Div, with the exception of outposts on a line generally ALTERGINGSWALDE-HOYERSDORF-REINSDORF supported by Div Arty, was in assembly area. A program of m(lintenance,
rehabilitation, and refitting was started. On the south, elements of the 76th In£ Div took over part
of the Div sector. The 689th FA Bn was relieved of general support of the 6th Armd Div.
Corps orders prohibited advance beyond the MULDE River and directed that the present front
line be held pending arrival of the Russian Army. The front reached by the Div on this date was the
farthest advance made during the campaign and, with limited readjustment as ordered from time to
time by higher authority, remained static until the termination of the war. The 6th Armd had no
further serious combat, the only action being a few shots exchanged oy patrols operating in front of
the line. The principal mission of the Div automatically _became military government which was
initiated informally and became more formal from day to day as it became apparent that military
operations in this zone were terminated.
CCA (Harris): The CP was opened at ZOLINITZ at 1730. CT 9 was relieved by the 1st Bn 304th
In£ Regt at 1510. CT 15 was relieved by the 2d Bn 304th In£ Regt at 1700. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq
Mecz reverted to Squadron control at 1600, after having been relieved by elements of the 304th Inf
Regt at 1515. The Command prepared to reservice and refit.
CCB (Hanson): CT 69 dispatched combat patrols to establish an outpost line and contact was made
with the 417th In£ Regt. CT 44 continued patrolling to the northeast.
Res Comd (Lagrew): The CP was opened at SEELITZ. CT 50 and CT 68 were relieved by the
1st Bn 417th In£ Regt at 1300. CT 50 opened its CP south of KLEIN MILKAU with the Combat Team
in bivouac there. At 1630 a small force was sent to clear the woods north of CARSDORF and by 1915
had completed the operation. CT 68 opened its CP at GROSS STADTEN with the battalion in bivouac
in that general vicinity.
Div Arty (Riley): Hq Div Arty opened its CP at ZSCHOPPELSHAIN at 1730.
86th CC (Brindle): Continued to make contact with the 9th Armd Div and closed in an assembly
area to begin a refitting program.
17 April1945
Having been given a new sector, the Div relieved those elemenl:s of the 76th In£ Div therein. Its
program of Military Government, maintenance, and rehabilitation was continued.
18 April 1945
At 1200 the 6th Armd passed from control of XX Corps to the VIII Corps. Contact was maintained
with the 9th Armd Div on the left flank and the 76th In£ Div on the right flank. The 603d TD Bn, 25th
Armd Engr Bn and 777th AAA Bn reverted to Div control in place. When CCB was ordered to take
over the Div rear area west to the SAALE River in order to maintain law and order, the 603d TD Bn
was later placed under CCB' s control.
19- 23 April1945
The Div maintained its line in the north sector of the VIII Corps zone and continued aggressive
patrolling to its front. Res Comd relieved CCB in place on the front line; CCB moved to the Div rear
area to maintain law and order, opening its CP at ZEITZ. The 6th Armd as a whole carried on an
intensive maintenance program. The CP of Res Comd was at GERINGSWALDE.
The 11th Armd Gp, Hq and Hq Co was attached to the Div and placed in charge of Military
Government in CCB' s and 25th Armd Engr Bn' s sectors.
*
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Composition of Commands:
CCA (Harris)

CCB (Lagrew)

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-)

69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
603d TD Bn

Res Comd (McKee)

Div Arty (Riley)

44th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (- )
25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn (-)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
23lst Armd FA Bn
19lst FA Bn (Atchd)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

24 April 1945
The Div, together with the 2d Inf Div 9-nd the 76th Inf·Div on its flanks, was ordered to withdraw
to positions west of the MULDE River. This movement was in accordance with letter VIII Corps 23
Aprill945. Res Comd ·lost 2 men killed and 5 wounded from a patrol ambushed in HARTHA. Artillery. and tank fire was placed upon the town. The 6th Armd was given a new rear boundary effective
at 1700 with the 7th TD Gp to take over the area west of ALTENBURG. Cub plane and ground patr~ls
continued a determined effort to contact the Russians to the east but were unsuccessful.
t
25-30 April 1~45
The 6th Armd, with the exception of ground and cub plane patrols and bridge guards, withdrew
its forward elements to positions west of the MULDE River. The two shallow bridgeheads left east
of the MULDE River after the general withdrawal to positions west of the MULDE River were maintained in order to protect the Div front and facilitate patrolling. Elements of CCB patrolling from the
new rear bounary west to the SAALE River were being relieved by the 7th TD Gp.
28- 30 APRIL 1945
The Div held defensive positions along the west bank of the MULDE River and in its two bridgeheads east of the MULDE River and patrolled aggressively to the east. At the same time a schedule
of maintenance and rehabilitation was maintained.
1-9 May 1945
The Div held defensive positions along the west bank of MULDE River and in its two bridgeheads
east of the MULDE River. CCA and Res Comd were on the line. CCA in the south part maintained
contact with the 304th In£ Regt, 76th Inf Div, Res Comd in north part maintained contact with the 271st
Inf Regt, 69th Inf Div. CCB IT}aintained law and order in the Div rear area. Div Arty supported the
6th Armd in its defensive mission and sent out air patrols. The 25th Armd Engr Bn remained in
assembly and policed its sector. The 11th Armd Gp continued to be charged with military governmental control.
Contact with the enemy was maintained by aggressive patrolling to the east. Cub planes were
used in close liaison with ground patrols. Minor skirmishes occurred, especially near ERLAU. Both
artillery and assault gun fire were placed on the town.
First contact with Russian forces was made by the CT 50 of Res Comd when one of its patrols met
a Russian patrol from the 117th Russian Div at W ALDHEIM at 062200. Later, elements of the 147th
Russian Inf Div were contacted as they moved south through the Div sector towards PRAGUE.
At 061800 the 6th Armd, under VIII Corps, passed from the FIRST ARMY to operational control ·
of the NINTH ARMY.
Active operations in the European Theatre of Operations ceased at 090001 May 1945 under terms
of unconditional surrender signed by the German High Command. The 6th Armd remained in position and continued its program of rehabilitation, maintenance and military government.
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BALLAD FOR YANKS
by Kenneth McCaleb
When the poet sings of the warrior kings
And the deeds of arms arid man,
Of Macedon's son and Attila the Hun,
Of Caesar and Kubla Khan;
When the martial bard finds it pressing hard
These ancient ones to match,
Let him limn the power of an Eisenhower,
Of Hodges and Patton and Patch.
When the books are writ and the lamps are lit,
And the stories are told again
Of the Lion's Heart and of Bonaparte
And the mad six hundred men,
When they give a cheer for the Iron Peer
Or the boy with the Ghent dispatch,
There are tales as bold which will yet be told
Of Hodges and Patton and Patch.
In the tales they tell of a soldier's hell
In the wars that we fought to be free,
Of the ragged few in Washington's crew,
Of Grant and the Jacksons and Lee,
Of the Alamo and of "Westward ho!"
And Pershing's magnificent batch,
Let Bradley be named on the list of the famedWith Hodges and Patton and Patch.
Sing loud the praise of remembered days,
Of Stalingrad, Tunis and Cannes,
Of Montgomery's gain from El Alamein
And MacArthur's stand at Bataan.
For the big shells whine in the Siegfried Line,
And the boys who started from scratch
Make the Nazi cower before EisenhowerAnd Hodges and Patton and Patch.
In Paris and Rome and the streets at home
And in hearts on land and sea,
Let the song ring out in a rising shout
In the voices of men who are free .
As the Yanks storm in on the road to Berlin,
Shout the song of the Eagle's hatch,
Singing " Long may it wave o'er the home of the brave"
- And o'er Hodges and Patton and Patch.

,
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For Outstanding

PRESIDENTIAL CITATIONS AWARDED DIVISION UNITS
Company B, 68th Tank Battalion
The following citation refers to action at HAN-SUR-NIED, FRANCE, "For extraordinary heroism
in action against the enemy on November 11, 1944" .
"Despite boggy ground that mired their tanks, strong enemy anti-tank fire, a numerically superior
enemy force that fought fiercely to protect its route of escape, the company crossed the swollen NIED
FRANCAISE River on a bridge that was wired for demolition, cut the wires and established a bridgehead.
"By their undaunted courage, dogged determination, and unwavering tenacity and under a
withering hail of fire of every type, they held and enlarged this vital bridgehead through which
troops of the 6th Armored Division poured in their drive to the SAAR River and the GERMAN border.
"The grim determination, outstanding skill and unhesitating courage of the officers and men who
fought through the heaviest of enemy opposition to the successful accomplishment of this vital mission
exemplifies the highest standards of the armed forces of the United States."
Co. A, 44th Armored Infantry Battalion, was also on this mission.

* * *
Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized
This second citation refers to the Cavalry Troop cited for their extraordinary heroism in action
against the enemy in effecting a crossing of the PRUM River at HEILHAUSEN, GERMANY, during the
period from 26-28 February . 1945.
"Braving enemy minefields and icy .waters, Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
Mechanized, captured and held vital ground which led to the successful establishment of a bridgehead on the east bank of the PRUM River.
"With its strength depleted by heavy casualties, the Troop withstood constant and intense artillery
and defeated counterattacks by numerically superior forces .
"For forty hours, the Troop was without food and water and was isolated from friendly forces.
Despite heavy losses and adverse conditions, they held the most advance point in the bridgehead,
enabling other forces to cross the river, secure the bridgehead, build a bridge, and continue the
attack to the RHINE River and CENTRAL GERMANY.
"The gallantry, grim determination and aggressiveness displayed by the officers and enlisted
men of Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized in the face of overwhelming.
odds were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service."

* * *
3rd Platoon Company C, 25th Armored Engineer Battalion
Copy of Citation not available.

t
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COMMENDATIONS OF DIVISION DURING OPERATIONS
To The Commanding General, 6th Armored Division-

18 December 1944

" The 6th Armored Division, on transferring from this Corps, takes with it the respect and admiration of this Corps. The record of your combat service has been in the highest tradition of the Army.
From the arrival of the division in mid-September in the Corps bridgehead over the Meurthe
River, through the initial attacks beyond the Foret de Gremecy and from Leyr to Letricourt, to the
jumpoff for the Corps attack on 8 November, the 6th showed unsurpassed confidence and competence,
and quick and cheerful cooperation under all circumstances. Your brilliant actions at Han sur Nied
and at Lemud-Sorbey in seizing the vital and bitterly contested crossings were followed by the fierce
fighting in the Foret de Puttelange, the capture of Landroff, Hellimer, ·and St Jean Rohrbach, and the
seizure of the Cadenbronn height commanding the Saare River on the German border.
Your achievements have been outstanding, the more so because of the overcoming of weather
and terrain conditions which might well have stopped armored operations completely. I wish to
express to all members of your command my sincere appreciation of the heroic achievements of the
6th Armored Division."
-Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy
Commanding XII Corps

28 February 1945
"I desire to express my appreciation for the fine performance of the officers and men of the 6th
Armored Division during the attack of the III Corps against the south flank of the enemy Ardennes
Salient.
The dogged determination under intelligent leadership displayed by all ranks, particularly
during the critical period of January l-8 in the area east of Bastogne, merits high commendation.
T~ repulse of those repeated furious counterattacks, as a determined enemy attempted tore-isolate
the forces in Bastogne, was responsible in a large measure for the continued success of the Corps
operation."
-Maj. Gen. John Millikin
Commanding III Corps

25 April 1945
"I deeply regret that the exigencies of battle have again removed your splendid Division from
the Third Army.
Much of the glory which the Third Army has achieved has resulted from the gallantry and energy
you and your Division have displayed from Avranches to the Mulde River.
Please express to the officers and men of your command my sincere thanks and appreciation
for their continued gallantry and effectiveness in combat."
-Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Commanding Third Army
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TRAINS
"There's nothing glamorous about changing a final drive
in an M-4 tank," someone once said, and it's true. It is just hard,
tedious, unpraised, necessary work. Doing the glamorless jobs
that keep an armored division on the roll is the mission of Division
.:- . iI
Trains. The work of the service elements of the division, grouped
-I
,.·i
together as the Division Trains, must be done smoothly, efficiently
. ·I
and with a minimum of interruptions, for if Trains should stop
I
working the great, roaring, rampaging armored columns would
.j
. .·l
come to a meek halt.
Col. Elmer Droste, commander, and Maj. Phillip Shoemaker,
Executive officer, were confronted with the problem, during
combat, of giving close support and yet remain far enough back
so as not to require additional combat elements for protection.
One element of the Division Trains, the Division Quartermaster', usually functitoned as an independent command so that
supplies were always available to the combat troops. Lt. Col.
Walter A. Boyle's mobile Division Quartermaster Office with its
stocks, records and attached trucks from the Quartermaster
Truck Company maintained its supply dump between the cliviCOL. ELMER H. DROSTE
sion' s combat elements and the army depots.
Trains Commander
Division Trains Headquarters Company and the Division
(BSCw/ C, Je~on d'HPHleur,
Band, which had laid aside its musical instruments during comrmx e uerre,
bat, reconnoitered for bivouac areas, furnished guards far out of proportion to their strength, and
supplied guides along the route of each advance.
I
The Military Police Platoon, attached to Trains, had its members assigned to combat commands
and other units throughout the division, to traffic control points, and occasionally as bridge guards.
Those men serving in combat commands collected and received prisoners and evacuated them to the
Division Prisoner of War enclosure at Trains where other MP's prepared the PW's for questioning
and guarded them until they could be evacuated. The supervision of these difficult jobs fell to Major
Eugene J. White, Division Provost Marshal.
The remaining elements of Division Trains-the personnel sections, Special Staff sections, Army
Post Office, signal, ordnance, supply and maintenance sections were prepared to function immediately
after entering a bivouac area.

.:..i
.;

ORDNANCE
Whether it's dismantling a 32-ton tank or repairing a delicate watch, it's all in the day's work for
the 128th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion. They have the huge job of keeping the division's 2039
vehicles and hundreds of trailers in ship-shape running order. In addition, they keep in repair and
adjustment the division's thousands of carbines and rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns,
tank guns and artillery pieces,
including other assorted weapons
in the division. They top this off
with watch repairing, fixing
stoves, modifying tanks and other
vehicles, repairing fire control
optical instruments and ordering,
issuing and installing astronomical amounts of spare parts.
During the division's rushing
breakthrough in France, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Germany, the
l28th Ordnance worked under
terrible handicaps of time, often
setting up in open fields in deep
mud and snow, but the work went
on and the fighting equipment was
delivered to the front in time.
*
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Even under fire the ordnance men had to work with exacting measurements and nothing left their
hands until it was perfect.
When the 6th Armored crossed the Rhine and fanned out for its spectacular push that didn't
stop until it met the Russians, ordnance followed as closely as it could, repairing tanks and equipment
on the side of the road, in fields, under any condition~.
During more than nine months of coropat, the 128th repaired 2,375 tanks and other armored
vehicles and 2,086 general purpose vehicles, including trailers. During that time more than 5,297
tons of spare parts were handled and issued.
Lt. Col. Raymond B. Graeves is the battalion commander.

SIGNAL
Two men grope in the darkness, not daring to show a light,
trying to find the broken ends of a black, muddy wire beside
a road.
"Damn those tanks; why don't they stay on the road?"
When you hear that brief, but to the point statement, you
know that the 146th Armored Signal Company is on the job,
following the fast-rolling tank columns as they link combat command communications to the nerve centers of the division.
Bustlil)g peeps, trailing wire from spinning reels, going up
virgin roads without benefit of reassuring "Roads and Shoulders
Clear of Mines" signs; harrassed, tired switchboard operators
struggling with scrambled boards with too many lines; message
center men running the wheels off their peeps to deliver the
goods; CW radio men hunched over their keys, pounding out
messages throughout the night- all are part of the 146th Armored Signal Company that gets the messages through.
The signal company had its fingers in every part of the division. The line crews laid and maintained over 1,400 miles of field
LT. COL. WILLIAM I. GIVEN
wire and rehabilitated and put into use for the division several
Divisi on Sig n al Officer
times that many more miles of open wire. Over these lines the
(BS w/ C)
switchboard operators handled an average of 1,500 calls daily
while the teletype operators hammered away to compile a monthly average of 374 messages cleared.
Among the most-traveled men in Europe, messengers of the division message center handled
73,743 messages through Division Forward and Rear message centers during the first four months of
1945. It is estimated that to handle the full total of 152,340 messages, fourteen peeps traveled a total
of 208,544 miles, an average of 2,128 miles per vehicle per month in servicing the division.
Radio Maintenance section repaired a total of 5,005 items of radio equipment during operations.
L
The Radio Platoon, trained and used as radio operators, compose the largest section in the 146th
Armored Signal Company. It was due to the work of these men that communications remained uninterrupted on the fast moves which were made by the 6th Armored Division. Radio sets and crews
were dispatched to operate for the higher echelons of command within the division, staying with the
commands to insure that communications were maintained.
Patient, skilled, persistent radio operators have given the radio nets of the division a magnificent
record in clearing radio traffic. Often the total per radio set passed the hundred mark for messages
enciphered, sent, decoded and delivered in one day.
Company commander of the 146th Signal is Captain Thomas E. Fisher. The Division Signal
Officer is Lt. Col. William J. Given.

ENGINEERS
Most versatile troops of the 6th Armored Division are the men of the 25th Armored Engineer
battalion. They build the bridges, clear minefields, maintain roads, demolish pillboxes, provide
drinking water for the division and even fight as infantrymen .
Commanded by Lt. Col. Donald G. Williams, the 25th Engineers operate in combat with the three
combat commands, ordinarily with one company assigned to both Combat Command A and Combat
Command B, with the rest of the battalion with Reserve Command.
During the fighting in Europe, the engineers made history, constructing 52 treadway bridges
with a total footage of 2,070 feet. The Battalion constructed two Bailey bridges of 60 and 160 feet
respective ly, and many hundreds of feet of timber, foot, and suspension bridges; 42 c ulverts, and 58
fords.
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In the Division's dash across the
continent, the 25th cleared 110
major road blocks, repaired 154
major road craters, and constructeel qlO feet of corduroy road.
Mine sweeping was another
slow, non-glamorous job . In
France, the 25th swept 221 miles
of roads; in Belgium, 113; in Luxembourg, 87; and Germany, 128,
totaling 549 miles.
On demolitions, mines and
booby traps, the Engineers were
experts. Here is their record on
this subject: 110 demolition charges removed from bridges or culverts; 15 friendly mine fields laid;
815 friendly mines laid; 95 enemy
mine fields discovered; 2,108
enemy mines removed ; 650
friendly booby traps set; and 152
enemy booby traps neutralized.
This work represents major tasks done by the Engineers. The Division Engineer troops did only that
work necessary to insure the advance of the combat elements and to assure resupply, leaving all otlter
tasks to Corps or Army Engineers. Most work on bridging, obstacle reduction and mine sweepihg
necessary to permit the advance of the division was done under enemy fire, often at night, and frequently under extremely adverse weather conditions.
Maintaining muddy, overworked roads kept engineer crews and bulldozers busy in every part
of the division area. Through their efforts the main supply route and important arteries were kept
open at all times. Many obstacles were brushed aside or by-passed by tank and infantry elements
to be reduced later by engineers. Anti-tank ditches ·were crossed and road blocks removed by tank
dozers with the tank battalions. Units laid hasty minefields and booby traps for their own security.
When the combat teams were stopped by obstacles, engineers were always on the job to get them
moving again.
·

THE MEDICS
Whenever the 6th Armored
Division stuck its nose arrogantly
into more than it could handle
with safety, the sound of "Medics!
Medics!" could be heard.
Tankers sounded that cry when
an 88 crashed through their armor . When mortars or machine
guns caught an infantryman, E;ngineer or artilleryman, it was
"Medics! Medics! ".
Trained enlisted men or medical officers ran to the vehicle,
ditch or foxhole from which the
cry came . Out of special pouches
on each hip they pulled life -saving, pain relieving supplies;tourniquets, bandages, morphine.
As the noises of battle blared all
around, they stopped the bleeding, splintered the fractures, eased the pain. Gently they lifted the wounded men onto litters and into
ambulances attached to each column. The ambulances speedily carried the wounded back to the
76th Medical Battalion, Armored, and the 76th took them farther to evacuation hospitals.
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Sometimes, through France and Germany, the advance was so fast that ambulances of the 76th
could not start back immediately to hospitals and they became a rolling hospital on the road. Plasma
bottles swung from the tops of ambulances, pouring life-giving fluid into the veins of the wounded.
At the first opportunity the ambulances raced to the rear, drivers making round trips totaling scores
of miles.
Artillery boomed and screamed around the vehicles marked with the Red Cross, rattling shrapnel
through surgical trucks and ambulances. Yet the casualties had their wounds bound and the ambulances and the peeps fitted with the new type stretcher bearers rolled back on their life-saving journeys.
In some sections that were exposed to enemy observation and artillery fire, ambulances could not
make the trip by day, but carried their wounded at night, churning steadily back to the 76th clearing
stations. Here the men were treated and their pain eased. At Bastogne, the men with trench foot had
their shoes cut off their purplish, swollen feet. A few minutes later they were on the move again,
rolling back in ambulances to the comfort of an evacuation hospital.
Medical service was always adequate, and was improved when the Battalion commander, Major
Leonard E. Rothman and Division Surgeon, Lt. Col. Roosevelt Carafelli, established a holding company
which reduced the strain on higher echelons of evacuation. This policy resulted in many men being
returned to duty much more quickly when they were so badly needed . .
Dentists of the Battalion extracted 1,305 teeth, and filled 5,262, . during operations.
From July, when the division landed in France, until V-E Day, the 76th Medical Battalion evacuated 10,325 patients, battle and non-battle casualties, including many wounded Germans.

CUBS AND ARTILLERY OBSERVERS
Forward observers on the ground and Cub pilots and observers in the air work together as eyes
of the artillery. From those on the ground and those who fly the division's 8 planes comes the information that sends the division's artillery crashing down on the enemy, clearing the way for the
tankers and infantrymen.
Although the Cub pilots wear wings, and received their basic flying training from the Air Corps,
they are first, last and always artillerymen. When aerial observers are not available the Cub pilots
take off in their tiny planes to act as both pilot and observer. Utterly without protection, the pilots
and observers are at the mercy of enemy small arms, and when they are attacked by enemy planes,
their only hope is to outfly them. Often, they do, but four planes were destroyed during operations.
Flying column cover for the speeding combat commands is one of their big jobs and often they
have spotted strong enemy positions and reported them in time for the column to bypass or better
prepare to attack the position. Often the Cubs spot and destroy targets before the tankers and infantrymen ever see them, and upon one occasion the capture of several enemy soldiers was accomplished
by observers pelting the troops with hand grenades from the planes, and upon their signals of surrender being guided back to friendly
trr,ops, has been reported.
' The forward observers on the
ground are always in front. Sometimes they operate from tanks or
peeps in the lead platoon. Sometimes they go forward on foot and
relay commands back, but they
are always with the lead troops.
The forward observer must always know exactly where he is at
all times on his map. On him
rests the terrible responsibility of
firing within a few hundred yards
of his own tro0ps and even a
small mistake could mean the
death of his own men.
The tankers and infantrymen
of the 6th Armored could always
find their artillery observer in the
front lines when the going was
toughest.
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THE END OF THE R~:a~~
At the end of the war in Europe, the 6th Armored Division moved from the line held on 8 May,
1945, in the ROCHLITZ, GERMANY area, and pulled back into the state of THURINGIA, with Division
Headquarters established in APOLDA. In the surrounding area troops assumed army of occupation
and military government duties, remaining in the sector throughout the month of June, 1945, where
the following duties were performed under the direction of Major Royce S. Weisenberger, established
as AC of S, G-5, of the Division after hostilities ceased; posting of 21,694 proclamations, laws, and
notices; cared for 96,698 displaced persons; and established 4 hospitals. Division troops governed
more than 1,100,685 German civilians up to 15 June, and established military government in 1,803
places.
1 July 1945 saw the Division on the move west again, and Russian troops moved into the territory
that was vacated. In the new area South of FRANKFURT, Division Headquarters was established at
GROSSOSTHEIM, with the units of the Division scattered over an area that placed another million
Germans under their control.
The 6th Armored Division had been placed in category IV, for demobilization, and assigned as
a vehicle for returning men who had Army Adjusted Service Rating Scores of 85 points to the United
States. This caused several thousand of the original troops of the Division to be transferred to the 2nd
and 3rd Armored, and 28th and 71st Infantry Divisions for return to the United States at a later date.
During this period the Commanding General, Major General Robert W. Grow, had been placed in
command of the 3rd Armored Division. Troops with high point scores replaced Division troops transferred.
Preceeded by some units of the Division, the Division Headquarters ceased operation as a whole
and moved from the occupation zone on 1 September 1945. Three days later troops closed into the
Staging Area known as Camp Philip Morris in the LE HAVRE, FRANCE area, where final processibg
was performed for return to the United States.
On 9 September Division Headquarters, followed by a steady stream of Division troops, sailed
from LE HAVRE, FRANCE, arriving in NEW YORK Harbor on 17 September and proceeding to
CAMP SHANKS, where the Division had sailed from 19 months before. Other units of the Division
landed at BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, and NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.
From these ports, Division Troops proceeded to Separation Centers throughout the United States
for discharge from the Armed Forces.
On 18 September, 1945, at CAMP SHANKS, N. Y. Brigadier General George W . Read Jr. and the
Division Staff turned over to the camp quartermaster the Division records, its flags, and the battle
standards and pennants it carried in its battles from BREST through GERMANY, and with the completion of the deactivation procedure, the 6th Armored Division ceased to exist-three years, seven
months, and three days after it was activated at FORT KNOX, KY. It was the first category IV division
to be deactivated in a debarkation camp in World War II.
The show had closed. The actors went their separate ways .
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